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"Life is not what one lived, but what one remembers and how one 
remembers it in order to recount it."  
 
Gabriel Garcia Marquez  




The structure of life-story narratives and their component chapters is of central 
importance to the cognitive representations and communication of autobiographical memory.  
While evidence points to the hierarchical role of chapters in autobiographical summations 
and abstractions of periods of time, and life-time periods feature as a fundamental 
characteristic of the most prominent model of autobiographical memory, few researchers 
have attempted to examine their existence as unique units of representation, and their impact 
on the recall of episodic events.  The present thesis sets out to establish the nature of life-
stories using established methods for life-story narrative and chapter elucidation and a novel 
paradigm for examining memory recall from within chapters.   It does so by contrasting the 
impact of life story chapters for people with depression against non-depressed groups, and in 
doing so finds evidence for chapters acting as affective schema for autobiographical periods, 
and access to episodic events, with an overall raised access for incongruent event 
representations.  The findings of this thesis also indicate that narrative disorder in depression 
is not reliably present (Studies one and two) and that chapters, while more negative in tone 
(Studies two and three), may not be structurally different for dysphoric narratives compared 
to control groups (Study two).  The schematic role of chapters in the recall of episodic 
memories, indicates a tendency in depression to display a negative bias in dissonance 
reduction between negative chapters and positive events (Study four).    
This thesis provides evidence that depression is linked to a negative bias in the higher-
order chapter level of autobiographical memory, and that due to dissonance reduction 
processes, and the rehearsal of affectively congruent event-based representations, people with 
depression may have reduced access to positive material which would be used in mood repair 
and the creation of positive variation to their life-stories by drawing on specific events. 
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 Chapter 1   Autobiographical memory and Chapter 1
life-stories 
 
 1.1  Autobiographical memory 1.1
This thesis focusses on the influence autobiographical life-story structures have on the 
recall of autobiographical memories.  Further to this, it examines how depression impacts on 
these effects.   This literature review comprises two chapters, the first giving an overview of 
our current understandings of the autobiographical memory system.  It goes on to link the 
autobiographical memory system with the concept of the life-story schema, and how 
component life-story chapters could influence recall of specific, event-based memories.  In 
the second introductory chapter theory and research will be examined which provides 
evidence for how depresso-typic self-schema in the form of life stories could impact on 
autobiographical memory.   
Since the early explorations of learning and forgetting by Ebbinghaus (1885) 
autobiographical memory has undergone periods of examination and argument in terms of 
definitions, phenomena, structure and function.  Early researchers included Galton, (1883) 
who carefully described and categorised his own memory experiences, and developed a 
standard protocol for memory cueing. But also Freud who used naturalistic observation and 
theory-building to infer memory processes, in particular the process of repression and 
intentional forgetting of events to reduce anxiety and distress (Tambling, 2012).   In 1972 
Endel Tulving significantly progressed the understanding and definitions of autobiographical 
processes by coining the terms ‘episodic’ memory (to denote memories representing specific 
experiences which had occurred to the person) and ‘semantic’ memory (facts which are 
remembered independent of the origin of learning or experience) to represent the two forms 
of declarative memory i.e. autobiographical information that can be brought to conscious 
awareness.  Episodic memory is by definition autobiographical, being memories of events 
which happened to the person, but while semantic memory may be information based, it can 
also involve information pertaining to the self and therefore may also be autobiographical.  




phenomena, associated with episodic memory, of consciously re-experiencing events on 
recall (Tulving, 1985), the feeling of being there which is associated with sensory detail and 
the ability to ‘remember’ rather than simply ‘know’ an event has occurred (Rajaram, 1993).  
These early distinctions are still influential in deciding the manner in which autobiographical 
memory is researched, and to some extent have resulted in memory types being categorised 
in ways which underplays the overlap and links between them.  For example any particular 
memory can involve a range of representations, affective, and semantic links, this is never 
more apparent than when examining autobiographical memory representations which 
comprise the consciously available, semantic, and episodic memory relating to the self. 
1.1.1 Functions of autobiographical memory 
The functions of autobiographical memory have been explained by a range of 
different models, each giving explanations for the ability to recall, (with varying levels of 
detail), past events and information about the self.  These are proposed to include, directive 
functions e.g. problem solving, where memory serves to inform on how situations have been 
dealt with in the past (Bluck, 2003; Vandermorris, Sheldon, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2013), 
social functions, e.g. retention of knowledge of social situations and relationships, and the use 
of descriptions of personal experience to connect with others (Bluck, 2003), and identity 
functions e.g. maintaining an ongoing sense of self (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004; 
Conway, 2005; Cox & Barnier, 2013; Prebble, Addis, & Tippett, 2013), a final fourth 
function was proposed by Williams, Conway and Cohen (2008) who highlighted the adaptive 
function of memories in maintaining or adjusting mood, by recalling pleasant events, or by 





Table 1.1: Key terms in autobiographical memory 
Theme Term Definition  
Autobiographical 
memory 
Semantic Memory for knowledge or facts which may be 
independent of context 
Episodic Memories for specific one-off events, usually containing 




Working self The theoretical structure which guides memory access 
according to current goals, maintaining coherence by 
modulating access to episodic memories, and impacting 
on encoding and consolidation of event-memories 
Conceptual self The theoretical structure which guides memory access 
according to beliefs of self and identity 
Life-time periods Theoretical clusters of autobiographical memory, 
including semantic information, general and extended 
events, and episodic memories 
General events Categorical and repeated events which may have 
overarching scripts for what occurs 
Extended events Memory for periods lasting longer than 24 hours which 
are interconnected by common themes or information 
e.g. writing a dissertation 
Episodic memories Sensory-perceptual, often visual, with autonoetic 
characteristics, representations of specific, single 
autobiographical events 
Retrieval processes Generative Episodic memory recall resulted from a cueing event.  
Thought to be a progression through general to specific 
representations  
Direct Spontaneous or cued recall which accesses event 
episodic knowledge without progressing through stages 
of increasing specificity 
 
This table provides definitions of the key terms introduced in this thesis and used in autobiographical memory research 
1.1.2 Models of autobiographical memory 
Theoretical models of the autobiographical memory system include the Self-Memory 
System (SMS) first outlined by Conway & Pleydell-Pearce (2000), and the Basic-Systems 
Model (Rubin, 2006). The SMS is widely accepted in the literature, and theoretically useful 
in that it accounts for variability in the recall of memories depending on current goals and 
self-identity (Conway, 2005); memory deficits of people experiencing mental health 
problems (Hermans, Defranc, Raes, Williams, & Eelen , 2005; Williams, Barnhofer, Crane, 
Hermann, Raes, et al, 2007); and the role of narrative accounts and narrative identity as both 




Berry, & Oost, 2013).  The SMS provides many of the descriptive terms used in 
autobiographical memory theory and research found in Table 1.1. The BSM provides a 
systematic explanation for the functioning of the autobiographical memory system based on 
established cognitive systems, i.e. unlike the SMS it does not require a separate 
representational system within memory, but proposes that a narrative ‘self-schema’ which is 
built around established links between information systems provides structure to the system, 
and hence is reliant to a greater extent on the ability to form an ongoing narrative identity. 
The self-memory system (SMS) proposed by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) is a 
theoretical structure composed of tempero-linear, hierarchically-structured autobiographical 
knowledge base, working self, and the conceptual-self.   The autobiographical knowledge 
base contains collections of abstracted self-knowledge which incorporate autobiographical 
memories along with social knowledge, and schema for typical events.  The working-self is a 
goal-directed construct which allows the prioritisation of information relating to current 
needs and motivations.  The conceptual-self is a model of current self-perceptions, and is 
thought to bias recall in favour information that does not challenge this (Conway, 2005; 
Hudson & Grysman, 2011; Moulin & Rathbone, 2014).  The recall of information from the 
SMS is thus goal-focussed in that the current priorities are favoured for access, and self-
continuous in that it favours access to material which is congruent with self-perception.  It 
has been proposed that the SMS does this through a dissonance reduction process with the 
subconscious decreasing access of memories which do not concord with self-image and goal, 
or distorting the memories of events in order to maintain coherence (Conway, 2005; 
Pasupathi & Oldroyd, 2015). 
The structure of the SMS knowledge base clusters information according to: i) 
lifetime periods, which contain information about personal activities, situations and goals at 
specific times of life, for example, ‘my doctoral studies’; ii) general events which are 
categorical and repeated events which may have overarching scripts for what occurs 
(Barsalou, 1988), for example, ‘going to the beach’, iii) extended events (Burt, Kemp, & 
Conway, 2003; Haque and Conway, 2001) which comprise sequenced events, such as ‘my 
holiday in France’ which are shorter, and potentially less significant, than life-time periods, 
and iv) specific events which are short and phenomenologically-rich cognitive experiences, 
for example, ‘when I climbed the Eiffel tower’ (Rubin, 1982; Schooler & Herman, 1992).  




system from the autobiographical knowledge base because of the functional separation shown 
in cognitive deficits such as semantic dementia (Hodges & Graham, 2001).  Overall, 
therefore, the SMS exists as a largely semantic information base but gives access to event 
specific knowledge in the form of episodic memories, which are sensory-perceptual, and 
usually visual in nature (Brewer & Rubin, 1996).   
This clustered, or hierarchical, nature of memory representation has been explored 
both in terms of generative retrieval from the recall of general to specific events, and event 
‘tagging’ and its priming effect.  Haque and Conway (2001) examined the stages of 
generative retrieval, where participants were ‘paused’ at different stages of recall, and asked 
to describe their cognitive experience in order to explore the temporal process of cued recall.  
During generative retrieval (as opposed to direct retrieval), there was a clear progression from 
a general event level to the location of specific events supporting a progressive sampling 
model. The theoretical hierarchy within the SMS incorporates ‘vertical’ links between life-
time periods and episodic memories and has been explored using the concept of ‘tagging’ or 
categorisation of episodic memories according to life-time periods, including studies which 
require participant judgements of temporal position of events (Skowronski, Ritchie, Walker, 
Betz, Sedikides, et al, 2007), the temporal sequencing of recall of specific memories (Burt, 
Kemp, & Conway, 2003; Betz & Skowronski, 1997), and the impact of priming cues on 
recall (Ball & Hennessey, 2009)    
Temporality judgments for when events occurred is facilitated by priming with 
information on lifetime periods suggesting that contextual information is closely tied with 
specific episodic memories.  Skowronski and colleagues (2007) used the concept of ‘life-era’ 
to explore the ability to judge the temporal sequence of specific event memories which had 
been recorded over five and a quarter years by 39 undergraduate students.  Life–eras included 
semesters of education and summer breaks, so could be considered ‘extended events’ within 
the SMS.  They found that participants took significantly longer to judge the temporal order 
of events from within era than those from adjacent eras, independent of the actual time 
between the events.  This suggests that event memories have a ‘tag’ which places them within 
life-time periods, and that it is this tagging which facilitates temporal judgements.  What this 
also suggests is that lifetime period creation is, at least partially, guided by socio-cultural 




A number of other studies examining retrospective categorisation of memories 
indicate that a hierarchical thematic structure is used to order events.  In their diary study 
Burt and colleagues (2003) gave participants the experimental task of categorising memories 
drawn from diary records of a three-month period, or visual images of ‘events’ during the 
same period.  Their results indicate that both for memories and for visual images of events, 
clusters of instances were ordered by theme, rather than simply temporality and ‘events’ were 
more likely to span more than one day. What this suggests is that episodic memories, which 
are single events of less than 24 hours, are not the key to cognitive ordering of 
autobiographical events, and that even interpretations of single events do not tend to map to 
single episodic memories, but may rather contain a ‘set’ of images and experiences. 
Evidence for the structural role of both life-time periods and general events in 
estimating personal age of specific childhood memories was also seen in a study which asked 
participants about their inferential strategies on estimating their own age during childhood 
events (Arbruthnott & Brown, 2009).  On examination of the inference strategies reported by 
31 participants for both the primary and secondary mention of what information was being 
used 52.6% of primary reports used a mix of landmark events and life-time periods, 25.9% 
used general events, while subsequent information was drawn more from event-specific 
knowledge (54.6%).  This indicates that life time periods are favoured as important markers, 
or tagging information for childhood memories, rather than the use of general events, and are 
often used as the point of entry in to the autobiographical memory store (as was suggested by 
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) in the SMS).  In support of hierarchical priming a study 
by Conway and Bekerian (1987) used life-time periods, and life-history events defined by 
undergraduate participants to prime memories cued by activity, action and object cues.  
Memories were recalled under primed and non-primed conditions and results indicate that 
priming with personally defined periods significantly shortened recall time.  Similarly, Mace 
and Clevinger (2013) compared performance of memory recall using life-time period cues, 
their results indicate that cued recall of memories for a particular period acts to prime other 
memories from this period in free recall tasks.  This shows that memories for particular life-
time periods mutually activate memories from the same life-time period, i.e. horizontal 
priming.    
Evidence for the categorisation of memories in to life-time periods has thus been 




horizontal priming (memories from a single life-time period prime memories from the same 
period).   Supporting the structural hierarchy proposed for the SMS, however these results 
can also be explained by another, somewhat less well-known model of autobiographical 
memory. 
In contrast to the internally fixed model of the SMS, where variability of recall is 
attributed to processes influenced by self-concept and current goals, but that a temporally 
stable hierarchical structure frames information, the Basic Systems Model (BSM) (Rubin, 
2006) explains autobiographical retrieval as being an essentially constructive processes, and 
representation of past events as more fluid than the SMS.  This model proposes that 
associations between pre-existing information systems allow the creation and recreation of 
autobiographical memory experiences without calling for a memory store, and that memories 
are created in situ as a result of associations rather than fixed links.  The BSM also provides 
explanations for memory experiences in emotional disorders (Rubin, Dennis, & Beckman, 
2011; St Jacques, Botzung, Miles, & Rubin, 2011), and the impact of motivational states and 
goal-directed behaviour (Rubin, Schrauf & Greenberg, 2003).   
In essence, Rubin proposes that autobiographical memory is enabled by three 
neurological systems, the hippocampus which facilitates the binding of information from the 
event itself, which will ultimately be recalled; the amygdalic system which co-ordinates the 
binding and re-binding of information as a result of the emotional content, and the frontal 
cortex which, in response to cues, will lead the search and retrieval process, and locate 
components relevant to the task while simultaneously inhibiting others (Moscovitch & Melo, 
1997; St Jacques, et al, 2011).  Once retrieved the visual areas of the frontal cortex may 
maintain and elaborate memories which can then be experienced as episodic memories.  Thus 
different information, or ‘kinds of memory’ will be retrieved depending on cues and 
motivational state.   
While in its early stages of development, this explanatory model functionally 
separates the encoding of memories (an area somewhat neglected by the SMS) with the 
process of reconstructive recall, which allows changes to occur in the related elements of a 
memory experience.  Rubin proposes that each autobiographic memory is composed of 
elements of information, including systems which support olfaction, spatial imagery, 




of these systems can be considered ‘stand alone; in that they have neural substrates, 
processes, structures and characteristic schemata.   
The Basic Systems Model allows for the construction of different autobiographical-
like experiences, including future imagining, false-memories and intrusive or ‘flashback’ 
memories.  It also presents the ‘self’ as a fluid system related to the available information.  In 
contrast the Self-Memory System (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), presents 
autobiographical memory as a more coherent structure, with a fluidity of self-knowledge 
being reliant on current goal-directed demand, and suggests that links between the 
information comprising memories are stable.   
The BSM requires no fixed hierarchical structure to enable recall, and thus does away 
with the requirement of memories to be theoretically categorised, for example in to semantic, 
general, and specific.  The role of temporally structured narratives are considered by Rubin to 
provide a key schema through which information is linked to create a sense of self-identity.  
This difference, that the SMS suggests an indirect role of narrative in memory re-
construction, for example through its role in narrative identity, while the BSM allows for 
direct influence of narrative schema in the creation of system-links and reconsolidation 
processes, underlies the perceived role of culture and society, and interactions with others in 
autobiographical memory. 
To some extent rehearsal is predicted by both models to impact on subsequent recall.  
In the BSM rehearsal can increase activation of memory components associated with recall, 
and also therefore other memories with overlapping components e.g. those with associated 
narratives, similar sensory details, or contextual information.  The SMS would predict that 
memory recall would raise the availability of memories with overlapping information, but 
that this would be influenced by the SMS structure itself, for example, the life-time period in 
which the memory is recalled might be overall, raised in activity, and this would account for 
the results of life-period priming research.  Ultimately, however, this does not preclude a 
similar pattern of activation in the BSM, but a difference would be seen in the relative 
influence of other system factors, such as valence, becoming the ‘common feature’ 
influencing activation. 
Whichever model best represents autobiographical memory, it is a dynamic system 




encoding events are attended to differently according to personal relevance (Klien & Loftus, 
1988; Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977), they then enter the long term memory for reasons of 
importance (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006), and emotionality (Talarico, La Bar, & Rubin, 2004).  
The formation of links between memory representations which are thematically similar 
events occurs through categorisation and semantisization.  Linking patterns within the 
autobiographical memory base may be based on temporality i.e. the events occurred at a 
similar time in a person’s life (Mace & Clevinger, 2013; Mace, Clevinger, & Bernas, 2013), 
or due to similarity in event e.g. job interviews, or emotional content (Berntsen & Rubin, 
2012).  Over time autobiographical memory shifts, usually within a fairly short time-frame, 
from details of specific experiences, including sensory details, to more semantic and 
knowledge based information (Conway, Gardiner, Perfect, Anderson & Cohen, 1997; 
Robinson & Swanson, 1993).  Ultimately resulting in cognitive representations in the form of 
both semantic and episodic knowledge (Piolino, et al, 2009; Westmacott & Moscovitch, 
2003).  As a result the ease at which episodic events are accessed, or come to mind, depends 
on the event recency (Rubin, 1982), the importance to self (Ritchie, Skowronski, Wood, 
Walker, Vogl, & Gibbons, 2006), uniqueness (Winograd & Neisser, 2006), and also 
emotionality (Reisberg & Heuer, 2006).   Once established within long-term memory the 
forgetting process too is not standardised in terms of time taken to forget, for example, events 
experienced between the ages of 15-30 are better remembered, resulting in a ‘reminiscence-
bump’ (Jansari & Parking, 1996).    
One of the key aspects in the maintenance of episodic details of autobiographical 
memory is rehearsal.  Memory rehearsal is the repeated access of memory details over time, 
at a conscious level it can occur through social (through discourse and narrative) or private 
(contemplation or rumination) ‘going over’ of events.  Vogl, Ritchie, Walker, Collins, and 
Skowronski (2009) suggested that there are five types of memory rehearsal which serve 
different functions and that these also differ depending on whether they are of negative or 
positive events.  These rehearsal types are involuntary recall; maintenance of details; to re-
experience emotion; for social communication and to create meaning or understand the event. 
Rehearsal of events also has a differential impact on event memories, with internal rehearsal 
and rumination generally found to enhance phenomenological details, while external 
rehearsal in the form of narrative communication and repeated experiencing of similar events 
increases semanticization (Nadel, Campbell & Ryan, 2007; Rubin & Kozin, 1984).  The 




example, negative memories may be rehearsed by healthy individuals to act as instructions 
for avoiding similar situations (Berntsen et al, 2011; Bluck, 2003; Pillemer, 1998, 2003) or as 
reference for future goals (Csikszentmihalkyi and Beattie, 1979), while positive event 
memories may serve to improve mood (Gilliahn, Kesslet, & Farah, 2007; Rusting & DeHart, 
2000) 
1.1.3 Experimental autobiographical recall methods 
The methods by which autobiographical memories are examined can inform the 
development of theoretical memory systems, in particular the propensity to focus on discrete 
units of memory, such as episodic events.  Research in to autobiographical memory recall 
began to be carried out by Galton, who used word cuing techniques (Galton, 1883) to induce 
the production of his own, and other peoples’ autobiographical event recall.  In response to a 
single cue word an individual may recall any combination of personal information such as: 
specific events, autobiographical facts, generic personal memories, semantic memories, and 
sensory information (Brewer, & Rubin, 1996) but Galton began a tradition of assuming recall 
of specific events as being an indicator of ‘true’ past experiences.  These units have lent 
themselves to researchers as they endow a binary system with which to judge memory 
representation, i.e. an event is recalled, or not recalled under specific circumstances. 
As a measure of event access and availability traditionally researchers have timed 
recall of episodic memories, and used this as an objective judgement of accessibility 
(Thompson, 1996), but alternatives to timed recall have been used e.g. the sentence 
completion task (Raes, Hermanns, Williams, & Eelen, 2007), and participant reports of 
difficulty of recall are also a reliable measure of accessibility (Ritchie, Skowronski, Walker, 
& Wood, 2006).  Each of these methods works on the assumption that a recall goal is the 
crystalisation, in the mind’s eye, of an image or coherent piece of information which 
constitutes a single memory, representative of a single event, entering conscious awareness.   
The process of accessing episodic autobiographical information may be either generative, in 
that the cue is considered and information is retrieved with increasing accuracy until 
something reflecting the required goal e.g. a specific autobiographical event, or can be 
subject to ‘direct recall’ (see Table 1.1)  In both experimental and naturalistic settings there 
may be phenomenological differences between these voluntary (generative) and involuntary 
(direct) recall experiences (Berntsen & Hall, 2004) but they are usually considered to be 




It is important to acknowledge that while the neurological process of recall can be 
tracked (e.g. Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Eichenbaum, 2004), participant reporting of 
recalled events is difficult to ‘standardise’ in practice. It is a subjective experience reported 
through a narrative in itself a ‘meaning-making’ process whereby what is reported may not be 
a direct reflection of what is experienced.  For example, people will provide event memories 
with pre-amble contextual information, and post-amble justification.  This reflects more 
contemporary models of autobiographical memory which preclude the differentiation 
between event-specific knowledge (such as time, place and event), with semantic self-and 
socio-cultural knowledge (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004).  Other researchers have 
questioned whether memories about the self are, in fact, different in nature to other memory 
types because of this peripheral knowledge (Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Greenwald & Banaji, 
1989).  Features of specific autobiographical memory recall which have been experimentally 
examined, and compared between populations include, accessibility, (usually reflected in the 
time taken to recall specific autobiographical memories), and phenomenological features of 
the memory event, such as vividness, emotional impact of recall, and sensory (usually visual) 
detail (Tulving, 1983).  Specificity of autobiographical memories as defined by information 
on what, where and when, may be judged by the researcher on the description provided by 
participants, or rated by the participants themselves (Conway, 2009).   
The standard method of cuing recall of autobiographical memories is the 
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT: Robinson, 1976; Williams & Broadbent, 1986), 
which requires participants to report memories cued by single words presented by a 
researcher.  This method induces both semantic and episodic memory details (Levine, 
Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2002), and some populations, for example people 
with depressive disorders, have been found to be significantly less likely to recall episodic 
details, with a preponderance of semantic details (McBride, Segal, Kennedy, & Gamar, 2007; 
Sumner, Griffiths, & Mineka, 2010).  In the Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI: 
Koppelman, Wilson, & Baddeley, 1989) subjects are asked to describe events within an 
interview discourse, and memory narratives are scored for characteristics of specificity such 
as sensory detail and event-specific knowledge.  Similarly, the Autobiographical Interview 
(AI: Levine, et al, 2002) aims to separate out semantic and specific autobiographical memory 
components, giving an overall comparison between these two aspects of the memory 
narrative.  The Test Episodique de Mémoire du Passé Autobiographique (TEMPau: Piolino, 




including a judgement of remember (episodic) and know (semantic) based on Tulving’s 
original recollective distinctions (Tulving, 1985).  As well as establishing the event within a 
spatio-temporal context, the TEMPau also asks for sensory-perceptual-affective-cognitive 
details, along with a judgement of visual field or observer perspective.  This final quality, not 
included in any of the other autobiographical memory tests, is based on the work of Nigro 
and Neisser (1983) who examined the role of the visual perspective on memory recall.  The 
study of perspective-taking in people with depression has suggested that the observer 
perspective is more common in people with depression (Kuyken & Howell, 2006), and in an 
AMT study of 123 participants with recurrent depression the observer perspective was found 
to be significantly linked to negative self-evaluation and avoidance (Kuyken & Moulds, 
2009). Of the methods used to cue recall of episodic memories, the TEMPau procedure best 
accounts for the phenomenological factors in memory recall, and sets the criteria for 
assessment of specificity from both an objective (researcher) and subjective perspective.  
Reported events are recorded as episodic if they are found to contain specific one-off details, 
of short duration (<24hours), to be factual (what happened), set within a defined spatio-
temporal location i.e. in a particular place and time, and be phenomenological.  Defining 
features from a subjective perspective are that the person has some sense of visual field 
(within the dimensions of field to observer); would remember details (rather than simply 
know they occurred); there would be a sense of autonoetic consciousness (travelling back in 
time); vividness; emotional intensity; and an aspect of having rehearsed the event prior to 
recall at test.   The TEMPau has been used to effectively examine autobiographical recall in 
subjects with MDD over the lifespan (Lemogne, Piolino, Friszer, Claret, Girault, et al, 2006; 
Piolino, et al, 2009).   
In addition to these standard sampling methods, a number of interview techniques 
have been used to retrieve episodic memories from within defined lifetime periods, and are 
therefore pertinent to an examination of the role of higher-order organisational structures in 
recall.  Borrini, Dall’Ora, Della Sala, Mannelli, and Spinnler (1989) used the three periods of 
adolescence, early, and late adulthood to elicit memories from 157 non-depressed older adults 
(over 55 years).  They aimed to remove the barrier to ABM access of current relevance, by 
limiting the time period from which memories could be sampled, and by requesting a specific 
memory, and allowing subjects to narrate until specific details were revealed.  The 
researchers concluded that memory recall is more likely to be accurate (as verified by a 




recall process, and if memory retrieval is generative i.e. progressing through contextual 
cueing to increasing event-specific detail.  Similarly Ivaniou, Cooper, Shanks, and Venneri, 
(2006), deployed an interview technique to examine patterns of memory deficit in elderly 
dementia patients with mild to moderate memory loss, using free- and cued-recall over four 
life-time periods childhood, early adult hood, late-adulthood and ‘recent’.  In cued recall each 
memory was defined in terms of ‘what’, ‘when’, ‘where’ and ‘who’, and these details were 
used to judge the degree of specificity by quantity of details available.  In the free-recall test 
two minutes were given for subjects to recall in minimal detail memories from the given life-
time period, and these were subsequently used to gather more detailed accounts of events 
which were then scored for details.   Koppelman, and colleagues, (1989) used similar lifetime 
period sampling in amnesia patients.   The use of life-time periods in each of these studies 
serves to control for the distribution of sampling across the lifespan, and as a result may 
increase the ecological validity of recall, mitigating against the demand characteristics of 
cuing tests based on the AMT, but they did not examine the impact of life-time periods on 
recall, and all of the studies neglected the elements of phenomenological ‘reliving’ 
experiences which have come to represent episodic memories, relying rather on information 
such as the ‘what, when and where’ of narrated events to account for specificity. This 
experience-near or ‘reliving’ is predicted by sensory experience (Rubin, Schrauf, & 
Greenberg, 2003; Tulving, 1983), and is an important aspect of specificity as it is thought to 
verify the personal experience of the event occurring. 
A further aspect of memory phenomenology is the perception of self-relevence, and 
self-defining features of event memories (Blagov & Singer, 2004; Singer & Moffit, 1991; 
Singer & Salovey, 1993).  Self-defining memories are enduring memories which are felt to be 
important or essential in defining the person of the reporter.  They are described as vivid, 
emotional, and highly accessible personal memories which are related to goal-achievement.   
Empirical evidence indicates that the importance of a memory will rely on its relevance to 
life-goals both at the time of the event, and subsequently (Singer & Salovey, 1993).  The key 
to self-defining memories is the continuation, over time, of their relevance to the self, Singer 
and colleagues (2013) conceptualised them as being a result of the perpetuation, over time, of 
representations of events which combine experience, with critical goals of the life-time 
period in which they occurred.  They also proposed that repeated themes within self-defining 
memories, for example being the victim of unjust actions, become narrative scripts for 




carried out using the centrality of event scale (CES: Berntsen & Rubin, 2006), which requires 
participants to score episodic events according to statements such as ‘This event has become 
a reference point for the way I understand new experiences.’ On a five-point scale from 
totally disagree: 1, to totally agree: 5. The original design of the study resulted in a 20-item 
scale with a Cronbachs’ alpha reliability score of 0.92, and a shorter 7-item scale with a 
reliability of 0.88.  Originally used to explore individual differences in PTSD, the scale has 
been applied more broadly to examinations of the relative perpetuation of some memories 
over others (e.g. Thomsen, Jensen, Holm, Oleson, Schneiber, & TØnnesvang, 2015). 
 1.2  Life-stories 1.2
There is a boundary that exists between our understanding of the cognitive 
representations which constitute autobiographical memory, and the ways in which this 
structure is used to incorporate and represent autobiographical material to the self, and others.  
The autobiographical memory base requires a framework for linking experience, semantic 
and episodic knowledge coherently.  The two leading theories both incorporate this structural 
framework, but position its origin and key functions slightly differently.  The SMS (Conway 
& Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, 2005) relies on a metaphorical ‘life-story’ structure 
created from experience (temporality being the key guide), current goals, self-identity, and 
the demands of coherence and correspondence.  Contrastingly, the BSM requires, and 
emphasises, the life-story narrative framework, using culturally understood patterns of 
thematic links and cause and effect.   These structures are not mutually exclusive, and differ 
in terms of the cultural impact of narrative construction and a reliance on a ‘storyline’.  Either 
way, from the research it appears that there are three structures which endow this continuity 
and linkages between autobiographical memory (as internal cognitive representations of self-
relevant material), the sense of self, and the construction of an autobiographical ‘life-story’ 
narrative which can be internally rehearsed and socially deployed.  These are the life-story 
narrative (McAdams, 1993; 2001), life-story schema (Bluck & Habermas, 2000; Habermas & 
Bluck, 2000), and cultural life-script (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004), which are illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
The following section will present the theoretical and empirical evidence for life-
stories, life-story schema, and life-story narratives highlighting their role in creating 





Figure 1-1: Relationship between life-story schema, narrative, and life-script: Autobiographical memory and 
life-stories are proposed to have a interactional effect on one another, and as a result cognitive representations 
in autobiographical memory are mediated through life-story structures prior to being expressed 
 
1.2.1 Life-story schema 
According to the ‘Life-story schema’ model proposed by Bluck and Habermas (2000) 
individuals maintain an internal abstracted cognitive self-concept which is used to organise 
autobiographical memory and which in turn influences life-story narratives.  The schema is 
analogous to the life-story of the SMS, but differs in that it provides a greater flexibility at the 
level of temporal coherence.  The SMS is proposed to allow variability and fluctuation in 
recall according to current goals and the ‘working self’ which, in theory means that self-
perception can change according to circumstances and motivations (Conway et al, 2004).  
Although deviations from this may occur in extreme cases, for example in those with 
neurological damage (e.g. Schacter, Curran, Galluccio, Milberg, & Bates, 1996), more 
commonly individuals have life-long autobiographical coherence which, according to Bluck 
and Habermas, is provided by the life-story schema.  In addition, the life-story schema is not 
so limited by the ‘life-time period’ hierarchical structure of the SMS, allowing for life-themes 
Life story schema 





- internally or 
externally rehearsed 
stories 
Interface with external world 
 
Cultural life script 











to span temporal periods, for example, ‘my relationship with my mother’ which is a lifelong 
categorisation.   
While it is proposed that life-stories develop by using a framework derived from 
childhood, on-going experience, and social context, the process of development is less clear.  
In their account Habermas and Bluck, (2000) describe the dynamic process of 
autobiographical reasoning which is the activity of thinking about the past to make links to 
the self, which results in a synchronic (reflects the current self) and diachronic (reflects the 
continuity of self over time) narrative.  This process is analogous to that of elaborative 
rehearsal, whereby event representations within working memory are transferred to long-term 
memory by the creation of links with existing representations allowing us to make sense of 
experience by drawing semantic knowledge from individual (episodic) events 
(D’Argembeau, Cassell, Phillips, Balteu, Salmon, Ven der Lindon, 2014; Habermas and 
Bluck, 2000; McAdams, 1985; McLean, 2005).   
Lilgendahl and McAdams (2011) conceptualised autobiographical reasoning 
according to two narrative processes evident in accounts of 88 mid-life adults.  These were 
the propensity to evaluate events positively, and the generation of events as having a number 
of positive impacts on personal growth.  Overall good mental health was associated with 
positive reasoning processes.  A number of other studies have used evidence for drawing 
positive conclusions from events as being representative of autobiographical reasoning (e.g. 
McLean & Pratt, 2006; Singer, Rexhaj, Baddeley, 2007).  The nature of the reasoning process 
itself has not been substantially explored but one study gives insight in to the dual cognitive 
process which appears to allow reasoning to occur.  Autobiographical reasoning is proposed 
to involve two cognitive activities: the recall of episodic events, and the generation of 
semantic links which create a broader personal significance and meaning between these 
events, and both essential to the formation of life-story schema.  Using methods which 
differentiate between neural activity during these stages, D’Argembeau, Cassol, Phillips, and 
Colleagues (2014) asked 24 young adults to recall self-defining memories during fMRI 
scanning.  Participants were instructed to recall events in two ways, either by concrete recall 
and re-experiencing of events, or by reflecting on the events, their implications and impact.  
The reasoning process which occurred during recall was associated with different brain areas 
involved in semantic processing, whereas the concrete re-experiencing recall was not. This 




with our ability to draw semantic and self-relevant conclusions from them.  But also that the 
use of these individual experiences depends on the context, i.e. what was also happening at 
the time, or how events are linked together.  This is important because if our semantic 
knowledge about ourselves is drawn from generalisation and integration of individual events, 
the ways that we perceive and recall these events will have broad ranging implications for our 
psychological well-being. 
Evidence cited for the existence of a life-story schema includes the findings that 
longer-term self-concepts influence memory encoding and recall (Rathbone & Moulin, 2014; 
Rathbone, Moulin, & Conway, 2008; Rathbone, Conway, & Moulin, 2011), and that 
autobiographical reasoning increases following both major life events and traumatic 
experiences (Lieberman, Meek, & Cohen, 2010; Suedfeld, Steel, Wiebe, & Krell, 1997; 
Suedfeld & Cassel, 2006).  This increase in autobiographical reasoning indicates that 
integration of events with the self-concept takes longer when they are dissonant, or less 
congruent with the current self.  In addition observations of the reinterpretation processes 
surrounding events and emotions (Levine & Newcome, 1997), and attitudes, indicate the 
tension between current self-coherence and past experiences, and events which are 
challenging to integrate, for example trauma, may demand to be internally or externally 
narrated resulting in a positive and agentic self-schema (Beike & Landoll, 2000; Suedfeld, 
Steel, Wieber, & Krell, 1997).    The process of autobiographical reasoning is analogous to 
that of ‘meaning-making’ in contemporary psychological talking therapies.  Essentially the 
same process is facilitated by a therapist in order to bring about acceptance of past events, 
and the creation of understanding and closure.  Meaning-making processes are common in 
narrative therapies (Brown & Tod, 2007; Caldwell, 2005), cognitive behavioural therapies 
(Holland, Chong, Currier, O’Hara, & Gallagher-Thomsen, 2015), and those working from a 
less ‘interventionist’ perspective (Thorne, Mearns, & McLeod, 2013) 
The function of the life-story schema, in acting as a template for memory, identity, 
and self-hood, requires the narrative of the life-story to have coherence, and a logical 
sequencing of both events and, as with the self-memory system, a conceptual self.  This 
appears to be something which is established in childhood, and evidence for life-story schema 
coherence being a developmental process which is independent of the ability to create 
coherence in narratives generally comes from studies which examine the production of 




narratives of 110 Danish children aged between 9 and 15 years, and found a strong 
correlation between age and coherence within the narratives.  Third-grade children of a mean 
(SD) 10.2 (0.1) years showed narrative coherence within their accounts of single neutral or 
moderately positive events, but were unable to narrate a coherent life-story (in this case from 
birth to the present day), the eighth grade of a mean (SD) 14.6 (0.3) years were able to 
produce a coherent life-story.  This result was independent of their ability to narrate a 
coherent single event once age was controlled for, suggesting that a ‘conceptual’ life story i.e. 
life-story schema, is required as a framework for the life-story narrative over and above 
linguistic competence.  Indeed the researchers found that life-story coherence was correlated 
with the typicality ratings,  of events proposed by the children, the typicality of an event was 
scored by the number of times it was mentioned in prospective life-stories produced by 
participants, e.g. an event ‘Beginning school’ being mentioned 97 times in at total 111 life-
stories would hve a typicality score of 97..  While accuracy in predicting the timing of typical 
life events developed concurrently to knowledge of the events themselves. In accordance 
with these findings, autobiographical accounts of the whole life-story narrative are thought to 
be possible from adolescence (McAdams, 1993), and there are parallels between early 
autobiographical memory development and the development of this narrative ability (Fivush, 
Habermas, Waters, & Zaman, 2011), suggestive of the interlinking roles of the schema, 
narratives and autobiographical memory proficiency. 
Elucidation of the differences between aspects of life-story schema and narrative has 
been neglected both in the theoretical work, and in research.  Theoreticians generally conflate 
the ability to produce a life-story narrative i.e. an account of the person’s life to date, with the 
existence of a life-story schema, and apart from the work carried out by Bohn and Berntsen 
(2008; 2013), this distinction has received little research focus.  A theoretical divergence 
between them is important when considering the role each plays in autobiographical memory.  
The importance of the schema is that it serves as a guide for experience and remembering, 
whereas the life-story narrative functions to present the story of the schema.  
1.2.2 Cultural life-script 
The development of the life-story schema, and life story narratives relies on the 
external, learning context of the person.  Life-stories schema are constructed with reference 
to culturally defined life-story script.  The role of which is to guide recall according to 




life-scripts include major events such as starting school, getting married, having children etc. 
with defined times when a person would be expect to experience these events.  The events 
within the cultural life script can be both single events, analogous to episodic memories, but 
also expected life-time periods such as ‘teenage’, or ‘university’. Cultural life scripts are 
elicited in research by asking participants to report events which are thought to be typical of 
the life course of someone (often of the same sex) in their culture.  On developing this 
concept Rubin and Berntsen (2004) found 35 life-events which were felt to be typical of both 
Danish and American life-stories, subsequently researchers have found both similarities and 
differences in life scripts between cultures (Alea, Ali, & Mercano, 2014; Berntsen & Rubin, 
2004; Erdogan, Barban, Avlar, Tas, & Teckan, 2008; Rubin, Berntsen, & Hutson, 2008; 
Scherman, 2013).   
Events which are common in the cultural life-script are also common in life-story 
narratives (Thomsen & Berntsen, 2008) and this appears to be as a result of learning 
expectations within the context of one’s own culture, for example what is of importance, 
what is of interest to others, and what should be seen as positive or negative (Zaragoza-
Scherman, Salgado, Shao, & Berntsen, 2015) and cultural comparisons have allowed 
sampling of autobiographical recall to illustrate the differences this makes.  The 
internalisation of a cultural life-script during late childhood and early adulthood is evidenced 
by the study by Bohn and Berntsen (2013) discussed above, as it indicates the existence of an 
understanding of typical events from one’s culture, and that this is influential in deciding 
what kinds of events are encoded and recalled.  The younger cohort in this study were 
significantly less likely to produce accounts of personal events which reflect cultural norms 
compared to the older groups. 
Overall, cultural life-scripts provide guidance on culturally significant events, 
influencing the life-story schema, and thereby indirectly, encoding and recall, and show good 
evidence of impacting on recall of events in terms of long-term cultural expectations 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2004), but also as shorter-term and priming influences, e.g. Wang (2013), 
who found that cultural goal-directive influence encoding and recall of memories.   
1.2.3 Life-story narratives 
While the cultural life-script and life-story schema lay out self-referenced 




narrative, which enables the telling of this story to the self and others.  While content of 
narratives is both experience- and culturally-defined, incorporating and selectively mobilising 
memories, a further aspect which influences their role in maintaining a consistent sense of 
self is the style of narrative expression used.  Evidence indicates that characteristics of life-
story narratives are a result of social learning, as there are strong links between children and 
parents for elaborative style (Fivush, 2007; Fivush and Nelson, 2006; Reese, Haden & 
Fivush, 1993), and structural scripting of narratives (Fivush, 2007; 2010; Fivush, et al, 2011; 
Reece, 2002), which is itself linked to a more coherent sense of self (Fivush, 2011).   
Overall, the production of a life-story narrative relies on the ability to respond to 
cultural expectations of narrative stories (how stories are told), and to require a schematic 
framework to structure autobiographical experience (life-story schema).  McAdams (1985) 
suggests that life-story narratives result in narrative identity by being both ‘synchronic’, 
meaning they bringing together of all the bits of the self and experience even when they are 
disparate and contradictory and ‘diachronic’ because they endow the ability to provide causal 
accounts.  Singer and Bluck (2001) propose that they are developed through narrative 
processing, that being the stringing together of images, plots and goals to form a coherent 
story, which is itself reliant on autobiographical reasoning, involving the interpretations and 
evaluation of events according to the existing self-narrative.  These ideas are supported by 
research which has shown that autobiographical narrative accounts are composed of both 
information on events, but also evaluations and conclusions drawn from them (McAdams, 
2006b). 
Life-story narratives have been examined theoretically and empirically from a number 
of perspectives (McAdams 1993; 2001).  Researchers have used life-story construction and 
characteristic themes and structures to draw conclusions on the ways in which different 
groups of people and personalities represent themselves through narrative (McAdams, 2006a, 
2006b), developmental processes (McLean & Pratt, 2006; Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010); 
quality of life and wellbeing (McAdams, 2001), and mental health (Adler, Turner, 
Brookshier, Monahan, Walder-Biesanze, et al, 2015; Angus & Greenberg, 2011).   
What has been indicated is that narratives have consistent canonical features which 
frame content and may be temporally stable, while focal subjects fluctuate according to 
experience and context.  These features include: coherence, and the ways in which narratives 




themes, for example, that ‘facing challenges head-on pays off’, or ‘things work out for 
everyone but me’.  Evidence for these and their link to psychological well-being is discussed 
in the next section. 
1.2.4 Life-story and psychological well-being 
The ability to construct a coherent autobiographical account or accounts has long been 
seen as a vital stage in development and essential for psychological well-being.  Erikson 
(1971) described it as the essential developmental step for adolescence, while Freud 
(Tambling, 2012) conceptualised narrative jumps, and non-sequiturs in communication of 
personal stories as evidence of defence mechanisms.  Coherence of life-story narrative 
accounts is measured by narrative features, such as organisation and logical sequencing of 
events, narrative description, and at the highest level a characteristic tellability pattern. 
Narratives are far more than verbal representations of experience, they contain 
information on past events, evaluations, comparisons, and conclusions.  They also function, 
in parallel with the social function of autobiographical memory (Alea & Bluck, 2003), to 
create social links with others, through shared understandings, and even in that they create a 
shared framework for ‘telling’ of events.  The use of schematic ‘master narratives’ has been 
suggested to serve as culturally defined story frameworks to guide the presentation of 
autobiographical stories (Boje, 1991; Thorne & McLean, 2002; Westrate & McLean, 2010).   
To compensate for the difficulties in telling some stories, structuring of negative events 
within master narratives can provide socially acceptable ways of relating autobiographical 
events, for example Thorne and McLean (2002) defined three forms of master narrative for 
trauma memories, these being: John Wayne, Florence Nightingale and Vulnerability, each of 
which defines a narrator position and gives context for the emotional response to the events.  
Master narratives linked to psychological well-being have been identified in a number of 
studies, for example the ‘Redemption’ and ‘Contamination’ sequences elucidated for 
narratives of older US adults by McAdams and Colleagues (2001).  Redemptive (negative 
events reveal positive outcomes) are related to both well-being and generativity in middle-
age, while contamination sequences (positive events reveal negative outcomes) related to a 
significantly lower reported level of well-being and generativity (Lilgendahl, et al, 2011).  A 
series of studies the master narratives of key-scenes from life-stories gained from 74 mid-life 
adults (ages 35-65) (using McAdams 1985 interview technique) revealed that contamination 




along with narrative coherence, and positively correlated with self-reported depression 
symptoms.  Redemption sequences were positively correlated with life-satisfaction, self-
esteem and narrative coherence, while negatively correlated with depression symptoms 
(McAdams, et al, 2001).   
That memory recall and narrative structure is independent of the episodic content of 
what is recalled and retold was further explored in a longitudinal study carried out by 
McAdams (2006b) undergraduates who were asked for 10 key scenes from life stories, only 
repeated 28% of these 3 month later and only 22% (of the original) were repeated at 3 years.  
Despite the apparent transience in events reported there were stable characteristics of the 
narratives, he found continuity in narrative complexity, and positive (versus negative) 
emotional tone and moderate but significant continuity for themes of agency and growth.  
McLean and Thorne (2003) looked at accounts of young adults important memories about 
interpersonal relationships, after a 6 month gap they found only 12% were exactly the same at 
follow up, but they found significant stability for emotional and motivational themes. In a 
qualitative study looking directly at the narratives of people who perceived themselves to be 
‘struggling with depression’, (Robertson, Verner, & Botha, 2005), ten adults were asked 
‘would you please tell me the story of your life?’  This study attempted to look at the 
psychological meaning of depression as expressed in narrative in terms of meaning 
attribution; language use; use of socio-political narratives and ways of dealing with 
depression.  Although this paper is written from a strictly social constructionist perspective it 
gives some insights in to the narratives of people with depression.  For example people with 
depression tended to make ‘Monolithic summations’ of experiences e.g. I have a very sordid 
life I’m afraid; have a narrative style of explanation and attribution indicating a mind-set that 
is ‘stuck in the past’ instead of ‘letting go and moving on’; made negative interpretations, 
showed negative discounting, and non-hopeful meanings to expected future experiences 
(which might indicate underlying problems with future problem solving); used language 
which was limited and negative, and often made negative generalisations (some in the face of 
contradictory evidence). This study looked at what the participants were talking about rather 
than specific narrative features and but features such as a negative bias, were considered one 
way by which competing narratives are locked out. 
The early development of, and existence and reliance on, narrative structures which 




are schematic.  A potential schematic feature of narratives which has been linked to mental 
health and well-being is structural coherence.  Reese and colleagues (2011) have developed a 
method for scoring three key aspects of coherence, theme, context and chronology, and a 
comprehensive study by Waters and Fivush (2015) used this method to examine narratives of 
episodic events (termed nuclear episodes) and generic autobiographical events of 103 
undergraduate students (mean age 18.87, range 18-28 years).  The transcripts were coded for 
coherence and identity features (using Waters, 2014 Self-function scale), and three different 
well-being scales (including the satisfaction with life scale, Diener, Emmens, Larsson, & 
Griffin, 1985; the Rosenberg well-being scale, Rosenberg, 1965; and the Psychological well-
being scale, Ryff & Keyes, 1995), were entered in to a component analysis of 17 sub-scales.  
This analysis revealed three main components to the subscales (purpose and meaning; 
positive self-view; positive relationships), which were then correlated with narrative 
coherence.  Results indicated that when levels of narrative ability are controlled for, 
coherence of specific events narratives was significantly correlated with purpose and 
meaning, and positive relationships.  In addition, results revealed that the identity function of 
the narratives moderated the relationship between coherence and sense of purpose (but not 
the other two components).  The authors propose two mechanistic accounts for these 
relationships.  The first being that emotional dysregulation associated with an absence of 
well-being, prevents the construction of coherent narratives.  The second is that once personal 
episodes are processed in to coherent narratives they become stable, and are no longer 
cognitively and emotionally demanding and thus lending stability to the sense of self and 
concurrent well-being.  
1.2.5 Life-stories as schema 
The three aspects influencing life-story structures detailed above are proposed to 
influence memory recall in different ways.  Life-story narratives influence recall by providing 
context, and can be adjusted according to current goals, social situation, and mood, but 
maintain structural features such as complexity, coherence, and thematic scripts like 
‘contamination sequences’ which may repeat within the narratives presented (McAdams, 
Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, & Bowmen, 2001).  Life stories are structured on cultural life-
scripts and endow relevance to events using the context of the ‘self’, and filter information 
which will become part of long-term memory and self-knowledge to ensure coherence with 




memory including the impact on episodic memory characteristics such as typicality, 
expectation, and rehearsal.   
Schema are a broad concept to describe cognitive frameworks for understanding 
experiences, they serve to ‘fill-in’ absent information about events using knowledge of 
typicality, once constructed a schema will endow rules of expectation and generalisation for 
schema-linked information (Bartlett, 1932).  An associated concept, Scripts are schema for 
routine, often culturally typical activities, and are semantic representations of sequences of 
events, actions, causal connections and roles, which allow effective navigation of common 
experiences and scenarios such as going to a restaurant (Schank & Abelson, 1977) and are 
analogous to general events with the SMS.   
Schema can be based on both semantic knowledge of culturally significant concepts 
such as the contents of rooms, crime scenes, common scenes, and stereotypes (Pezdek, 
Whetstone, Reynolds, Askari, & Dougherty, 1989), usually on the basis of schema consistent 
and inconsistent information.  But have also been examined, to a lesser extent in terms of 
memories for cultural life-scripts with a similar focus on typicality, and atypicality.  While 
theoretically indicated by their role in autobiographical memory being influenced by self-
identity (e.g. work following Markus, 1977), to date the concept of schema have not been 
examined explicitly with respect to life-story schema and life-story narratives.   The problem 
may be one of operationalisation of the life-story schema to enable features of the schematic 
representation to be fixed, and thereby predictive of expectation, schema-typicality, and 
schema-consistency of information.  A more detailed examination of the research literature 
concerning schema will now highlight how this enquiry could take place. 
In general, schema provide information on expectation, information which is schema 
consistent is expected, whereas schema inconsistent information is not.  This typicality factor 
can influence both encoding and recall by combining schematic with episodic information, 
guided by the overall match between a particular experience or piece of information with the 
schematic understanding of the context.  This in turn has led to an examination of 
expectation, typicality and relevance in terms of schema consistency and inconsistency on 
memory for objects, events and characteristics.   
Expectation or typicality reflects the degree to which a particular feature is likely to 




schema.  So a schema for a library may contain books and a window, the former would be 
typical and relevant, whereas the latter would be merely typical.  Evidence points to enhanced 
recall of high schema-relevant items when compared to low schema relevance, when 
relevance is experimentally manipulated on encoding (Goodman, 1980), but for atypical 
events if typicality is manipulated on encoding there is a both a recall and recognition bias 
(Pezdek, et al 1989).  This means that items which are considered typical of the schema tend 
to be more likely to be recalled, possibly due to the established links between similar 
information raising accessibility, but that atypicality on encoding has the effect of making 
representations more available.  The reasons for this are unclear but accounts of the role of 
atypicality within scripts have resulted in a number of explanations.  Similar to schema, 
memories of script events also tend to be biased in that deviations from established scripts 
tend to be more memorable (Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Graesser, Gordon, & Sawyer, 1979; 
Mandler, 1984).  This is associated with a number of script models for memory including 
Schank’s (1982) Dynamic memory model where atypical events decrease script coherence, 
and remain more memorable due to processing demands (Hastie, 1980; Srull, Lichtenstein & 
Rothbart, 1985).  The ‘Script pointer plus tag’ model which posits atypicality with the need to 
encode in more detail, as the script cannot be relied on to provide appropriate information.  A 
third theory for why atypicality endows memorability is that it is a form of the von Rostdorff 
effect (Koffka, 1935) which suggests that the similarity of background information, such as 
lists of similar items, impacts on the memorability of items which are different, for example 
‘peach’ in a list of vegetables.   
The relative memorability of events as typical to scripts has also been examined in 
terms of standardised stories, which relate ‘typical’ events such as washing a car, along with 
atypical aspects of the events. Lampinen, Fairies, Neuschatz, and Toglia (2000) used this 
paradigm to examine the recollection of 37 undergraduate participants of a story based on six 
scripted critical events, each of which contained two typical and two atypical aspects.  Events 
were presented either immediately following the story, or 24 hours later and remember, know 
(Rajaram, 1993) or inferred (based on plausibility) judgements made.  Remember judgments 
were also linked to whether this was based on perceptual, cognitive or emotional information.  
Typicality of information had a significant impact on recognition, and both remember and 
know judgements.  With atypicality being more memorable overall at immediate and 24 hour 




In the only published paper which has explicitly examined the role of life-stories as 
schema which influence memory recall and recognitions, Koppel and Berntsen (2014) carried 
out three studies which used a cultural life-script as a schema for which events in a life-story 
narrative could be judged as consistent, or inconsistent. This consistency judgement was 
based on the idea that some events are uncommon and/or infrequent within a prototypical 
life-story, while others are expected and frequent.  The events were tested under recall or 
recognition conditions for presented information.   In their first study 48 female Danish 
students, with a mean age of 22.8 years were presented with a life story containing nine 
critical life-study events (drawn from the cultural life-script of Danish people developed by 
Bentsen and Rubin, 2004).  Of these events six were schema consistent, in that they were 
narrated with the expected emotional valence, while three were narrated with an inconsistent 
emotional valence.  The critical life-script events were chosen on merit of being strongly 
emotional in the 2004 study, and this allowed a clear conversion of the emotional content, for 
example, one schema inconsistent event was a divorce presented as a positive event.  Three 
versions of the story were used, containing the same events but counterbalancing the 
inconsistent event valence, with a number of filler items which did not differ between stories.  
During presentation participants were asked to rate critical events as either schema consistent 
or inconsistent, and also give positivity ratings for events. Participants were provided with 
one life-story and tested for recognition of events from the story, and give a remember/know 
judgement (Rajaram, 1993). Two delay conditions occurred after presentation of the life-
story, half were given a 20 minute distractor before the test phase, and half returned after one 
week.   Results of Study one revealed an affective dissonance reduction effect, in that 
inconsistent events were rated as less positive when the expectation was that they would be 
negative, and vice-versa, but that expectation consistency had no impact on recognition.  The 
expected life-script frequency of events, as defined by Berntsen and Rubin (2004), impacted 
on the correct recognition of events in the week-long condition, indicating that in the longer-
term the cultural life-script acts as a schema for memory of events, and that the valence of 
incongruent events are adjusted to fit the schema on recognition.  In Study two, the cognitive 
demands of the task were increased, 24 female student participants (mean age 23.7 years) 
underwent the same life-story presentation procedure as Study one, but were not given the 
opportunity to rate the events presented (as this represented an opportunity for rehearsal in 
Study one), they were then tested for recall of items and asked for a remember/know 
judgement.  Expected frequency had no impact of recall, although the latter results suggested 




judgements were more likely to be reported as ‘remember’, than ‘know’, again indicating that 
unexpected or atypical information is more likely to be remembered.   Similar to Study one, 
schema-consistency had a significant impact on judgements of event positivity, whereby 
participants aligned their ratings with schema expectation rather than presented valence.   In 
addition it appeared that temporality of the event (start to end of the life-story provided) 
impacted on recall more than recency, frequency or consistency i.e. events were recalled in 
the order they were presented, and therefore conformed to the expected life-story progression.  
Study three examined the impact of expected life-script frequency of events on recall by 30 
female participants (mean age 22.8).  The life-story presented included 30 critical events, (10 
high frequency, 10 low-frequency and 10 non-life-script events all matched for valence), with 
a single one week delay condition, followed by free recall of story events.    Results revealed 
a significant effect of life-script expectancy on recall accuracy, and as with Study two a recall 
order which matched the temporality life-story.   
While not examining memories for autobiographical events, and instead focusing on 
narratives of events in the life-stories of others, this study is one of the few which have 
specifically linked the structure of the cultural life-script with memory recall, the 
manipulation of the valence of event to create atypical representations gives good evidence 
for the interaction between expectation and recall and recognition.  In addition to this, it 
accounts for the links between internal schema of life-stories which influence patterns of 
recall, in terms of consistency and expectation with life-script.  The impact of atypicality is 
revealed by the events being given ‘remember’ rather than ‘know’ judgements (remember 
being recall or recognition of an event memory which includes some episodic detail, whereas 
know is the recall or recognition of events without such detail, the latter therefore being based 
on the belief that events have occurred), and in that it influenced judgements of the emotional 
content of events by bringing the valence in to line with expectations.   
Taken together this points to an aspect of recall which favours atypicality from 
expectation during encoding, but during recall events may be adjusted to align with schematic 
representations, and the Koppel and Berntsen study has extended this concept to include 
expectations of life-story events using cultural knowledge.  This empirical evidence which 
indicates that cultural life-scripts are used as cognitive schema supports the suggestion that 
life-story schema may also fulfil a similar role on an individual level.  The function of 




typical and atypical life events, but also in terms of life events typical to the individual, the 
latter as a part of Becks schema model of depression (1967) which is examined in Section 
2.2.1. 
In order to operationalise predictions that the life-story schema functions to create 
expectations of events which are potentially influential on encoding, and on recall of personal 
memories, it is necessary to explore the structure of the life-story schema.  The following 
section details research on the structure of life-story chapters, a component of life-story 
narratives, and life-story schema which occur at a mid-level.  These are predicted to play a 
fundamental role in the structural schema used to access autobiographical information. 
 1.3  Life-story chapters 1.3
The next section will discuss the evidence for temporal organisation of 
autobiographical narrative information in the form of life-story chapters, similar to the life-
time periods, and extended events of the SMS (Pillemer, Krensky, Kleinman, & Goldsmith, 
1991; Schooler & Herrman, 1992; Thomsen & Berntsen, 2008) which themselves have an 
organisational role in memory  (Burt, Kemp, & Conway, 2003; Conway & Bekerian, 1987; 
Skowronski, et al., 2007).  Life-story chapters, are a clustering of related events and 
information within autobiographical reports, which are thought to represent the underlying 
structure of autobiographical memory.  They are proposed to contain information about 
temporality of events, typical events within a given time period, goals, place, plans and 
emotional tone (Thomsen, 2015). The creation of autobiographical life-story chapters reduces 
the requirement to choose from a vast number of specific events in favour of summary 
periods, and within a life-story, and enable the creation and maintenance of a sense of self-
coherence (Habermas & Bluck, 2000).   
Figure 1-2 shows the theoretical structure of the life-story narrative and life-story 
chapters.  Within this illustration, chapters may be represented as periods of years, but more 
significant sets of events may cover considerably shorter periods, resulting higher and lower-
order chapter structures. Different studies indicate that chapters may be formed either occur 
as a by-product of goal pursuit (Brown & Schopflocher, 1998; Shank, 1982) in that over 
periods of time events spent with the same aim or outcome in mind will be linked; by the 
retrospective cognitive reviewing of past events (Barsalou, 1988), or a combination of both.    




retrospective life-story chapter creation, has yet to be explored, but it is reasonable to assume 
that it follows a similar two-phase process to autobiographical reasoning.  It may also be that 
this process occurs hierarchically with an emphasis on chapter-level processing, followed by 
life-story processing.  For example, as outlined in Section 1.2.1 the reasoning process begins 
with the systematic recall of autobiographical episodic memories pertaining to a particular 
period or theme, and this information is then linked by extrapolated self-knowledge, 
justification, and rationalisation.  That this is occurring at a chapter level, and subsequently at 
a life-story level would increase internal coherence of extrapolations e.g. ‘I was a shy child’, 
rather than longer term extrapolations and narrative links, e.g ‘I was a shy child but then 
became more confident at university’. 
 
  
Figure 1-2: Hierarchy of chapters in autobiographical memory Illustrating the clustered hierarchy and 
relationship between longer and shorter time periods for autobiographical memory 
 
The difference between the life-time period/extended events structures of the SMS, 
and the definition of life-story chapters has not been made clear in current literature. Most 
researchers do not define any difference, and those working from an autobiographical 
memory perspective use the terms interchangeably, with work exploring the role of chapters 
using that of lifetime periods, general events and extended periods provided in narrative 
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It is worth noting at this stage therefore, some disparity between the apparent 
clustered structure with life-time periods as a higher order structure and general events as 
lower-order, for example a general event such as ‘going to the cinema’ could not be thought 
of as strictly belonging to a particular life-time period unless further perceptual information 
was provided to evidence this, and as such would be more classifiable as a script for an 
activity rather than an autobiographical event.  While the concept of general events creates 
problems for the SMS, it is less so for narrative accounts which may be structurally bound by 
semantics, it seems logical to assume that consideration of a particular event such as going to 
the cinema will be communicated to others either with some contextual information such as 
general information about when and where, or as a semantic understanding which would be 
presented in the abstract e.g. ‘when you (‘one’) goes to the cinema’.  In schematic terms the 
difference between general events and life-time period/extended events is less pronounced, 
however general events are more representative of scripts, while chapters are more 
representative of temporally defined schema. 
Links between the structure of life-story chapters, and that of the autobiographical 
memory store have been suggested by a number of researchers, but these connections have 
been analogous rather than explicitly defined.  For example Thomsen (2009; 2015) examined 
life-stories in order to categorise the elements of the self-memory system (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), relating to life-time periods, extended events.  According to 
Thomsen, narrative and conceptual chapters are representative of this mid-level 
categorisation of semantic autobiographical knowledge (Thompson, 2009) 
This suggests a dual role of life-story chapters as schema which lies in their 
influencing role in providing information on typicality which in turn influences recall, and 
potentially subsequent narration, which feeds back in to the schematic representation.  As a 
result, narration of personal events, either through individual rehearsal (thinking about 
experiences), or through interpersonal exchange (talking about experiences) has been 
suggested as the way in which cognitive schema are created and maintained, through 
autobiographical reasoning (Habermas & Bluck, 2000; Thomsen, 2015), with narratives 




1.3.1 Research evidence for life-story chapters 
While there are considerable overlaps between the research carried out on the impact 
of life-time periods on memory recall, there is a separate tradition of research in to role of 
chapters as a structuring component of narrative accounts, as defined by either participants or 
researchers, or interpretation of characteristic prose in narrative texts.  The following section 
will discuss the research which has used chapters, of these, five studies (Burns & Leonard, 
2005; Dalgleish, et al, 2011; Pillemer et al, 1991; Thomsen & Berntsen, 2008; Thomsen, 
Pillemer, & Ivcevic, 2011) explicitly asked participants to report life-story chapters, while a 
number of others (Malley & Stewart, 1991; Pillemer, Sanborn, DiDonato, & Wink, 2003; 
Thomsen, 2009) have relied on researcher interpretation of narrative accounts.  
Of the five studies eliciting participant defined chapters only three have a specific 
focus on autobiographical memory in terms of distribution of content episodic memories, 
others looked at the inclusion and characteristics of events which occur within the cultural 
life-script; thematic similarities within and between chapters, and changes to structure over 
time and gender.  Pillemer and Colleagues (1991) asked participants to define chapters after 
eliciting a narrative of the first year of undergraduate study in 30 students, and examined the 
differences between men and women in chapter categorisation, along with the distribution of 
memories within the chapters.  Thomsen and Berntsen (2008) and Thomsen and Colleagues 
(2011) looked for links with the cultural life-script and to establish a pattern of chapter 
distribution analogous to the reminiscence bump, while Dalgliesh and Colleagues (2011) 
aimed to examine biases in chapter attributes occurring in participants current and recovered 
depression when compared to never-depressed controls; and Burns and Leonard (2005) 
examined the narrative chapter structures for developmental progression in response to the 
idea that, for women, life is over at 40.   
Procedures for elucidation of chapters are generally similar, with instructions being 
some variation on the following request: 
‘Imagine that your life story is a book, and that within this book there are chapters.  
You can have as many chapters as you like, and they can be of any length.  The 
chapters should include your entire life (or since 10/11 years old).  There is no right 




Of the four studies which asked participants to title their chapters, all resulted in 
labels which summarised one or two important themes.  In a study of older adults (aged 49-
75 years), who were asked to narrate their life-stories and subsequently produce chapters for 
them, participants reported chapters within recognisable themes, as might be representative of 
life-periods e.g. childhood, early adulthood; work/education themes e.g. ‘primary school’, 
‘retirement’ and relationships e.g. ‘marriage’, ‘young children’ (Thomsen, et al,  2011).  
Using a similar procedure Dalgleish and Colleagues (2011) asked participants (aged between 
40 -60) with current MDD, remitted MDD and never depressed controls to report chapters for 
their past and future lives and provide a short description or name for the period. Examples of 
chapters from the past included ‘school days’, ‘depression’, ‘Grandparents death’, ‘marriage’, 
with future chapter titles being relatively similar but age-appropriate, for example, 
‘grandchildren’ and ‘new career'.  When comparing chapter narratives of women between 40-
45 with those of women between 60-65 for themes, Burn and Leonard, (2005) noted while 
many chapters were given formal titles, such as ‘Bob’s retirement’, others were more 
emotionally compelling, e.g. ‘Disaster time’.  A gender difference was reported in only one 
study (Pillemer, et al, 1991) who found that male participants tended to describe chapters 
using themes, while women tended to define chapters by emotional tone.   
One area of research has specifically linked chapter-based memories with the 
schematic structure of autobiographical memory has examined participant-defined chapters 
and their associated specific memories as analogous to the autobiographical memory 
‘reminiscence bump’ (Jansari & Parkin, 1996).  Thomsen and Berntsen (2008) examined the 
recall of specific memories considered ‘central’ the life-story in 59 older adults (60-70 year 
olds), and also the distribution of life-story chapters.  Their results suggest that the cultural-
life script has an organisational role in linking the recall of events and the structure of 
chapters, with the relationship between specific memories and the start of chapters, with life-
script events and a ‘reminiscence bump’ clustering around the 20-30 year age bracket.    Later 
research has found evidence that the distribution of specific memories was more common at 
the beginning of chapters, and that positive but not negative chapters showed a chapter-level 
reminiscence bump for specific memories (Thomsen, et al, 2011).  In this study adult 
participants (mean 59.5 (6.5) years) were asked to section their life stories in to personally 
meaningful chapters, and the most positive and negative were selected, and each used to cue 
recall of a specific memory.  Results from these studies suggest that chapters show a their 




chapters, and that chapters themselves cluster through the life-course in the same ways as 
specific memories, with an associated positive memory bias.  These results cannot be 
explained by the biological, account of reminiscence-bump causation which proposes an 
evolutionary advantage of recalling novel events (Schrauf & Rubin, 1998), along with raised 
cognitive performance at late adolescence/early adulthood.  Favouring instead a conclusion 
which is conducive with either a cognitive account which emphasises that memories recalled 
from the bump are more likely to be ‘first-time’ events (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002); and the 
narrative identity account which related the preferential recall to their having occurred during 
a period of identity schema formation  (Demiray, Gülgöz, & Bluck, 2009; Glück & Bluck, 
2007; Rubin, Rahhal, & Poon, 1998).   The authors conclude that chapters have a role in the 
specific memory reminiscence bump as a result of the higher number of ‘new’ chapters at this 
age, or that higher numbers of culturally significant (life-schema) of novel events, which 
would be more memorable (for the latter) or more likely to be recalled and rehearsed (for the 
former), in addition there may be a greater number or degree of shifts in self-perceptions or 
goals which delineates new chapters (Glück & Bluck, 2007) at this age.  While it is not clear 
whether the clustering of memories create chapters, or chapter structures define the memories 
which are recalled, and whether these factors interlink the process appears to be a smaller-
scale version of the creation of the life-story. 
As outlined above, specific links between SMS structures of lifetime periods, and 
general events, have been drawn to evidence cognitive representations analogous to chapters.  
This is not unreasonable given the similarity in definition, but to date only one study has 
matched researcher interpretation of chapters i.e. the ways in which narrative is thematically 
sectioned in to life-story chapters, with those reported by the person i.e. how the person 
recalls their lives (Pillemer, et al, 1991), and while authors reported a good level of similarity 
between participants and researchers, this study only examined the story narrative of a single 
year in participants lives. This limited time-scale could have led to a degree of convergence, 
without providing strong evidence for the idea that researchers can predict how memories are 
clustered from an external perspective, for example by categorising narratives.  
Studies which have examined chapters from the perspective of researcher 
interpretation can be categorised in to those examining autobiographical memory, including 




‘extended events’ (Conway, 1996; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) of the self-memory 
system, and those examining narrative accounts.   
When examining the narrative, rather than the specific, memory-linked, role of 
chapters, Thomsen (2009) elicited life-story narratives from 30 elderly Danes aged a mean 
(SD) 79.3 (3.4) years, with life-stories lasting around 45 minutes (as requested by the 
interviewer).  A comprehensive component analysis was carried out, to examine the structure 
and categories of information which were communicated by the narratives.  Results indicated 
that that chapters are the most frequently used structural component of life narratives with a 
mean (SD) 33.13 (20.2) chapters per life-story, while specific memories occurred a mean 
(SD) 7.80 (7.4).  Similarly, Mackavey, Malley and Stewart (1991) carried out a content 
analysis on 49 published accounts of psychologists’ lives for autobiographically 
consequential events which occurred as both specific and extended narrative forms, with 
episodic memories accounting for less than a third of reported autobiographical descriptions.  
A further two studies have examined the distribution of specific event narratives found that 
they were more common early on in stories as suggested by the reminiscence bump recall 
studies by Thomsen, and Berntsen (2011), and that women tended to include a greater 
number within their narratives (Pillemer et al., 1991; Pillemer, et al, 2003; Pillemer, et al, 
1988).  Thus it appears that in order to communicate our life stories we speak at a chapter-
level more commonly than event-level.    
1.3.2 Role of life-stories in autobiographical memory 
A life-story narrative is a form of representation of the content of autobiographical 
memory, structured around what individuals learn and understand about culturally significant 
events, and what is worth telling (Bohn, 2011; Bohn & Berntsen, 2013; Fivush, Habermas, 
Waters, & Zaman, 2011; Koppel & Berntsen, 2014; Rubin, Berntsen, & Hutsen, 2008) and 
influenced by the context of ‘telling’ and the audience (Pasupathi, McLean, & Weeks, 2009).  
The structure of the narrative is not simply a representation of events which have happened to 
a person, but also a result of autobiographical reasoning (Habermas & Bluck, 2000, 
Thomsen, 2015), the process by which life-period events are connected in personally 
meaningful ways to a temporally and thematically structured whole.  As a result of the 
temporal magnitude of life-stories, which by definition span the lifetime, there is a significant 
role to play of mid-level structures in enabling the organisation, contextualisation, and 




the phenomena of episodic memory recall, and the proposal that specific events are the 
building blocks of life-stories (Bluck, 2003), Thomsen (2009; 2015) has argued that 
autobiographical chapters are an under-explored, but essential, aspect of the life-story 
providing a framework for autobiographical memory recall, and through this a person’s sense 
of self.  Suggestions for why life-story chapters are a neglected area include that there have 
been definitional difficulties in deciding what they constitute.  They are not, for example, 
represented within Tulving’s (1985) definitions of memory categories ‘episodic’ and 
‘semantic’, as they include a range of both types of information, i.e. an autobiographical 
semantic memory (Thomsen, Oleson, Schneider, & Tǿnnesvang, 2014).  Differences in the 
ways that chapters are described within the literature also add to the confusion, for example, 
‘extended event timelines’ (Barsalou, 1988), ‘life-time periods’ (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000), ‘mini-narratives’ (Robinson, 1992), ‘autobiographical periods’ (Brown, Hansen, lee, 
Vanderveen, & Conrad, 2012), event-clusters (Brown & Schopflocher, 1998), and ‘life-story 
chapters’ (McAdams, 2001) all appear to indicate the same phenomena.  While it could be 
argued that this definitional difference could indicate a loosely defined concept, 
contemporary evidence points to neural correlates of personal, autobiographical semantic 
memory being distinct from episodic memory (Renoult, Davidson, Palombo, Moscovitch, & 
Levine, 2012), and both that semantic and episodic information contributes to temporally 
extended personal events (Prebble, Addis, &  Tippett, 2013).   
Thomsen (2009; 2015) proposed that life-story chapters should be defined as 
memories for different activities and episodes stretching over an extended periods of time and 
relating to the same higher order activity, and they are often, in practice likened to the 
chapters of a book, containing a temporal narrative, and connective event links along with 
information and evaluations.  As a result of the need to represent real-life events, in 
combination with the need to create an autobiographical ‘sense’ to life-stories, chapters can 
be of various lengths and incorporate definitions such as ‘mini-narratives’, and ‘extended 
events’, all of which are analogous to components of the self-memory system, for example 
the lifetime period, ‘my time in the army’ or extended event ‘our summer in Italy’.  
Thomsen’s later work proposes the title ‘autobiographical periods’ apparently in order to 
span the research in to autobiographical memory, and narrative construction, the latter of 
which tends to rely on this ‘book chapter’ metaphor in research (Thomsen, 2015). For the 
purposes of this thesis the term ‘life-story chapters’ or ‘chapters’ will be used as this draws 





The role of chapters in life-stories is reflected in everyday interactions where 
recollective experiences rely on personal semantics and life-story chapters which are 
frequently used to contextualise and create temporal reference points (Brown, Sheval, & 
Rips, 1986; Friedman, 2004; Shum, 1998).  Research has pointed to the use of chapters as 
being frequently mentioned in tasks where extended periods are related to others (Barsalou, 
1988; Habermas & Diel, 2013; Mackavey, Malley, & Stewart, 1991; Pillemer, et al,, 1991; 
Robinson & Taylor, 1998; Steiner, Pillemer, Thomsen, & Minigan, 2014; Thomson, 2009), 
when autobiographical memories are cued by music (Ford, Addis, & Giovanello, 2011), or 
narrative-based sentences for past and future (Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009).  Thus in 
research settings there is a preponderance of chapter-like recall, comprising autobiographical 
semantic knowledge which stretches over temporal distances greater than the notional 24 
hour period which delineates episodic memories.   
A further aspect of differentiation between chapters and episodic memories are that in 
practice episodic memories which are retained for significant periods are often self-defining 
(Pillemer, 1998; Singer & Salovey, 1993); emotionally potent, or relating to life transitions 
(Thomsen & Berntsen, 2008) or cultural events (Harris, Barnier, Sutton, & Kiel, 2010), and 
so potentially serve to illustrate significant points in the life-story, but these are by definition 
not representative of life in general.  The day to day story of life is less defined, containing 
clusters of events, and periods which are semantically distinct from others.  Personal 
narratives themselves also tend to comprise a variety of autobiographical features, along with 
explanatory and contextualising components which are a result of a chapter-level 
autobiographical reasoning process described as ‘life-period reasoning’ (Thomsen, 2015).    
Overall it is clear from reviewing the literature on life-story chapters, that as a result 
of approaching the concept from two directions, these being from autobiographical memory, 
and from structures of narrative accounts, the nature of chapters themselves is confused.  If 
chapters are in fact the same as life-time periods, or general/extended events, why use a new 
term?  Also, if they are narrative representations of time periods of varying lengths, should 
the SMS be adjusted to accommodate this variability?  Alternatively, could they be 
considered constructed narrative devices for representation of clusters of events of similar 
nature?  Examining participant-created chapters has directly revealed in only one study 




memory and the self-memory system (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  Other studies have 
either inferred the links between autobiographical memory and narrative construction, or 
remained indifferent.  In practice the concept of chapters has ecological validity, in that they 
are easily identified by participants and by researchers in transcripts and published narratives 
(Pillemer, et al, 1991; Schooler & Herrman, 1992; Thomsen, Pillemer, & Ivcevic, 2011; 
Thomsen & Berntsen, 2008), but their relationship to cognitive autobiographical 
representations has not been fixed. 
The research discussed in this section highlights one of the perennial problems of 
autobiographical memory research, that being the tension between reported experience and 
narratives, and internal representation.  As discussed in the section on autobiographical 
memory, there is good evidence from priming studies for a hierarchical clustering of 
autobiographical information, and as metaphorical ‘chapter' structures are suggestive of life-
time periods, or extended narratives, they are a useful proxy in research as they appear to 
make ‘common sense’ to research participants.  As yet research has not effectively addressed 
the question of whether matching of internally (participant) defined chapters, when compared 
to externally (researcher) defined chapters is possible as only one study has examined this 
(Pillmer, et al, 1991).  In particular the research by Thomsen (2011; 2015) which evidenced 
the ubiquitous nature of chapters in narratives used a broad definition and did not 
differentiate the use of chapters as a narrative device to make stories more coherent, and the 
underlying structure of memory representation.  Despite this, if chapters are approached as 
schematic representations, specific predictions can be made about the relationship between 
chapters and the memories which might be cued by them by using participant interpretations.  
For example, because chapters appear to be both constructed with reference to cultural 
knowledge (life script),narrative identity (life-story schema), and the demands of 
communication, but also relate to actual events it could be predicted that there are specific 
events which actually occurred to the individual, but are also used as exemplars for chapters 
e.g. for a chapter about ‘life as a soldier’ a specific memory could be ‘the day I was send to 
Afghanistan’, and that these would be rehearsed to a greater extent than those which 
correspond less to the chapters theme, recall-ability would therefore rely on how relevant the 




 1.4  Summary of Chapter 1 1.4
This introduction has concerned itself with examining the suggested role of life-story 
schema and life-story chapters in the structure of autobiographical memory.  The existence of 
the life-story schema as a cognitive framework for underlying autobiographical memory is 
suggested by studies which show a link between the patterns of recall over the life-time and 
the ways these are structured within the life-story.   Evidence points to life-story narratives 
relying on schematic representations internalised during childhood (Bohn & Berntsen, 2008), 
and that memory narratives are guided by learned cultural patterns from the cultural life script 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2004).   
In addition, the two theoretical models of autobiographical memory both rely on a 
life-story template to guide self-knowledge, the SMS uses an abstracted ‘life-story’ as the 
entirety of autobiographical knowledge, while the BSM uses the structure of a narrative 
schema to provide a guide for meaning and relevance throughout the autobiographical 
memory system.  Life-story chapters, are sub-sections of the life-story narrative, and this 
suggests is that chapters are narrative-based sub-structures of the life-story schema.  They are 
thematically linked clusters of autobiographical information, which have abstracted 
attributes; are identifiable in life-story narratives, and easily defined by participants under 
experimental conditions, and occur more frequently in narratives than other components 
(Mackavey, Malley, & Stewart, 1991; Pillemer, et al, 2003; Thomsen, 2011) 
The difference between a life-story chapter, and a representation in narrative of a life-
time period (the theoretical structure from the SMS), reveals an overlap but some differences.  
Although it is common for chapters to be temporally represented, this is not always the case 
(Burt, Kemp, & Conway, 2003; Burt, 2008), and this suggests that they are more akin to the 
BSM which would rely on a narrative chapter structure which reflects fluidity and thematic 
linking seen in a few studies.  Despite this the best evidence for a hierarchical categorisation 
in autobiographical memory does emerge from the use of life-time periods, or chapter-like 
structures acting as priming clusters (Conway & Bekerian, 1987), and for use in temporality 
judgements (Arbruthnot & Brown, 2009).   The temporal stability of life-story chapters has 
not been explored, but is indicated by priming studies, and that many chapters match 
culturally defined life-periods, such as marriage, university life, etc. (Burns & Leonard, 2005; 




patterns which reflect those found for autobiographical memory recall, as shown by evidence 
for a reminiscence bump of, and for, chapters (Thomsen & Berntsen, 2008).   
That chapters are schematic in nature, i.e. create a template for the recall of events 
with a particular subsection or period of a persons’ life is predicted by a number of 
characteristics.  The first is that they comprise not simply clusters of episodic memories, but 
also abstracted knowledge and summative conclusions from the period in question, and also 
research in to the process of autobiographical reasoning, and narrative processing (McAdams, 
2006; Singer & Bluck, 2001).  Effective processing of events creates a closure on the 
narrative story which represents them, and this crystallisation of chapters reduces 
opportunities for variability, re-interpretation and change, while the entirety of the life-story 
schema must remain ‘open’ throughout life, life-story chapters can close.  The role of 
autobiographical reasoning in the establishment of life-story schema is suggested by 
increased reasoning following challenging events, a synchronic-diachronic challenge.  Life-
period reasoning has not been explored, but likely to follow the same two-stage process as 
autobiographical reasoning.  What we still don’t know is how the proposed chapter schema 
would influence the recall of material which was dissonant, or incongruent with the content 
of the chapter in question.  Questions also remain concerning the use of chapters in research, 
because of the variability in definition, and the interchangeability of life-time periods (as 
cognitive structures), and life-story chapters (as aspects of narrative).  Does the structure of 
the life-story narrative and component chapters, match the life-story schema, and if so do 
differences in narrative structure represent differences in schema? 
In order to explore these questions this thesis looks to compare the life-story 
narratives, and life-story chapters of people with depression with non-depressed groups.  
People with depression are reported to produce narratives with reduced coherence, more 
negative motifs and summations, and may be impeded in their ability to undergo 
autobiographical reasoning as a result of cognitive difficulties and impeded rehearsal.  The 
following chapter outlines these in detail and puts forward the argument that a breakdown in 
the chapter structure for people with depression may be a diathesis which impacts on their 






 Chapter 2   Depression and Memory Chapter 2
 
 2.1  Occurrence of depression 2.1
Worldwide, depression is believed to affect over 350 million individuals at any one 
time, and occurs across countries irrespective of cultural and economic status (Marcus, 
Yasmay, van Ommeran, & Chisholm 2012).  In a recent survey of 17 countries, the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) found that on average 1:20 people had experienced a depressive 
episode in the previous year (Marcus, et al,  2012).  Depression tends to occur early on in life 
and is likely to reoccur, and has been established as a chronic and life-long condition (Gotlib 
& Hammen, 2009).  Daily 3000 people worldwide with a diagnosis of depression complete 
suicide, with 20 attempters to every completer (Marcus, et al, 2012).  
The term ‘depression’ can refer to a range of diagnosable experiences of mental 
distress, all relating to a central cluster of negative emotional regulatory symptoms such as 
dysphoria or prolonged sadness.  The nature of this disorder has been examined in terms of 
its symptoms, course, epidemiology and aetiology, and the ways in which we understand and 
prioritise these features impacts on our approach to its treatment and anticipated outcome.   
2.1.1 Dysthymic and major-depressive disorders 
All depressive disorders share similar features, but this thesis concerns itself with the 
experience of both dysthymic-, and major-depressive disorder, the onset, maintenance, 
recurrence, and relapse of which have been examined in detail by Gotlib and Hammen 
(2009).  Features of the disorders include: dysphoria or sustained sadness; anhedonia (an 
absence of emotional responsiveness); weight or appetite disturbance; sleep disturbance; 
psychomotor agitation/retardation; fatigue and loss of energy; feelings of worthlessness/guilt; 
diminished concentration, and thoughts of suicide or death. 
Diagnosis of depressive disorders involves the observation or reporting of symptoms 
according to criteria established in psychiatric guidance such as the Diagnostic Statistical 
Manual of the American Psychiatric Association (DSM: American Psychiatric Association, 




specific levels, and these include risk factors, including familial patterns of occurrence 
(Weissman, Wickramaratne, Nomura, Warner, Verdeli, et al, 2005) and genetic markers 
(Flint & Kendler, 2014).    Cognitive factors such as subjective emotional experience 
(Bylsma, Morris, & Rottenberg 2008), thinking style e.g. rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008), diminished cognitive control (Roiser, Blackwell, Rock, & 
Riedel, 2014), attentional bias (Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2004; Pyszczynski, 
Hamilton, Herring, & Greenberg, 1989) and impaired memory function (Dalgleish & 
Werner-Seidler, 2014).  Along with biological and neurological markers of the condition such 
as neuroendocrinology (Checkley, 1996; Ströhle, 2003) 
Proposed external factors which influence the incidence of depression include socio-
economic status, familial and social context (Burcusa & Iacono, 2007; Gilman, Kawachi, 
Fitzmaurice & Buka, 2003; Lorant et al., 2006; Wille, Blettner, & Lemstra, 2008), and 
features which exist on the boundary between internal and external factors, such as social-
interpretive bias, and interpersonal function (Beck, 1967; Joiner & Tommons, 2013).  This 
final feature of depression is one which has been minimally explored, but as people with 
depression are as embedded in the shared interpersonal context as the rest of humanity, it 
bears merit to consider how aspects of communication might affect the experience of their 
condition. 
Depression is a syndrome which cannot be effectively diagnosed without the 
reporting, by the individual, of behavioural and experiential symptoms, or close clinical 
observation.  Depression diagnosis is carried out by a trained clinician using interview 
techniques such as SCID-II (First, et al, 1997) (Appendix 12), which allows the systematic 
evaluation of DSM-specific criteria for depressive disorders.  Criteria include at least one of 
the following to be currently interfering with the person’s life most of the day, nearly every 
day, for at least two weeks: abnormal depressed mood most of the day, or abnormal loss of 
all interest and pleasure most of the day, or, if 18 or younger, abnormal irritable mood.  
Along with at least five of the following symptoms, present during the same two-week 
depressed period: abnormal depressed mood (or irritable mood if a child or adolescent); 
abnormal loss of all interest and pleasure; appetite or weight disturbance; sleep disturbance, 
either abnormal insomnia or abnormal hypersomnia; activity disturbance, either abnormal 
agitation or abnormal slowing (observable by others); abnormal fatigue or loss of energy; 




abnormal morbid thoughts of death (not just fear of dying) or suicide.  As a number of these 
are largely subjective, diagnosis requires the person or someone who has been in close 
contact with them to report these symptoms, in addition a number of them are reports of 
‘change’, being the reduction or increase from normal levels, which can also lead to 
variability in the perceived severity of the condition. 
Rating measures for depression are used, not for diagnosis, but to monitor symptom 
severity, for example the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, (HADS: Hamilton, 1967); 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II: Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), and the Patient Health 
Questionnaire (PHQ-9: Kroenke & Spitzer, 2002).  As a result of this variety in symptoms, 
and diagnostic criteria, problems are seen when trying to establish a match between diagnosis 
of mild depression by the presence of absence of symptoms, and the use of boundary scores 
on established mood rating measures, and there remain critics of the assumption that mild- 
moderate- and major- depression exist upon a continuum of symptom severity (Hegerl, 
Allgaier, Henkel, & Mergl, 2012) 
The merits of diagnostic assessments such as the SCID-II (First, et al, 1997) which is 
based on the criteria laid out in the DSM, is that the experience of the person is closely 
examined and both presence/absence of a symptom is established, with concurrent 
assessment of severity, and the length of time each symptom has been experienced.  Thus 
assessment interviews are more stringent in ensuring there are no ‘false’ positives and 
negatives.  Self-report scales such as the HADS, PHQ-9 and BDI-II are tick box short 
measures which allow the person to rate the presence, absence and severity of the key 
symptoms of depression without obtaining a full history.  As a result of the summative 
scoring of the scales, the scales do not require the presence of the standard DSM-V diagnostic 
criteria for depressive disorder, neither do they allow the differentiation between the various 
depressive conditions. These scales are thus less time consuming, and may be used to track 
depression severity over time, they are not however diagnostic of depression. In research the 
term dysphoria is used to denote symptomatology of moderate- to major-depressive disorder 
in the absence of clinical diagnosis. 
2.1.2 Causes and treatment of depression 
The primary causes of depression are not conclusively established but evidence points 




therapeutic and mental healthcare practice, the most useful theoretical model for examining 
the onset and perpetuation of depression is the biopsychosocial model (Engels, 1977) which 
allows the incorporation and consideration of all causative and maintaining factors for mental 
health problems including depression.  More specific models pertaining to depression include 
the diathesis-stress model (Beck, 1967; Ingram & Luxton, 2005) which proposes causal links 
between the multiple influential factors found in depression. 
The idea that predispositions, maintaining, and resilience factors are relevant to the 
development of psychological disorders has been long established, with a formalised 
diathesis-stress model being formally developed for schizophrenia in the 1960s (Ingram & 
Luxton, 2005).  Within these models mental illness is understood in terms of a pre-existing 
vulnerability (diathesis), combined with a triggering experience (stress) which leads to the 
experience of mental illness. The diathesis can be conceptualised as either a genetic, early 
life-stress, and/or a schematic factor, while the stressors are usually conceptualised as life-
events such as trauma, social and emotional challenges, and in some cases physical injury.  
Despite the general acceptance of the biopsychosocial model, medical treatments for 
depression tend to target biological causes leading to treatment addressing the biochemical 
and neurological features of depression (Linde, Rucker, Jamil, Schumann, Meissner, et al , 
2015), while a diathesis-stress model (Ingram & Luxton, 2005) is commonly used as the 
foundation for psychological therapy and treatment.  
Beck’s diathesis-stress model of depression proposes that diathetic aspects of 
depression are the cognitive and behavioural biases which form part of personality interact 
with environmental triggers, to initiate functional biases in cognition, emotion and behaviour.  
Beck’s model forms the foundation of the most common, psychological treatment for 
depression, cognitive-behaviour therapy.  This therapy directly addresses cognitive schema, 
and attempts to adjust habitual ways of thinking, expectations and emotional responses 
(Beck, et al, 1979).   
Preventative measures which address diathesis aspects of depression have shown to 
be effective in reducing risk of developing the disorder.  In their 2008 review of 19 studies in 
to randomised controlled trials of methods to prevent the onset of depressive disorders, 
Beekman, Cuijpers and Colleagues, found that interventions in a range of groups reduced risk 
of developing depression by around 22%.  The majority of interventions were CBT-based, 




psychoeducational and peer-support groups.  This reveals that not only are there specific risk 
factors related to depression, but that aspects of individual experience and cognition may be 
changed to provide protective factors reducing the chances of depression occurring.  The 
corollary to this is that there is an imperative to define the risk factors which predispose 
individuals to depression 
 2.2  Cognitive features of depression 2.2
The key assumption of the Beck model is that dysfunctional schema are vulnerability 
factors for depression, and are often assumed to have some element of latency (usually in that 
they are formed in childhood, and become apparent under stress).  Cognitive schema 
themselves may be conceptualised to have links with development, during which schema are 
thought to be established, and personality, which is theoretically both the foundation and the 
result of dysfunctional schema.  While useful, therefore, to establish the components which 
cause and maintain depression, Becks model does not serve to delineate what constitutes 
‘dysfunction’ in any particular component.   
While established as a key component of Beck’s model of depression, the definition 
of ‘cognitive schema’ has not been well elucidated, being differently described as sets of core 
beliefs about the self and the world, but also as rule systems, they may also be described in 
terms of ‘cognitions’ and ‘multi-sensory representations’ (James, Southam, & Blackburn, 
2004). In addition, Becks model for depression suggests that people who are at risk of 
depression have a functional negative schema for self-related material, which is manifest in 
behaviour and interactions as ‘low self-esteem’.  This is variously described in terms of 
negative self-evaluation in comparison to others, low estimations of own ability, and 
associated lack of confidence, and is a continuous construct in those experiencing it (Hankin, 
Frahley, Lehey, & Waldman, 2005).  Orth and Robin’s 2013 meta-analysis explored the 
evidence for this link being a diathesis aspect of depression, asking if depression could be the 
result of a pre-existing low sense of self-value (the ‘vulnerability model’), whether a 
reduction in self-esteem was as a consequence of having depression (or ‘scar model’), or 
alternatively as a combination of these two processes (the ‘reciprocal relation model’).  They 
used regression analysis to examine longitudinal evidence linking the incidence of predictive 
and maintaining factors which pointed to vulnerability as a result of pre-existing low-self-




functioning sense of self, and self-esteem, is thought rely on the ability to relate and recount, 
to the self and others, a narrative life-story which both positions the narrator in a positive 
light, allows the potential for a coherent progression in to the future, and confirms a particular 
life-position based on the principles and beliefs of the individual (McAdams, 2006).  If this 
aspect of self is impaired it is reasonable to assume that the resultant poor-sense of self-
identity is a vulnerability which can lead to depression.   
Of particular interest to cognitive psychology are the aspects of bias which influence 
the attention, processing of information, and memory for events which re-inforce negative 
self-schema.  Attentional biases may be both precursers and maintaining factors in depressive 
disorders (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1997; Browning, Holmes, & Harmer, 2010) tending to 
result in an enhanced perception of negative material, for example, people with depression 
will have a reduced tendency to avert attention from negative material (as seen in non-
depressed individuals) (Bradley, Mogg, & Lee, 1997; McCabe, Gotlib, & Martin, 2000).  
Attentional bias has also been shown to be experimentally sensitive to negative mood 
priming (Gilboa & Gotlib, 1997; Ingram, Bernet, & McLaughlin, 1994; Ingram, Miranda, & 
Segal, 1998; Miranda, Gross, Persons, & Hahn, 1998; Miranda & Persons, 1988; Miranda, 
Persons, & Byers, 1990).  Evidence of a negative processing bias was found to be predictive 
of later depression was shown in a study by Rude and Colleagues (2003).  Using the 
Scrambled Sentences task (SST: Wenzlaff, 1993), which requires participants to order a 
selection of words in to grammatically correct sentences, the words provided give 
opportunities for negative, and positive statements.  For example, ‘winner, born, am, I, loser, 
a’ could result in ‘I am a born winner’, but also ‘I am a born loser’.  A negative processing 
bias in the SST is provided by a higher proportion of negative as opposed to positive 
sentences. At follow-up 12-18 months after the SST task, those participants who had 
subsequently experienced a depressive episode where found to have been more likely to 
complete sentences with a negative rather than positive meaning.   Similar to attentional 
biases in depression, negative processing biases may not be immediately evident under 
experimental conditions, leading to some confusion as to the role in the aetiology of 
depression.  When cognitive load is increased during experimental tasks, for example, by 
rehearsing a sequence of numbers while performing the experimental task, aspects of bias 
which had otherwise been undiscovered have been revealed.  Wenzlaff and Bates (1998) 
found that when participants were given a scrambled sentence completion task, under 




in short-term memory) formerly depressed students in the load condition completed more 
sentences with negative rather than positive meaning when compared to never depressed 
controls.  This aspect of increased load could impact on recovery maintenance, as Segal, 
Gemar and Williams (1999) found that the long-term probability of relapse after CBT and 
psychopharmacology treatment in depression was mediated by dysfunctional attitudes, but 
only when these attitudes had been reported after negative mood-induction. 
The presence of maladaptive cognitive mechanisms in depression is also linked to 
cognitive processing mode in memory encoding and recall.  Processing mode relates to the 
cognitive generation of events as either abstract/analytic ideas, or more concrete/experiential 
events, the former being information or ‘facts’ about events, the latter containing more 
sensory material or evoking physical sensations.  An abstract thinking style has been linked 
to brooding rumination, one of the risk-, maintenance- and re-occurrence-factors in 
depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008).  It is also linked to the 
perceived disparity between ideal and actual experiences (Martin & Tesser, 1989; Watkins, 
Moberly & Moulds 2011; Werner-Siedler & Moulds, 2011), a further feature of depressive 
cognition.  In a recent study Werner-Siedler and Moulds (2012) found that manipulating 
processing mode in memory recall following negative mood induction, requiring participants 
to focus on an episodic memory using either an abstract (thinking of the meaning of the 
event), or concrete (visualisation of the event details) processing mode impacted on the 
ability to use specific (event-based) positive memories in mood-repair, with concrete 
processing in depressed participants resulting in positive mood gains, while abstract 
processing did not. This abstract rather than concrete modality is reflected in a diminution of 
memory features such as vividness, experiential detail and coherence rather than simply 
availability of memories (Sutin & Robins, 2007).  
One aspect of depression which could explain both the abstract cognition and 
cognitive load phenomena is that of the use of cognitive management strategies by people 
with depression, to suppress, or avoid negative information, particularly that which is highly 
self-relevent.  One body of research which has examined the role of inhibition in depressive-
cognition comes from explanations for overgeneral memory which is a precursor, possible 
risk factor, and symptomatic of depression (OGM: Williams, 2006).  Over-general memory 
was first established as a feature of suicidal groups by Williams and Broadbent (1986), and 




examined experimentally by asking participants to report, in response to cue-words or 
images, specific episodic memories (being an autobiographical event, lasting no more than 
one day, for which the person can recall features which indicate that it was a single occasion).  
‘Generality’ is considered to be present when the reported event cannot be confirmed as 
being a single specific event despite instructions.  The standard test for OGM is the AMT 
(Williams & Broadbent, 1986), a word-cuing task, however other paradigms have been 
developed to explore the phenomena at more depth (Goddard, Pring, & Felmingham, 2005; 
Raes et al 2007).   
The causal link between OGM and depression has been elucidated by examining 
populations who experience OGM, such as those who have experienced childhood trauma 
(Crane, Heron, Gunnell. Lewis, Evans, & Williams, 2014), and abuse (Aglan, Williams, 
Pickles, & Hill, 2010; Kuyken & Brewin, 1999; Raes, Hermann, Williams, & Eelen, 2005), 
which support the idea that it is predictive of depressive status (Hermann, Vandromme, 
Debeer, Raes, Demyttenaere, et al, 2008); suggests that it develops as a result of habitual 
avoidance of negatively impactful memories, and that it is therefore an emotional regulation 
strategy (Hermann, et al, 2005; Williams, 2006).  This functional avoidance explanation is 
part of the CaRFAX Model of depression (Williams, et al, 2007) which itself draws on the 
Self-memory system model of autobiographical memory (Conway & Pleyell-Pearce, 2000).  
The CaRFAX model proposes that, once initiated by a cue or search criteria for a specific 
autobiographical event, a generative memory search will start at the level of general events 
and under normal circumstances this will result in access to one of a number of events within 
this category which best fit the search criteria.  Once functional avoidance is established the 
event memories will become less likely to be accessed, with concurrent reduction in 
activation over time.  A number of studies have shown that OGM is independent of current 
depressive status, (Aglan, Williams, Pickles, & Hill, 2010; Hauer, Wessel, Geraerts, 
Merckelbach, & Dalgleish, 2008), and avoidant coping (Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979; 
Brewin, Watson, McCarthy, Hyman, & Dayson, 1998; Hauer, Wessel, Engelhard, Peeters, & 
Dalgleish,2009; Hauer, et al, 2008; Hauer, Wessel, & Merckelbach, 2006; Kuyken & Brewin, 
1995; Raes, Hermans, Williams, Beyers, 2006; Stokes, Dritschel, & Bekerian, 2004; Wessel, 
Merckelbach, & Dekkers, 2002), and the short-term emotional benefits of OGM were seen in 
two studies by Raes and Colleagues (Rae, Hermans, De Decker, Eelen, & Williams, 2003; 
Raes, Hermans, Williams, & Eelen, 2006, Study 1; but see Philippot, Schaefer, & Herbette, 




methods discussed in Section 1.1.3, so while the AMT allows assessment of memory 
specificity using a simple binary i.e. memory meets criteria for episodicity or not, the 
interview techniques and TEMPau are designed to explore the boundary between semantic 
and episodic memory features within a single narrative.  Narrative-based sampling methods 
are considered to be more ecologically valid as they represent a closer analogue to real-life 
recall circumstances.  In practice it is the balance between semantic and episodic information 
which characterises overgenerality in memory recall in that the former outweighs the latter.  
Original findings for OGM in patients with suicidal tendencies led to the use of the AMT to 
examine a number of psychopathologies, including schizophrenia (Warren & Haslam, 2007); 
post-traumatic stress disorder (Sutherland & Bryant, 2007); trauma (Raes, Williams, Herman, 
Eelen, 2005); personality disorders (Bech, Elklit, & Simonsen, 2015), complicated grief 
(Macallum & Bryant, 2011); post-natal depression (Croll & Bryant, 2000) and in particular 
MDD (Crane, Barnhofer, & Williams, 2007; Dalgliesh & Brewin, 2007).  While these results 
helped guide theoretical models to explain manifestations of disorders, for example the 
absence of problem-solving abilities in depression (Evans, Williams, O’Loughlan, & 
Howells, 1992; Kao, Dritschell, & Astell, 2006; Pollock & Williams, 1998), aspects of the 
testing protocols and conditions have suggested that OGM is not a fixed state but is 
dependent on the context of recall and method of cuing, so for example when asked to 
verbalise cognitive imagery and processes during AMT recall, MDD patients were found to 
have intact autobiographical memory recall (Barnhofer, Jong-Mayer, Kleinpass, & Nikesch, 
2002).   
The recall of OGM in MDD is also complicated by the conflicting evidence for the 
role of cue-valence.  A number of studies indicate that positive cues are more likely to result 
in over-general recall than negative cues (Bergouignan, Lemogne, Foucher, Lougin, Vistoli, 
et al, 2008; Brittlebank, Scott, Williams & Ferrier, 1993, Lemogne, Piolino, Friszer, Claret, 
Girault, Jouvent, et al,  2006; Wessel, Meeren, Peeters, Arntz, & Mechelbach, 2001; 
Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams & Scott, 1988), while other studies report the 
opposite effect (Brewin, Reynolds, & Tata, 1999; Burnside, Startup, Byatt, Rollinson, & Hill, 
2004; Hermans, De Franc, Raes, Williams, & Eelen, 2005; Mackinger, Pachinger, Leibeseder 
& Fartecek, 2000; Park, Goodyer, & Teasdale, 2002, 2004; Scott, Williams, Brittlebank, & 
Ferrier, 1995; Watkins & Teasdale, 2004), while still others report no differences (Dickson & 
Bates, 2006; Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1996; Kuyken & Dalgleish, 1995; Kuyken & 




2007).  This further indicates that the crucial factor in the ability to recall episodic memories, 
or at least memories with greater levels of episodic as opposed to semantic details is the 
method of cuing, and that while over-generality may be a habitual state (Williams, 2006), be 
predicative of later depression on-set (Gibbs & Rude, 2004; Sumner, Griffith, & Mineka, 
2010), and stable during periods of remission (Peeters, Wessel, Merkebach, & Boon-
Vermeeren, 2002), it does not mean that episodic memories are unavailable to people with 
depressive disorders.  Nor does the research point to the valence of either the cue, or the 
memory itself being systematically influential in deciding whether a memory is subject to 
over-general recall. 
Notwithstanding the role of avoidance or suppression in the management of negative 
material in depression, autobiographical memories have been suggested to have a mood-
repair function.  In their ground-breaking study Parrot and Sabini, (1990) found that when 
study participants spontaneously recalled memories, non-depressed individuals whose mood 
had been negatively induced, recalled episodic memories which were more positive than 
those who were not depressed, indicating a mood regulation function.  This function has been 
found to be impaired in formerly depressed groups, and reversed for people currently 
experiencing depressed i.e. recall of positive memories increases negative mood.  In a study 
of currently-, formerly, and never-depressed adults, Joorman, Seimer, and Gotlib, (2007) 
examined two methods of mood regulation, distraction, and recall of positive memories.  For 
controls both of these were effective in mood repair, however recall of positive memories for 
the formerly depressed group had not impact on mood, and for the currently depressed group 
actually had a negative impact. 
In addition to recalling memories of positive events, mood in non-depressed groups is 
also maintained by future imagining of affectively positive events, this has been linked to the 
ability to maintain perspective on current events e.g. imagining how things will improve, and 
allow disengagement from current negative events (Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008).  Future 
thinking is suggested to have equal importance for emotional well-being when compared to 
memory (Lavender & Watkins, 2004; Luxton, et al, 2006), and the cognitive processes 
involved in the construction of future-imagined events are thought to be similar to those used 
for the reconstruction of memories (Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009; Schacter & Addis, 2009; 
Schacter, Addis & Buckner, 2007).  The ability to imagine both positive and negative future 




depression has been linked to a decreased ability to generate future events (Dalgleish, 
Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Canterbury, & Yule, 2003; Dickson & Bates, 2006; Sarkohi, 
Bjärehed, & Andersson, 2011; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996).   
The theoretical reliance on the SMS in the development of the CaRFAX model of 
overgeneral memory lies in the assumptions around the relationship between categorical, or 
categorised memories and the specific memories to which they are linked.  In the SMS 
memories are associated with particular life-time periods, and general memories sit within 
these lifetime periods as summations of repeated events.  However, while no specific links 
have been drawn to date between the functions of the Basic Systems Model and depression, it 
is possible to provide some predictions which would explain over-generality of recall of 
specific events.  These include that the BSM relies on a narrative framework to structure 
recall, in essence the reconstruction of events is not reliant on accuracy of representation of 
past events, but is rather a representation of what is produced in narrative.  As is described in 
the following section, a narrative-based account of memory can account for many of the 
observed relationships between autobiographical recall and the organisation of self-
knowledge in depression. 
2.2.1 Self- and narrative-schema in depression 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the definition of ‘cognitive schema’ has not 
been well elucidated, being differently described as sets of core beliefs about the self and the 
world, and rule systems, but are also described in terms of ‘cognitions’ and ‘multi-sensory 
representations’ (James, Todd, & Reichelt, 2009) which are memory-like in nature i.e. 
representative of past events, containing episodic detail (James, Reichelt, Freeston, & Barton, 
2007).  Schema, according to Beck’s diathesis-stress model can be conceptualised as being 
both conscious, and pre-conscious, learnt expectations and it is autobiographical memory 
which provides the components of schema construction.  While schema may theoretically 
consist of Socratically-based if X then Y sequences e.g. If my boss is angry (X) then I am 
rubbish at my job (Y), autobiographical memory is the ‘evidence’ store for these beliefs e.g. 
events when I was rubbish at things.  The links between self-concept (the characteristics I 
believe I possess) and self-esteem (the value I place on these characteristics) and depression 
have been explored by Beck and Perkins (2001), who developed the proposal that 





One schematic representation of self is the life-story schema, which, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, uses the information within the autobiographical memory system and 
the framework of the cultural life script to guide the self-concept.  In this respect it can be 
thought of as a meta-schema which links narrative identity, guided rehearsal and 
communication of autobiographical information, with the autobiographical memory base.  
Dysfunction within this meta-schema would be predicted to disrupt processes associated with 
the life-story, such as sense of self, and also the ability to draw on aspects of experience to 
narrate life-experiences. 
The idea that dysfunction as represented in narratives is associated with mental health 
problems is not new, Schaffer (1983) conceptualized psychopathology as essentially both 
reflected and perpetuated by a life-story, that does not cohere, is not flexible, and describes an 
essentially non-agentic, non-responsible self.  Impoverished and disorganised narratives 
appear to reflect a diminished sense of a coherent self or super-ordination (Salvatore, 
DiMaggio & Semerari, 2004) and the production of disrupted and disorganised narratives is 
found in a range of people suffering from mental health problems (DiMaggio, 2006; Lysaker 
& Lysaker, 2006; Neimeyer & Buchanan-Arvay 2004).  Narration of positive events, or the 
ability to represent negative events in a positive light as a result of autobiographical reasoning 
allows ‘meaning-making’ (Taylor, 1991) and the maintenance of positive self-image.  This 
process can be considered to be a primary role of narration i.e. that being able to explain an 
event to produce a cause and effect sequence, or to create aspects of the event which can be 
used positively, for example by containing ‘lessons learnt’, or as a foil for current situations.  
The secondary impact of narration is that in communicating events there is concurrent recall 
of the cognitive representation, or memory, linked with it, and research where the positively 
of self-image in communication was manipulated has shown that changes to the affective 
content of memory as a result (McLean, 2005; McLean & Pasupathi, 2011).   
There are two important narrative features of depression which are predicted to 
impact on the consolidation and maintenance of life-story schema and autobiographical 
memories.  The first is the range and characteristics of available audiences, while the second 
is the ways in which narratives are constructed, and stories told by people with depression. 
The sharing of personal experiences and events helps to maintain social bonds, and 
interpersonal contact.  It occurs within constraints of what can be discussed, and what 




Oldroyd, 2015; Pasupathi, Stallworth, & Mudoch, 1998).  Social discourse rules may involve 
the requirement for novel information (Pennebaker & Harber, 1993; Skowronski, et al, 
2004); for relevance, for example, when speakers adjust their information to match the 
expectation and also the goals of the listener (Russell & Schober, 1999).  However, this could 
be dysfunctional in people with depression.  In a review of social skills in people with 
depression evidence was found indicating that reduced social-skills can be a risk-factor and 
lead to depression, and that depression can lead to poor social skills (Segrin, 2000), although 
the former assertion is perhaps the least supported (Lewinsohn, Roberts, Seeley, Rohde, 
Gotlib & Hops, 1994).  Poor social skills include embodied communication such as eye-
contact and posture, along with volume and modulation of voice (Youngren & Lewinsohn, 
1980), which may be perceived negatively.   Some features of depression also impair access 
to social rehearsal, for example, smaller social networks (Santini, Koyanagi, Tyrovolas, 
Mason, & Haro, 2015); an inability to recall specific events (Sumner, Griffith, & Mineka, 
2010); impaired executive control and memory intrusions (Roiser, Blackwell, Rock, & 
Riedel, 2014), and a negative recall bias (Watkins, Grimm, Whitney, & Brown, 2005) which 
limits access to tellable information (Adler,  et al, 2015). 
In terms of the content of speech there are significant thematic differences between 
depressed and non-depressed groups, for example negative evaluations and negative 
emotional tone in conversations (Hautzinger, Linden & Hoffman, 1982), although content 
may still be moderated according to the audience, with strangers receiving less negative 
reports than friends (Segrin & Flora, 1998).  There are also a number of communication 
functions which are characteristically heightened in depression, these being re-assurance 
seeking behaviours, (Joiner, Metalsky, Gencoz, & Gencoz, 2001) and solicitation of negative 
feedback (Giesler, Josephs & Swann, 1996).  Coyne, (1976) studied the emotional responses 
of conversation partners for depressed participants and found a significant negative effect of 
interactions, and this led him to propose an interpersonal model of depression maintenance, 
whereby audiences experience interactions with people with depression as negative and may 
act to limit or avoid them, leading to isolation.   Emery and Breslau (1989) found evidence 
for language deficits in elderly people with depression, and there are changes in neural 
circuitry of language when comparing before and after major depression treatment 
(Abdullaev, Kennedy, & Tasman, 2002).  Despite this there is evidence that sharing personal 




depression (DeSilva, Mckenzie, Harpham, & Huttley, 2005; Ehasn & DeSilva, 2015; Santini, 
et al, 2015)   
Evidence of depresso-typic structuring of personal stories is indicated by research on 
the nature and characteristics of narrative production, but also from a small number of studies 
specifically examining the structure of entire life-stories.  The features of narratives discussed 
in the previous chapter, including themes, structure, thematic coherence, integration, 
underlying narrative motifs, have been specifically examined in the narratives of people who 
are suffering from depression.  
People with depression have narratives which differ from non-depressed groups in 
two areas, the first is the propensity to relate negative information, the second is in 
structuring of the narrative frame, and sequence of events.  Depresso-typic narratives are 
temporally disordered (Fromholt, Larsen, & Larsen, 1995; Habermas et al, 2008); focus more 
on negative events (Rude, Gortner, & Pennebaker, 2004), and have a more depressed 
explanatory style (Seligman, Castellon, Cacciola, Schilamd, Luborsky, et al, 1988; Silverman 
& Peterson, 1993), and this has been linked to future outcome of depressiveness.    People 
with depression also use more negative or negatively charged words (Alison & Burgess, 
2003; Rude et al, 2004), particularly when talking about themselves (Fromholt et al, 1995).  
There is some evidence that the narratives of people with depression reflect a sense of 
temporal stagnation, for example, Luborsky (1993) found depressed elderly people produced 
narratives which reflected a recurrent themes and a cyclical nature.  Narrative processes 
appear to act in ways to support the depressive experience of the person, in terms of 
interpretation and meaning construction, a bias which may predate the depressive episode 
(Rude et al, 2003). 
Habermas and Colleagues (2008) carried out a study to investigate evidence that life 
narratives both reflect and stabilize psychopathology.  They examined the narratives of 20 
adults with clinical depression being treated in a psychiatric institute with 20 matched 
controls.  Their examination was based on the proposed role of narrative in psychopathology 
in that life story narratives not only reflect but perpetuate the essential characteristics of the 
self.  They found that life-story narratives of people with depression differ from controls in 
the kind of events included in the life story, with a mood congruent effect for the narration of 
autobiographical events, a depressed explanatory style (more self-blame and external 




in narrative.  Habermas and colleagues were particularly interested in the ways that a sense of 
distance from past events was reflected in narrative and used the ability to compare past and 
present as an indication of temporal structuring.  Narratives for people with depression and 
dysphoria were negative, sparse and affectively congruent, and in addition, the results 
indicated that depressed individuals were less able to take a distanced perspective on past 
events.  This dual-examination of the content and structure of depressive narratives has led to 
the proposal that difficulties resulting from cognitive processing biases interact with habitual 
narrative structuring, and also potentially impact on social interactions.   
2.2.2 Therapeutic interventions impacting on self-schema in depression 
In order to establish the role of recounting events in narrative form to benefit mental 
health, Pennebaker and Seagal (1999) reviewed research indicating that the process of 
narration of events and experiences in an emotional way is linked to both good mental and 
physical health.  This finding has been replicated across age, gender, culture, social class, and 
personality type (Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999). In his original study (Pennebaker, 1997) 
found that writing about personal experiences in an emotional way for as little as 15 minutes 
over the course of three days brings about improvements in mental and physical health. Using 
a text-analysis computer program, which categorises text according to the emotionality of 
words, they found that those who benefit maximally from writing tend to use a high number 
of positive-emotion words, a moderate amount of negative-emotion words, and increase their 
use of cognitive words over the days of writing. These findings suggest that the formation of 
a narrative is critical and is an indicator of good mental and physical health, perhaps by 
organizing complex emotional experiences.  Pennebaker’s focus on written narrative has led 
to an expansion of the notion of verbal accounts providing the same mental health benefits, 
and that the effective structuring of narrative has an essential role to play in this process 
(Singer & Salovey, 1998).  
When suggesting the focus for change in talking therapies in his development of 
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT), Beck, (1979) emphasised the role of realistic 
(sometimes things are bad/good) rather than global thinking (everything is terrible/great).  In 
therapy clients may be asked to engage in the recollection and narration of ‘alternative’ event 
memories, or self-knowledge, for example beliefs based on the events around the breakup of 
a relationship, with associated memories of saying or doing ‘the wrong thing’, can be re-




right thing’, and accepting a more realistic view on events.  Brewin (2006) proposed a 
cognitive model for the impact of this differential recall, as a result of therapeutic 
interventions, on both semantic and episodic autobiographical knowledge in people with 
depression, aligning with the idea that narrative schemata may be responsible for the 
maintained recall of autobiographical information which maintains the depressed state.  
Brewin argues that as therapy has become less reliant on traditional behavioural and 
cognitive techniques, an alternative explanation must be provided.  Early theories suggested 
that the targets of therapy were the representations of past, and potential future events and 
that effective manipulation of these images e.g. Hackmann, (2011), and Smucker, Dancu, 
Foa, & Niederee, (1995), to provide alternative images, and that CBT works to manipulate 
the relative activation of imagery, leading to alternative evaluations.   Therapy involves 
adjustment of negative representations by the activation of positive competitors, in traditional 
model of CBT this process has involved the targeting of negative representations and making 
attempts to adjust these.  However using a hierarchical approach to this process what could be 
happening in CBT is that information in the form of conclusions about the self and the world 
created from particular summations of experience, or assumptions, is changed as a result of 
the recall of alternatives.  Similarly Schema-focussed therapy has been developed for people 
with long-standing mental health problems for whom positive alternatives are not available 
for elaboration (Padesky, 1994) specifically to construct real or imagined images of events.  
According to Brewin, negative representations remain available even after therapy, but a less 
competitive at preventing recall of positive representations.  This assumes that for any 
particular situation or cue there is a competitive process at a pre-conscious level (Brewin, 
1989), but in mental health disorders that this can be disrupted by a negative attentional, and 
retrieval bias. 
In the selection of memory representations it is widely assumed that some process of 
retrieval competition, decides which representation enters consciousness (Anderson, Bjork, & 
Bjork, 1994).  Stronger association with a retrieval cue will be more likely to win the retrieval 
competition, and come to mind through a process of cognitive interference (Anderson & 
Neely, 1996).  Explanations for competitive preference in the long term include the occlusion 
approach which proposes blocking of competitive links to other material (Anderson & Neely, 
1996), the unlearning approach which proposes that less competitive information experiences 
attrition of associations (Melton & Irwin, 1940), and the attentional focus approach which 




activation of competing but not-wanted items.  Standing activation is reliant on levels of 
rehearsal, primarily in terms of frequency, and elaborative rehearsal processes are likely to 
make representations highly accessible (Baddeley, 1990).  This means that in the long-term 
preferences for retrieval are likely to be reinforced, and as a result of retrieval, long-term 
forgetting occurs.  This phenomena has been extensively explored for the competitive 
inhibition of recall of information in the short-term, through retrieval-induced forgetting 
(RIF: Anderson, Bjork & Bjork, 1994) and studies indicate a longer term impact of an 
apparently adaptive function of memory selection (Anderson, 2003). 
The impact of RIF specifically predicts that retrieval of a negative memory may 
reduce the accessibility of competing positive memories and vice versa.  This suggests a 
cycle whereby negative mood creates negative evaluation and elaboration through 
autobiographical reasoning, creating a bias toward negative recall of ABM, which in turn 
enhance negative mood (e.g. Ingram, 1984, Teasdale, 1988).  Raised competitiveness of 
memories is not simply a factor of self-relevance and cue-strength, but also the visio-sensory 
details of the memory which make it distinct (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993; Hunt & Smith, 1996) 
and that this distinctiveness makes the memory more likely to inhibit other memories 
(Anderson, Green, & McCulloch, 2000).   
Thus Brewin, (2006) has proposed that CBT acts to enhance the competitive retrieval 
of positive self-knowledge compared to, more habitual, negative knowledge. For people 
experiencing depression a change from global negative thinking (Dalgleish, et al, 2011)  to a 
realistic and balanced approach to self-knowledge is beneficial, and this could occur only by 
accessing both positive and negative material for both past and future chapters.    
Brewin’s suggestion is therefore a unifying theory which can be applied to a range of 
already effective therapeutic techniques, gaining support using a principle of parsimony.  
Other therapy techniques mimic these ideas by specifically drawing on visual images and 
changing their details to enhance retrieval, for example cognitive imagery rescripting which 
allows adjustment to be made to memory representations e.g. during an assault the person is 
able to defend themselves (Arntz & Weertman, 1999; Hackmann, 1998).  While still others 
encourage tolerance, rather than avoidance of negative imagery changing the associated 
valence of cognitive representations (Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy: Williams, 2010; 
Acceptance and commitment therapy: Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999; Hayes, Levin, 




This process may also form an active ingredient in constructivist forms of talking therapy, as 
exploration and potential revision of personal narratives is considered one of the major 
achievements of successful therapy. Many theorists from within the field of psychotherapy 
and counselling view therapy as a process of story reformulation and repair (Angus & 
McLeod, 2004; Salvatore, et al, 2004; Singer & Bonalume, 2010), or event incorporation 
(Stiles, 2001), and that access to a more rich and nuanced narrative could be the result of 
therapeutic interventions (White, 1989).  In their comprehensive examination of therapeutic 
narratives, Singer and Bonalume, (2010) found reduced complexity and memory-narrative 
specificity, reduced levels of causal and temporal coherence for clients at the beginning of a 
course of psychotherapy for depression, and from this proposed a systematic methodology for 
assessing narrative change.  The authors suggest that at the beginning of therapy memory and 
life-story narratives presented by clients may be those which have been well rehearsed and 
less susceptible to fluctuations.  Their subsequent examination of narratives from pre-therapy 
individuals with depression found that temporal and casual coherence, specificity and 
complexity in the narrative, improved significantly over the course of treatment (Singer, 
Blagov, Berry, & Oost, 2013).  DiMaggio (2006) also found that therapy brings about both 
modifications to the content of stories but also their form (in terms of organisation and 
coherence).    
Some therapeutic interventions focus explicitly on client narratives in order to 
enhance the ability to incorporate alternative scripts and new ways of talking about unique 
events (Salvatore, et al, 2004; Freedman & Combs, 1996; Neimeyer & Tschudi, 2003; 
Maruna & Ramsden, 2004; White & Epston, 1990).   For example, in Narrative Therapy 
(White & Epston, 1990) impoverished, disrupted or disorganised narratives are thought to 
result from the dominance of cultural narratives which are too restrictive to incorporate the 
tellers’ subjective experiences. Singer and Bonalume (2010) provide a causal account of 
these changes by suggesting that at the beginning of therapy the memory narratives presented 
by clients may be those which have been well rehearsed and less susceptible to fluctuations, 
and that these may be ‘self-defining’ functional narratives which are easily recalled and 
presented.  They suggest that exploration and potential revision of these memory narratives is 
one of the major achievements of successful therapy.  
In support of this idea Pals and McAdams (2011) predicts that changes and new 




events, and can trigger corresponding changes in habitual patterns of thinking, feeling and 
behaving, which have already been shown to help people suffering from depression (Lopes, 
Goncalves, Fassnacht, Machado, & Sousa, 2014), and even when narrative was not the 
specific focus of intervention narrative change has been shown to be a feature of good-
outcome but not bad-outcome therapeutic interventions (Angus & Kagan, 2013; Moreira, 
Beutler, & Goncalves,2008).  When examining transcripts from clients from three therapy 
models (cognitive, narrative and prescriptive - one good outcome one bad outcome), Moriera 
and colleagues compared transcripts from the beginning, middle and end of treatment in 
terms of narrative structural coherence, process complexity and content diversity.  Results 
indicated that narrative change related to good outcome, as the client is able to narrate events 
in novel and increasingly detailed ways.   
Returning to the hierarchical structure of the life-story schema, Brewin’s proposal 
indicates that schematic representations are problematic, and that therapy adjusts these by 
bringing in alternative representations, which is supported by research in to narrative change 
in therapy.  Chapters are proposed to be schematic components of the life-story and exist as 
extrapolated self-knowledge and conclusion around particular life events, clustered by theme 
or by temporality (or both).  Chapters constitute a useful level at which to examine 
predictions around how narrative features link to schematic representations, as they are 
effective in cueing episodic memories, and the formation of chapters involves 
autobiographical reasoning.  In addition to this, cognitive features of depression such as 
OGM and rumination could impede the recall of competitors to currently available 
representations. Returning to the hierarchical structure of the life-story schema, Brewin’s 
proposal indicates a number of factors which would impact on competition accounts of 
depression maintenance.  First that, in depression, negative schematic representations 
facilitate retrieval of congruent information, and that this becomes a summative 
representation of autobiographical events (Barsalou, 2003).   
 2.3  Summary of Chapter 2 2.3
Mental-health requires the ability to construct rich self-referential narratives 
incorporating a range of positive and negative events (DiMaggio, 2006; Di Maggio, et al¸ 
2003).  People experiencing depression are found to be more likely to produce thematically 




1988), and negative, autobiographical narratives (Adler, Kissel & McAdams, 2006; 
McAdams, Diamon, de St Aubin, & Mansfield, 1997).  Along with these narrative 
characteristics, people with depression also experience cognitive autobiographical memory 
deficits, including a negative memory bias (Watkins, et al, 2005), mood congruency effects 
in perception and recall (Kuyken & Dalgleish, 1995); over-generality or non-specificity of 
episodic memories, (Barsalou, 1988; Williams & Broadbent, 1987), and positive memory 
recall deficits may impact on mood-repair in people with depression (Joorman & Siemer, 
2004; Werner-Siedler & Moulds, 2012).  This has two implications for research in to life-
story research, the first being whether depresso-typic characteristics of narrative are 
represented at a chapter level, but also whether these narrative differences are representative 
of underlying cognitive schema which influence the recall of autobiographical information, 




 2.4  Summary of Chapters 1 and 2 2.4
The life-story schema is an internal representation of autobiographical information, 
the structure of which is framed around cultural expectation, aligned to personal experience.  
The life-story narrative is thought to be the communication, in whole, or in part, of this life-
story schema.  The life-story narrative itself contains thematically, and temporally linked 
chapter clusters of autobiographical information which both organise and facilitate recall of 
episodic memories.  The process by which episodic memories are linked within the life-story 
schema is autobiographical reasoning, and an associated process, life-period reasoning is 
likely to account for the formation of chapters.  
In depressive disorders narrative accounts are found to lack temporal and thematic 
coherence, and early evidence indicates that life-story narratives, and chapter structures may 
be structured differently from non-depressed groups.  In addition to this, a number of 
cognitive factors may influence the ability of people with depression to establish chapter 
structures through life-period reasoning, including a negative recall bias, and overgeneral 
memory.  In combination with negative affective tone, depresso-typic structure of narrative 
would in turn disrupt the rehearsal, either social or solitary, of positive life-story events.  The 
therapeutic benefit of recall and integration of positive autobiographical events in to life-
stories is well established, and Brewin (2006) has proposed a unifying theory as to how this 
may function to create improvements for people in therapy independent of the ‘school’ of 
therapy delivery. 
 2.5  Questions addressed in this thesis 2.5
While the establishment of evidence for the structural and organisational role of life-
story chapters is of theoretical importance in the development of an understanding of the 
links between narrative and autobiographical memory, there are also implications of the 
structure of life-stories for people experiencing depression.  Narrative disorder, temporal 
monotony, and over-generality of autobiographical memory recall are all symptomatic of the 
depressive experience, and can have specific implications for the ability of people with 
depression to engage in ‘talking therapy’ aimed at addressing their condition.  It is for this 
reason that the studies in this thesis address the similarity between depressed and non-




ii) to produce chapter-level structural elements of life-story narratives, iii) to recall events 
which are positively incongruent to chapter-level schema. 
Before this can be established the first question is whether chapters exist as contextual 
schematic information, and as such are influential in the recall of episodic memory.  This 
prediction draws on the concept of schema atypicality.  If the schematic chapter is used to cue 
a memory, this will influence recall in several ways, for example, the typicality and relevance 
to the chapter of the memory is likely to improve its chances of retrieval, so a chapter about 
school is far more likely to cue a memory of a classroom-based activity.  If a chapter is 
perceived as an unhappy period in life then retrieval of a negative memory for this time is 
more likely for two reasons, first that there may be more memories which are congruent with 
this negativity, but second that positive event memories may be atypical, and therefore create 
a dissonance with the chapter content.  Finally the atypicality of the event must be taken in to 
account as this is likely to make the event more memorable overall.  The chapters in which 
memories are perceived to belong will act as a prism to influence the recall of memories 
which belong to it, and it is proposed that these influences, as with schema research discussed 





 Chapter 3   Life-story narratives and Chapter 3
chapter-cued memory recall  
 
 3.1  Introduction 3.1
The ways in which people tell their life-stories has long been of interest to social and 
psychological science (McAdams, 2001; McAdams & McLean 2013).  Personal narratives 
have been examined in terms of developmental influences (Glück, Bluck, Baron, & 
McAdams, 2005; McAdams, Bauer, Sakaeda, Anyidoho, Machado, et al, 2006), culturally 
defined content (Bohn & Berntsen, 2011; Koppell & Berntsen, 2014; Thomsen & Berntsen, 
2008), and audience effects (Pasupathi, Mansour, & Brubaker, 2007; Pasupathi, Stallworth, 
& Murdoch, 1998).  Comparisons between the life story narratives of different groups is a 
growing area, particularly with respect to their relation to the cultural life-script (Bohn & 
Habermas, 2016; Coleman, 2014; Janssen, Uemiya, Naka, 2014; Ottsen & Berntsen, 2014), 
and characteristics of narratives produced by people experiencing psychopathology (Adler, 
Turner, Brookshier, Monohan, Walder-Biesanz, et al, 2015; Phillips, 2004; Waters & Fivush, 
2015).   
Life-stories in depressed subjects have been examined in a number of key areas: the 
defacto content of the life-stories which provide information around the person, the ways in 
which these life-stories can change as a result of recovery or therapeutic interventions, in that 
different information may be forthcoming, or alternative conclusions or ‘life-lessons’ can be 
expressed (Angus & Greenberg, 2011; McLeod, 1997; Singer, Blagov, Berry, & Oost, 2013), 
and that the structure of narratives can differ from those on non-depressed groups.  In 
addition to the content of life-stories in depressed groups, there may be differences in the 
structure of life-story narrative delivery, for example a speech patterns (Alpert, Pouget, & 
Silva, 2001; Mundt, Snyder, Cannizzar, Chappie, & Geralts, 2007), with concurrent or 
independent reduction in word count (Derby & Hollien, 1977).  The self-function of 
autobiographical narratives suggests that the greater the degree to which the narrator can 
create a self-focus, the greater their ability to differentiate self-from other.  This leads to 
different predictions for people with depression, the first is that it is likely that social isolation 




Haro, 2015) and a ruminative self-focus (Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 
2001) would lead to a greater self-focus within a narrative as a result of reduced access to 
stories and information on other people’s activities and interactions, while the ruminative 
self-focus would increase accessibility of self-relevant, negative, material.  In terms of the 
content of speech there are significant thematic differences between depressed and non-
depressed groups, for example negative evaluations, and negative emotional tone in 
conversations (Hautzinger, Linden & Hoffman, 1982), although content may still be 
moderated according to the audience, with strangers receiving less negative reports than 
friends (Segrin & Flora, 1998).  There are also a number of communication functions which 
are characteristically heightened in depression, these being re-assurance seeking behaviours, 
(Joiner, Metalsky, Gencoz, & Gencoz, 2001) and solicitation of negative feedback (Giesler, 
Josephs & Swann, 1996). 
In order to examine the differences in structure and content of life story narratives in 
depression, evidence for self-reference, and negative bias (in the form of negative life events 
reported) were examined by Boulard (2015), in her analysis of 60 life-story narratives of 
hospitalised adolescents with major depressive disorder, non-hospitalised adolescents with 
depression, and never depressed controls.  Her results revealed that hospitalised adolescents 
produced narratives which were structurally significantly shorter than the other groups, 
textual analysis of content also revealed a significant self-focus for the hospitalised group, 
with greater use of the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘me’, compared to the other groups, there was also a 
diminished range of topics for discussion.  While this may be indicative of depressive 
characteristics, it is not unreasonable to consider this small study in the light of the 
populations chosen for analysis, as the state of being hospitalised could present either the 
outcome of depression severity, or the cause of prosodic slowing, and an environment where 
self-focus is more likely (there being fewer distractions).   
In addition to a negative self-focus, depressive narratives are created with diminished 
coherence and reduced evidence for a sense of self represented in spoken word, and in text 
(Adler,Wagner, & McAdams, 2007; Prebble, et al, 2013).  Reduced coherence of spoken 
accounts is seen in the narratives of clients entering psychotherapy (Angus & Kagan, 2013; 
Singer, Blagov, Berry, & Oost, 2013), and in narrative accounts of depressed individuals 
(Fromholt et al, 1995; Habermas et al, 2008; Shafer, 1983).  Features of the narrative 




(Cohen, 2011; Fromholt, et al, 1995; Goncalves, Matos, & Santos, 2008; Habermas, et al, 
2008; Luborsky, 1993), the attributional style including negative evaluations of self 
(Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Schulman, Castilion, & Seligman, 1989); self-
blame (Tilghman-Osbourne, Cole, Feltham, & Cielsla, 2008), and characteristics of temporal 
disorder (Habermas, et al, 2008; Kuhs, 1991).   
The schematic nature of life-story narratives was introduced in Section 1.2.5.  That 
the content of narratives can fluctuate, while structural motifs and narrative form can remain 
constant has been shown in studies of ‘master narratives’ (Boje, 1991; Thorne & McLean, 
2002; Westrate & McKlean, 2010), and the narrative sequences reported by McAdams and 
colleagues (2001) indicates that structured assumptions about the stories of the self, and the 
internal and external (spoken) representation of these is different for depressed compared to 
non-depressed groups.  The links between the life-story schema represented in life-story 
narratives have indicated that schematic representations of life-story chapters help organise 
events in narrative (Thomsen, 2015), and guide recall of constituent events (as discussed in 
section 1.3.2), so while the focus of narrative accounts in depression is predicted to be self-
directed and negative, this aspect of narrative structure could influence the ways in which 
autobiographical information is recalled.   
In their study of 17 life-story narratives from older adults with major-depressive 
disorder, compared to 17 never-depressed controls, Habermas and colleagues (2008) used 
two measures of narrative temporal coherence.  The percentage of propositions (i.e. 
individual statements or meaning units), which deviated from the temporal linear order, and 
the percentage of propositions which drew comparisons between the present and the past.  
Deviations from linear order were significantly more frequent for the depressed group, while 
the proportion of past-present comparisons was significantly smaller compared to controls.  
Overall the authors suggest that this resulted from the depressed group being more ‘stuck in 
the past’ and less able to create narrative, and by inference cognitive, distance to past events.  
However, these differences, while significant, were small and not indicative of global 
temporal breakdown of life-story structures.   
One study points to this lack of variation in narrative accounts being a result of an 
underlying difference in the structural attributes of chapters, rather than life-stories, for 
people with depression.  Dalgleish and colleagues (2011) found that when asked to apportion 




depressive disorder (MDD) were significantly more likely to use negative attributes, to re-use 
negative attributes repeatedly for a number of chapters, and were less likely to re-use positive 
attributes.  In addition the current-MDD group were more inclined to compartmentalise their 
attributes, creating both broadly negative and broadly positive chapters, while the control 
group showed a more variable attributional pattern.  Interestingly a remitted MDD group 
showed a similar pattern of compartmentalisation and negative bias, but not redundancy in 
negative attributes, and future chapters did not show any group differences.  What this 
indicates is that people with depressive disorders have pre-established chapter schema within 
autobiographic memory, but possibly not future imagining, which are structured differently 
from never-depressed groups.   
The proposition of structural dissimilarity between depressed and non-depressed 
groups is supported by the current models attempting to explain the impact of depression on 
cognition.  Depression is characterised by cognitive over-representation of negative material 
which is thought to be both symptomatic and causative in the perpetuation of depressive 
symptomatology (Beck, 1976; Markus, 1977; Segal & Ingram, 1994).  Evidence points to 
increased levels of negative thoughts, biased attention, interpretation, and memory (Mathews 
& MacLeod, 2005).  Gotlib and Joorman (2010) reviewed the evidence for memory and 
cognition in depression and proposed that a negative cognitive bias in depression is not 
simply due to attention being drawn to negative, particularly self-referencing material, but 
that reduced inhibitory processes lead to an inability to disengage from negative material, and 
reduced cognitive control means that positive compensatory material is less accessible.  Over 
time this is suggested to lead to the establishment of negative schema (Beck, 1987), and 
subsequent emotional dysregulation, as the processing of information is filtered by negative 
internal cognitive representations.  Externally represented these structures include i) narrative 
self-representations (descriptions and evaluations of self), drawn from autobiographical 
memory and semantic knowledge, ii) life-story narrative accounts and finally iii) episodic 
recall.  Accordingly Brewin’s model of cognitive therapy (2006) proposes that increased 
variability of affective material can be achieved by the practiced recall of autobiographical 
events to change their competitive advantage over more negative but well-rehearsed 
memories.   But, recalling positive events is not simply a matter of accessing appropriate 
episodic material.  Accessibility concerns characteristics of episodic events including the 
speed at which they are recalled (e.g. Williams & Broadbent, 1986), the visio-sensory 




Eustaches, 2009), specificity of details (e.g. who, what, where, and when); ways in which 
they are felt to be personally significant or important to the ‘self’ (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006); 
along the visual perspective perceived during recall (Nigro & Neisser, 1983) all of which 
endow the memory with a sense of re-living, and these factors must be considered when 
evaluating the complex nature of ‘accessibility’ in episodic information.   
That chapters are schema implies that there are associated characteristics which are 
common to them.  In Koppell and Berntsens (2014) study of schema expectation in life-
stories, valence of events was used to establish typicality, and researchers found that affective 
atypicality of event on presentation was predictive of both greater recall, and judgements of 
remembering the event (as opposed to simply knowing it occurred).  Expanding on this it is 
proposed that typicality in terms of chapter schema will enhance recall, either in terms of 
accessibility, or representative detail (clarity), leading to a prediction of affective 
incongruence at the point at which the event occurs may raise memory accessibility.   The 
role of typicality to schema also indicates that there would be a recall expectation bias in 
component information (Pezdek, et al, 1989), whereby memories which are congruent with 
the beliefs and assumptions about the schema, or in this case the chapter, would overall be 
more accessible.  Memories for which there are no representations available would be ‘filled’ 
in with reference to the schema, and as a result, over time, chapter-based memories would be 
expected to become more schematic, and less variable.  Event memories which do not ‘fit’ a 
particular chapter would be less likely to be recalled as part of a particular chapter, and may 
become less available over time.   
In a study of life-period cued episodic memories Beike and Landoll (2000) examined 
the cognitive response to the recall of memories which were inconsistent with beliefs about 
the life-period.  Their aim was to explore the role of dissonance reduction processes in 
response to recall, and in doing so did not explore the relationship between the events and 
their life-period context.  On recall of incongruent events participants were found to engage 
in consistency restoring actions, which included changes to memory representations, the 
attribution of cause, and salience of the event, along with a subsequent increase in 
accessibility of congruent event representations that fit with the schematic beliefs of the life-
period.  This suggests that incongruent memories are either adjusted to fit chapter-schema, or 




Together the evidence that life-periods, and chapters can be effectively used to cue 
autobiographical memory, (reviewed in Sections 1.1.2 and 1.3.1), and indications of the 
schematic role of life-stories, suggests that chapters act to index episodic memories, and to 
prime their recall, but also act as cognitive schema.  As schema they are not direct 
representations of events as they occurred, but rather an extracted representation of 
information guided by expectation, and in this respect are predicted to influence recall of 
chapter-cued memories to fit with expectations.  Drawing on evidence of monotony, and lack 
of affective variation in narrative structures for depressed groups, and the cognitive deficits 
which impair episodic recall, and thus make depressed groups more reliant on schematic 
representations (Beck, 1987), this relationship between chapters and content is proposed to be 
qualitatively different from non-depressed controls in terms of both a negative bias, and a 
decrease in the variability of valence between chapters and episodic memories.    
Specific predictions based on this are that depressed groups will experience an intra-
chapter schematic monotony, which is reflected in a reduction in the affective variance 
between chapters and episodic memories.  This reduction could be indicated by: 
 reduced accessibility of incongruent events, or  
 reduction in memory features which are themselves indicative of personal 
relevance and rehearsal of the event.   
o clarity  
o centrality  
o field perspective 
To enable an exploration of the impact of schematic chapter structure on recall this 
study took a top-down approach to the structure of life-stories, by examining the structure 
and distribution of life-story chapters, and in doing so allowed a detailed exploration of the 
impact of chapter context on episodic memory recall.  This approach also enabled a 
subsidiary examination the structure of autobiographical life-story accounts.    Participants 
were asked to verbally narrative their life stories, then reported chapters from these life 
stories, and these chapters were subsequently used to sample both positive and negative 
episodic memories. 
For depressed groups it was predicted that there would be structural differences in 




chapter sequencing.  Secondary to this and given an absence of breakdown (i.e. depressed 
and non-depressed groups represent their chapters in similar ways) and following Dalgliesh 
and colleagues’ study (2011) and Habermas and colleagues (2008), it was predicted that 
access to the episodic memory content of the chapters would be influenced by a monotony in 
affective tone. 
Drawing together predictions about the influence of schematic monotony of narrative, 
life-stories, and life-story chapters, with the requirement for the recall of episodic memories, 
it is further proposed that there will be, for people with depression: 
 A temporal breakdown in the chapter structure in terms of sequence of 
production, number produced 
 As a result of depressive status, a negative affective bias would mean both 
chapters and episodic memories were rated as more negative than controls 
 A subsidiary prediction is that the depressed group will show evidence for a 
depresso-typic narrative structure and content difference, in terms of self-focus 
and negative bias in their life-story narratives.  Prosodic slowing would result 
ini) a lower word count for the depressed group compared to controls, and a 
negative self-focus would result in proportionally ii) fewer positive words, iii) 
more negative words, iii) more self-referencing words, and iv) fewer social 
words 
Within this study we have assumed that i) chapters are more likely to represent the 
internal cognitive representation, and hierarchical memory structures if they are defined by 
the subject (as opposed to the researcher), ii) that chapters are temporally defined having a 
clear beginning and end (although this may be ongoing for current chapters) iii) chapters may 
overlap, or be clustered within one another. 
 3.2  Method 3.2
3.2.1 Participants 
This study recruited twenty-eight participants aged 18-55 via the University of St 
Andrews School of Psychology participant recruitment SONA system and campus posters. 




difference between the groups, t(23)<1, the range being 18-55 for the depressed, and formerly 
depressed group, and 18-54 for the controls. The mean (SD) age of the MDD group was 24.3 
(9.6), and the controls 27.27 (12.3) years.  The MDD group (n=14) contained two males, and 
controls (n=11) three males.  All participants received a £10 payment for their time. English was 
the first language of all participants and no participants had a history of neurological or 
attentional disorders. Participants were tested individually. This study was approved by the ethics 
committee of the University of St Andrews (Appendix 1)  
Allocation to two groups, depressed and never-depressed control, was carried out 
using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-II, First, Spitzer, Gibbon & 
Williams, 2002) (Appendix 12), which establishes diagnostic status for current and former 
depression.  Four participants met criteria for a historic diagnosis of MDD, ten participants 
met criteria for current MDD, and these fourteen participants constituted the MDD group 
while eleven met the criteria for never depressed and were considered the control group.  
Three participants were excluded as they met the criteria for a historic, but not current 
diagnosis of sub-clinical depression.    
3.2.2 Design 
The overall aim of this study was to examine both narrative construction and also 
memory recall.  In order to do this this study used established protocols to elicit life-story 
narratives from both depressed and non-depressed participants. Using these as guides, 
participants were asked to define life-story chapters associated with the narratives.  In a 
follow-up session these chapters were used to cue the recall of specific memories.  The use of 
this chapter-based memory cuing task was designed to address the question of group 
differences and the impact of affective incongruence on the recall of memory features.  The 
study used participant-defined, rather than researcher-defined chapters as cues which 
accommodates the need for ecological validity in the cuing process.   
The elucidation of life-stories, life-story chapters and the cued recall of memories was 
carried out using the procedure below.  The analysis of the life-stories comprised an 
examination of the transcribed narratives for group differences in word count, and the 
proportions of positive words, negative words, self-referencing words, and social words, in 
relation to the length of the narratives.  The life-story chapters were compared between 




chapters were then used to cue episodic memories.  Initially group differences in episodic 
memory recall were examined, and following this episodic memories were categorised in 
terms of their affective congruence to the cueing chapter.  Each memory and chapter were 
rated by participants according to the statement ‘I feel positive when I think of this 
memory/chapter’ Both episodic memories and chapters were categorised as being either 
positive or negative according to their positivity rating, with 1-3 being negative, and 4-6 
being positive.  They were then categorised according to the match between episodic memory 
positivity and chapter positivity.  Negative incongruence being a negative memory in a 
positive chapter, positive incongruence being a positive memory in a negative chapter, and a 
congruent memory being a memory which is categorised as the same valence as its cuing 
chapter.   
3.2.3 Measures 
The National Adult Reading Test (NART: Nelson & Wilson, 1991) is a measure of 
premorbid intelligence, with results showing strong correlations with IQ as represented by the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Blair & Spreen, 1989).   It involves participants reading a 
series of 50 words out-loud, e.g. Chord, Prelate, Demesne, which are then scored for correct 
pronunciation (Appendix 11).  In this study it was used to ensure parity between groups for 
verbal fluency. 
The Structured Clinical Interview for Diagnosis II (SCID-II) (Appendix 12) was used 
to establish depressive status in participants.  The SCID-II uses the criteria established by the 
DSM-IV to diagnose the current or historical presence or absence of depressive disorders 
(First, et al¸ 2002)  
3.2.4 Procedure 
In the first session participants were tested individually for approximately one hour, 
this was composed of four sections 1. Completion of NART (Nelson & Willison, 1991), 2. 
Verbal narration of life-story narrative, and 3. Memory reporting, 4. Completion of SCID-II 





‘I am interested in understanding who you are and how you have become the person 
you are today.  Please tell me about your life to date.  Give yourself about 15-20 minutes and 
try and tell me a coherent story of your life so that I can get a good picture of you.’ 
The researcher remained silent during narration as far as possible, non-verbal cues 
were used to reinforce to the participants that they were being listened to, but no comments 
on the narratives were made.  Participants were able to see a clock during narration and were 
therefore able to regulate their divulgences to meet the suggested time limits.  The time taken 
to complete this task ranged from 7 to 36 minutes, mean (SD) 21.20 (7.87).  No 
standardisation of prompts was carried out. 
Following this narration the participants were required to generate chapters which 
would represent significant periods of their lives.  They were given the following instruction: 
‘I would like you to imagine that your life-story is a book, and that within this book 
there are chapters each involving a different part of your life.  The chapters of your life-story 
can be thematic e.g. ‘my love of art’, or relating to particular time in your life e.g. ‘my time 
in the army’.  Chapters can be any length and can overlap, for example during your time in 
the army you could have taken up painting. 
Starting with the first chapter that comes to mind, write a title and brief description of 
the chapter in the space on top of one of the booklets provided, and follow the instructions on 
the front cover of the booklet.  Then think about the title and description of the next chapter 
you think and write this on another booklet, continue until all you chapters have been named 
and each has a response booklet with the front cover completed’ 
Participants were free to complete as many or as few chapter sheets as they chose 
(Appendix 6).  The booklets each had a front page requiring the completion of the title of the 
chapter, a space for a short description, and a likert scale ratings (1=very negative, 6=very 
positive) ‘In terms of how I feel now this chapter is…’.  The function of this question was to 
ascertain the valence of the chapter, allowing for an exploration of a negative bias in 
depressed group towards chapter definition, and also to allow the relative affective 
congruence of memories to their contextual chapters to be examined.  Following this the 
participants underwent the SCID-II to establish their depressive status.  Subsequently they 




In the second session the previously generated chapters were used to cue 
autobiographical memories.  The participants were given the chapter booklets prepared in the 
previous session and asked to recall three memories for each.  Each booklet contained 
prompts for events within the relevant chapter, being ‘first to mind’, ‘negative event’ and 
‘positive event’ in that order.  The purpose of this sampling technique was to garner a range 
of autobiographical memories with different affective values.  Each event had a space for a 
title, a short description, and rated for clarity, centrality of event, difficulty of recall, 
positivity, rehearsal and perspective by indicating on a Likert scale 1-6 (not at all – very 
much so): 
Category 1: Clarity calculated as the sum of the following ratings 
1. ‘This event is very vivid.’ (vividness) 
2. ‘This event feels coherent and complete.’ (coherence) 
3. ‘Thinking about this memory is like travelling back in time.’ (mental time travel) 
Category 2: Centrality of the event (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006: 2005) as calculated as the sum 
of the following ratings: 
4. ‘This memory is of an event which was a turning point in my life’ 
5. ‘This memory is of an event which is central to my sense of who I am’ 
6. ‘I automatically see connections between the events in this memory and my present 
life’’ 
7. ‘This memory is of an event which was very important to what I was doing in my life 
at the time’ 
8. ‘This memory is of an event which was very important to what I was doing in my life 
at the time’ 
Category 3: Difficulty of recall  
9. ‘I found it difficult to retrieve a memory for this part of the task’  
Category 4: Positivity 





Category 5: Rehearsal 
11. ‘I have thought about this memory a lot’ 
12. ‘I have spoken about this memory to other people’ 
Category 6: Perspective 
13. ‘I experience this memory as if I am looking through my own eyes (as opposed to 
watching myself)’’ 
To establish all memories recalled are ‘specific’ it is possible to check them against 
established criteria all of which were confirmed by the subjects during data collection using a 
‘check back tick box’: That the event occurred within a 24 hour period; that the event has at 
least two features which allow the recaller to distinguish it from other similar events.  The 
further criteria that the event occurred to the subject, rather than an event which was known 
about or reported to the subject was also included in the instruction. 
The event report section took a further 30-40 minutes.  The entire second session was 
completed in around 60 minutes.   
 3.3  Results 3.3
The initial screening for equivalence between groups was carried out to ensure that 
differences in life-story narrative accounts were not a result of differences in verbal fluency.  
The NART results revealed no significant difference in verbal fluency between the two 
groups, t(23)<1. with the MDD group scoring mean (SD) 42.71 (4.23) and the control group 
43.09 (4.23).   
3.3.1 Analysis of chapters 
The number of chapters produced varied from 3 to 9 for the MDD group, and 4 to 11 
for the controls. To compare groups for the production of chapters, analysis of group 
differences in the temporal sequence, number and valence of the chapters produced was 
examined.  Predictions were that the MDD group would differ from the control group in i) 
the degree to which the chapters would be produced in sequence from early years, to present 
day, ii)  the number of chapters produced, and also, as a result of a negative bias, that iii) the 




While there appeared to be some variability in the length of chapters all participants 
produced chapters in temporal sequence, from early on in life to the present day, so no group 
comparisons were made leaving the first prediction that the MDD group would produce 
chapters out-with temporal order untested but with no apparent support. The number of 
chapters produced by each group was analysed using an independent samples t-test, results 
revealed no difference between the number of chapters produced, t(23)<1 MDD mean (SD) 
number of chapters 5.43 (1.65), control 5.00 (1.34)..  There was also no difference in the 
positivity of the chapters produced, with the mean (SD) valence of chapters for the MDD 
group 4.25 (0.82), and for controls 3.93 (0.98), an independent t-test revealed no significant 
group difference t(23)<1.   
This established not only an absence of negativity in the chapters produced, but also 
indicated that there were no group-based structural differences in the representation of 
chapter level information, and validated the use of chapters to cue episodic memories in both 
groups with any group differences in recall being the result of the relationship between 
chapter and episodic memory.  A table showing examples of chapter themes, titles, and 
lengths can be found in Appendix 9. 
3.3.2 Analysis of episodic memories  
Two sets of analysis were carried out on the memories which were recalled by 
participants during the procedure.  The first compared the episodic memories recalled 
according to both group and valence to establish baseline comparability, the second analysis 
examined the memories according to the group and their valence with their contextual 
(cueing) chapter.  These analyses looked at the mean scores for the memories reported for 
each of the participants in these categories.   
To examine whether there was a base-line group difference in the positivity of 
memories recalled the mean rated positivity of recalled events was compared. An 
independent samples t-test revealed no group difference in the valence of memories recalled 
t(23)<1. with MDD having a mean (SD) positivity of 3.23 (0.49), and controls 3.35 (3.63).   
Again this is contrary to the original prediction that there would be a negative bias in the 




A series of mixed factorial ANOVAs were carried out to establish baseline group 
differences between negative and positive memories.   These were categorised according to 
their reported positivity 1-3 being negative, and 4-6 being positive.   Mean group differences 
were explored for clarity, centrality, recall perspective, recall difficulty.  During this series of 
analyses a mixed factorial ANOVA (within: memory valence [positive or negative] between: 
group [MDD or control]) was used with these independent variables being consistent 
throughout. 
The clarity of episodic memories recalled revealed a main effect of memory valence 
on clarity F(1,23)=7.511, p=0.013, 
2
p =0.34, with negative memories being rated with lower 
clarity mean (SD) 15.38 (3.29) compared to positive memories 17.14 (2.99); a main effect of 
group F(1,23)=7.743, p=0.012 
2
p =0.36, where the MDD mean (SD) rating was 15.12 (3.11) 
compared to controls 18.34 (2.17), there was no interaction F(1,23)<1.    
Next, group differences in the reported centrality of the episodic memory was 
examined, the independent variables remaining the same, there was no main effect of 
memory valence on the reported centrality of memories, F(1,23)<1. no effect of group, 
F(1,23)<1, and no interaction F(1,23)<1. The mean (SD) centrality of memories reported by 
the MDD group was 16.23 (3.82) and for controls 15.90 (2.64), for negative memories, 14.64 
(4.30), and positive memories 16.01 (3.45) 
The reported perspective experienced during recall was found to be independent of 
memory valence F(1,23)<1, a main effect of group on the reported perspective of recall 
F(1,23)=9.382, p=0.006, 
2
p =0.54 was seen, and no interaction between these variables 
F(1,23)=1.548, p=0.229.  The MDD group were significantly less likely to report seeing 
events through their own eyes, with a mean (SD) rating of 3.76 (1.19), compared to controls 
4.99 (0.89), for negative memories the rating was 4.31(1.30), and positive memories 3.88 
(0.45). 
The difficulty with which episodic memories were recalled was not dependent on 
their valence F(1,23)<1, but a main effect of group, F(1,23)=6.593, p=0.019, 
2
p =0.27 
indicated that the MDD group reporting a significantly greater difficulty in recalling cued 
memories.  The mean (SD) rated difficulty of recall for negative memories was 2.15 (1.08) 




1.90 (0.52). No interaction between the valence of the memory and the group was revealed 
F(1,23) <1. 
The difference in the ability to recall memories and the reduction in clarity perceived 
by the MDD group could have been as a result of the reduced rehearsal of the events, two 
measures which examined this: ratings of the degree to which the memory is thought about, 
and spoken about were summed and used as co-variates in the analysis.  This mean rehearsal 
measure was calculated for each participant using the rating for rehearsal for each reported 
memory.  Overall mean (SD) rated rehearsal (talking) for negative memories was 3.23 (1.78), 
and positive memories 3.01 (1.09), while the MDD group rated talking about their memories 
as 3.57 (1.88), and controls 3.16 (1.21).  Overall mean (SD) rated rehearsal (thinking) for 
negative memories was 4.01 (2.11), and positive memories 4.21 (1.34), while the MDD 
group rated thinking about their memories as 3.84 (1.33), and controls 3.84 (1.33) 4.38 
(1.98). 
The impact of rehearsal on difficulty of recall was examined first by controlling for 
the degree to which a memory had been thought about, revealing no main effect F(1, 22)<1, 
and the group effect which remained F(1,22)=4.525, p=0.045 
2
p =0.28.   Controlling for the 
degree to which participants reported speaking of an event did not significantly impact on the 
difficulty of memory recall, had no effect F(1,22)<1, while the group effect remained 
F(1,22)=4.530, p=0.045, 
2
p =0.28.   Thus it appears that the group difference in the perceived 
difficulty of recall did not relate to the degree of rehearsal. 
The impact of rehearsal on clarity was also examined revealing an effect of how much 
a memory had been thought about when controlled for, this removed the group difference in 
memory clarity F(1,22)=2.591, p=0.220.   However, controlling for speaking revealed no 
effect on clarity F(1,22)<1, with the group difference remaining F(1,22)=4.418, p=0.048, 
2
p
=0.19.  It appears that thinking about a memory was a significant factor in the rated clarity for 
the control group, and that speaking about the memory has no effect. 
Overall the control group recalled memories with greater clarity than the MDD group, 
and results indicate that this may be due to an increased tendency to internally rehearse (think 
about) them.  The control group also reported that memories were easier to recall, and were 




reflective of a greater reported engagement in episodic memories which belong to life-story 
chapters, independent of valence.  It also indicates that there may be some level of over-
generality in the recall of chapter-cued episodic memories, supporting the finding that people 
with depression experience over-general memory recall.   
Impact of narrative congruence on memory features  
An examination of the prediction that as a result of schematic monotony, the MDD 
group would have a relatively reduced access to episodic memories which were incongruent 
followed.  Episodic memories recalled using chapter cues were categorised according to the 
congruence category, i.e. ‘positively incongruent’; ‘negatively incongruent’, or ‘congruent’ 
with the rated positivity of their cueing chapter. This categorisation was carried out according 
to the criteria in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1: Congruence of memories 
Memory Valence Chapter Valence Category 
Positive (rated 4-6) Positive (rated 4-6) Congruent 
Positive (rated 4-6) Negative (rated 1-3) Positively incongruent 
Negative (rated 1-3) Positive (rated 4-6) Negatively incongruent 
Negative (rated 1-3) Negative (rated 1-3) Congruent 
 
This table indicates the categorisation criteria for the three congruence categories (congruent, positively 
incongruent, and negatively incongruent) used in the analysis of episodic events in Study 1. 
 
For each participant and category a mean score was calculated for the memory 
features: clarity, centrality of the event, difficulty of recall, rehearsal (thinking and speaking), 
and recall perspective.  Because of the nature of the task there were varying numbers of 
memories of each class, while all participants reported both negative and positive memories, 
they did not necessarily report memories for each of the three valence categories.  These 
analyses are looking at the mean scores for the memories reported for each of the participants 
in these categories.  The number of memories for each category by group is shown in Table 
3.2.  Of the total 24 participants, three failed to recall events form all three categories, one 




members failed to produce negatively incongruent memories, while one member of the 
control group failed to produce negatively incongruent memories, and one did not produce 
any congruent events.  The mean (SD) number of chapters produced was for the MDD group 
negative 2.22 (2.36), positive 3.21 (1.87), and controls negative 2.50 (2.18), positive 2.51 
(1.67). 
 





MDD        (n=14) 63 91 48 
Control     (n=11) 51 85 59 
 
This table indicates the number of memories within each category by group.  Three memories were recalled for each chapter,  
 
A series of mixed factorial ANOVAs using the same independent variables (between: 
group, within: congruence category) was carried out, with congruence being defined as one 
of three ways: 1. Positively incongruent, 2. Congruent, or 3. Negatively incongruent.  Follow-
up analysis, compared the effect of positive and negative incongruence on the dependent 
variable of interest.  The means for each memory category can be found on Table 3.3.The 
effect of congruence on mean memory clarity was examined using a mixed factorial ANOVA 
(between: group, within: congruence category (positively incongruent, congruent, negatively 
incongruent)), this revealed no main effect of congruence category on the clarity of the 
memories recalled F(1,17)=3.239, p=0.090, a significant effect of group on clarity  
F(1,17)=4.550, p=0.048, 
2
p =0.21 as would be expected from initial analysis, and no 
interaction F(1,17)<1.     
  Follow-up analysis using a mixed factorial ANOVA (between: group, within: 
congruence category (positively incongruent, negatively incongruent)) revealed a significant 
difference between the two incongruence category, F(1,18)=4.493, p=0.048, 
2
p =0.12, with 
negatively incongruent memories being rated with greater clarity, a consistent group effect 
F(1,18)=7.424, p=0.014, 
2
p =0.25, and no interaction F(1,18)<1.  This indicates that 





Next, and following the same mixed factorial ANOVA analysis, the impact of 
congruence on the rated centrality of memories was explored.  Analysis revealed no effect on 
congruence category on the centrality of the memory recalled F(1,17)=1.219, p=0.329, no 
effect of group F(1,17)=1.010, p=0.285, and no interaction F(1,17)<1.  Follow-up analysis 
revealed no significant difference between the centrality of negatively and positively 
incongruent memories F(1,18)<1, no consistent group effect F(1,18)<1, and no interaction 
F(1,18)<1.  Overall the centrality of the events was not influenced by the schematic 
incongruence of the event. 
The same mixed factorial ANOVA was carried out to examine the role of congruence 
on rated difficulty of access for memories.  Analysis revealed no main effect of congruence 
category on the difficulty of recall of the memory F(1,17)<1, no significant effect of group 
F(1,17)=4.270, p=0.054, and no interaction F(1,17)<1.  Follow-up analysis revealed no main 
effect of congruence category F(1,18)<1, no group effect F(1,18)=2.031, p=0.171, and no 
interaction F(1,18)<1. Indicating that rated difficulty of access was not influenced by the 
schematic incongruence of the event. 
A mixed factorial ANOVA examine the impact of congruence on rehearsal (thinking).  
Analysis revealed no effect on congruence category on the rating of how often a memory was 
thought about F(1,17)=2.076, p=0.168., a significant effect of group F(1,17)=5.786, p=0.028, 
2
p =0.37, and no interaction F(1,17)<1.  Follow-up analysis revealed no main effect of 
incongruence category on rehearsal F(1,18)=3.110, p=0.095, a group effect F(1,18)=4.962, 
p=0.039, 
2
p =0.32, and no interaction F(1,18)=1.187, p=0.290.  The MDD group reported 
thinking about their memories more than controls, but the incongruence of these events did 
not impact on this. 
A further mixed factorial ANOVA was carried out, on the degree to which 
participants felt they had spoken about the memory.  Analysis revealed an effect on 
congruence category on the rating of how often a memory was spoken about F(1,17)=5.579, 
p=0.030, 
2
p =0.16, a significant effect of group F(1,17)= 4.571, p=0.047, 
2
p =0.17, and no 
interaction F(1,17)<1.  Follow-up analysis using a mixed revealed a significant difference 
between the degree to which positively and negatively incongruent memories were spoken 
about, F(1,18)=5.859, p=0.026, 
2
p = 0.24, a group effect F(1,18)=5.985, p=0.025, 
2
p =0.22, 




Finally a mixed factorial ANOVA was carried out to examine the impact of 
congruence on visual perspective during recall.  Analysis revealed no effect of congruence 
category on the rating of field perspective (‘I see this memory through my own eyes’) 
F(1,17)<1, no significant effect of group F(1,17)=3.530, p=0.078, and no interaction 
F(1,17)=1.474, p=0.241.  Follow-up analysis revealed no significant difference between the 
perspective of positively and negatively incongruent memories F(1,18)<1, a group effect 
F(1,18)=6.498, p=0.020, 
2
p =0.17, and again no interaction F(1,18)=2.802, p=0.111.  These 
results indicate that the MDD group are more likely to view incongruent episodic memories 
from an observer perspective compared to controls, but that the valence of the incongruence 
does not impact on this. 
Overall these results indicate that the congruence of a memory with its contextual 
chapter has little impact on the ease at which the memory is recalled, or the rated centrality, 
however negatively incongruent memories are recalled with greater clarity than either 
congruent or positively incongruent memories, and that these memories are more likely to be 
spoken about.  Group differences reveal that the control group report thinking more about 
their memories, and are more likely to recall their memories with greater clarity than the 
MDD group.  The MDD group were also more likely to view their incongruent memories 
from the observer perspective than controls.  
No interactions between congruence and group were revealed, and therefore what has 
not been supported is the prediction that incongruence has a different effect on memory 
characteristics depending on the depressive status of the recaller.  This study gives no support 
for the prediction that the MDD group, compared to controls, would experience a reduced 






Table 3.3: Means (SD) for memory features Study one 
Memory characteristics Congruence category MDD Control 
Clarity
1
 Negatively incongruent 17.914 (3.65) 17.132 (4.10) 
Congruent 14.929 (3.12) 16.161 (2.54) 




 Negatively incongruent 16.010 (4.30) 15.931 (3.45) 
Congruent 15.493 (3.05) 14.147 (6.23) 




 Negatively incongruent 4.010 (1.10) 3.041 (1.80) 
Congruent 3.964 (1.50) 3.344 (1.24) 




 Negatively incongruent 4.011 (0.83) 3.041 (1.10) 
Congruent 3.964 (0.68) 3.562 (0.88) 




 Negatively incongruent 3.900 (0.60) 3.871 (1.17) 
Congruent 3.012 (0.77) 3.114 (0.82) 




 Negatively incongruent 2.471 (0.65) 3.336 (0.54) 
Congruent 3.764 (0.83) 3.681 (0.42) 
Positively incongruent 2.610 (0.40) 3.412 (0.68) 
This table provides the mean (SD) ratings for the two groups, for each memory characteristic within each 
congruence category. 
                                                 
1 Higher values  indicates increased clarity 
2 Higher values indicate greater centrality 
3 Higher values indicate greater difficulty 
4 Higher values indicate greater rehearsal 
5 Higher values indicate greater rehearsal 




3.3.3 Analysis of life-story narratives 
In order to establish whether depresso-typic characteristics were present in the life-
stories of the MDD group, the life-story narratives were transcribed and examined for group 
differences in i) word count, and proportions of ii) positive words, iii) negative words, iii) 
self-referencing words, and iv) social words, all calculated as proportional to the length of the 
narratives 
The word count was predicted to be lower for the MDD group.  As it transpired the 
relative length of narratives was very broad and so a mean rate of word production was 
calculated to allow for the time taken to produce the words i.e. words/time taken to narrate 
life-story, rather than simply number of words.  There was no significant difference between 
the groups for the number of words produced during narration t(23)<1. 
Analysis was carried out using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count system (LIWC, 
2016) to explore the relative distribution of positive, negative, social, and self-referencing 
words.  This textual analysis programme allows objective analysis of coded word content of 
written and transcribed texts.  The results reflect the percentage of each category of word in 
any given text.  The word categories chosen for this analysis were based on the prediction 
that people with current or historical major depressive disorder would be more likely to use 
negative words and less likely to use positive words in their life-story narratives when 
compared to never depressed controls.  In addition it was predicted that this group would use 
more self-referencing and fewer socially referenced works, as they would be more ‘self-
focussed’, and less social as a result of a ruminative cognitive bias, and social isolation.   
Table 3.4: Component production (%) in life-story narratives for Study one 
 MDD (SD) Control (SD) t-test 
Self-reference (%) 8.02 (1.76) 10.36 (2.20) t(23)=2.949, p=0.007 
Social words (%) 7.53 (2.42) 8.12 (1.16) t(23)<1, n.s. 
Positive words (%) 2.19 (0.74) 2.57 (0.86) t(23)=1.191, p=0.246 
Negative words (%) 0.86 (0.42) 1.45 (0.60) t(23)=2.874, p=0.009 
 
This table provides the proportion of words, as compared to the total number of words produced in the life-
stories, which were categorised within each category.  Results are provided for the dysphoric and control 




A series of independent t-tests was carried out to explore group differences in these 
narrative characteristics.  Table 3.4 shows the mean (SD) % of the components produced. 
The anticipated group difference in the overall proportion of positive words found no 
support,. while a group difference in the proportion of negative words indicated that, contrary 
to prediction, the control group produced a greater mean (SD) relative percentage of negative 
words, 1.45 (0.60)%, compared to the MDD  group, 0.86 (0.42)%.  Group differences were 
found between the percentage of self-referencing words in the narratives, but not for the 
proportion of social words, and this effect was again the opposite of that predicted with the 
control group being more self-referential with a mean (SD) percentage of 10.36 (2.20)% 
words in the narrative compared to 8.02 (1.76)% for the MDD group.  While these 
proportions were very small, the results are contradictory to the proposal that there would be 
a greater self-focus and a negative bias in the MDD group compared to controls. 
 3.4  Discussion  3.4
This study explored the schematic role of life-story narrative chapters in the structure 
of narrative and the recall of autobiographic episodic memories.  This involved a process of 
life-story narration and chapter generation and resulted in a rich data set allowing an 
exploration of the structure of chapter representations, these chapters were, in turn, used to 
cue episodic memories, and an exploration of the nature of these, and comparing two groups, 
those who have experienced major depressive disorder (MDD), and non-depressed controls 
we were able to make predictions concerning the nature of the internal cognitive structures 
which are represented through narrative accounts.    
There were two questions concerning the characteristics of this chapter-cued memory 
recall, the first, examining the role of chapters as schematic representations, asks whether the 
use of life-story chapter context will influence recall.  That chapters are schema implies that 
there are associated characteristics which are common to them, and it was proposed that 
atypicality in terms of chapter schema will enhance recall, either in terms of accessibility, or 
representative detail (clarity), leading to a prediction of affective incongruence raising 
memory accessibility overall.  Drawing together predictions about the influence of cognitive 
deficits, and schematic monotony of narrative, life-stories, and life-story chapters, with the 
requirement for the recall of episodic memories, it was further proposed that there would be, 




the affective variance between chapters and episodic memories.  In addition, a temporal 
breakdown in the chapter structure in terms of sequence of production, number produced, a 
negative affective bias would mean both chapters and episodic memories were rated as more 
negative than controls.  A subsidiary prediction was that the depressed group will show 
evidence for a depresso-typic narrative structure and content difference, in terms of self-focus 
and negative bias in their life-story narratives. in i) word count, and proportions of ii) positive 
words, iii) negative words, iii) self-referencing words, and iv) social words.  Because this 
study was exploring a relatively novel cueing method, there was also a consideration of 
whether the depressed group would display over-general recall of episodic memories. 
The prediction that temporal breakdown in chapter structure was drawn from research 
which indicates that their formation relies on specific memory recall (D’Argembeau, et al, 
2014), and life-period reasoning (Thomsen, 2015) processes,and as a result of overgeneral 
memory recall people who had experienced MDD may be impaired in this.  This prediction is 
supported by a number of studies which show a breakdown in life-story coherence in 
narrative accounts (e.g. Adler, et al, 2007; Boulard, 2015; McAdams, 2006; Waters & 
Fivush, 2015).  Initial analysis therefore examined the temporal structuring of life-story 
chapters, but no evidence was seen for chapter-level disorder. The groups were similar in 
terms of the temporal production (which chapters came first), and the valence of the chapters 
produced.  During the chapter production phase chapters were reliably produced sequentially 
from early childhood, through school, careers and on to the present day.  Interestingly, no 
matter what the age of the participant there was little difference in the number of chapters 
produced, and thus the length of chapters varied according to age for both groups.  This 
feature may have more to do with the demand characteristics of the task than the internal 
representation of the autobiographical life-story narrative, in that reference is made to the 
chapters of a book, that chapters can be of any length, but that perhaps participants were 
likely to be aware of the time which they were given to produce the chapters (coming at the 
end of the hour-long session), and their ability to use their previously narrated life-story as a 
structural cue.   
In order to test the prediction that chapters represent sub-divisions of a schematic life-
story, and are themselves schematic in nature, the impact of affective atypicality or 
incongruence of events was expected to follow a pattern of increased accessibility.  This was 




would be reduced.    This study builds upon procedures which have already attempted to 
refine recall within life-time periods, and incorporates the TEMPau criteria in to an 
experimental design.  In addition, a centrality of event measure was incorporated in to the 
ratings, as this has been found to be an important aspect of inclusion in to life-story 
narratives, and influential on rehearsal and thus subsequent accessibility (Berntsen & Rubin, 
2006).  The impact of affective narrative congruence on episodic memory recall has not been 
addressed in any research study to date.  While congruence of memories with their cuing 
chapters had no impact on the centrality (personal importance) of memories, nor did it impact 
on the difficulty of recall, there was an impact of incongruence on the clarity of memories.  
Overall negatively incongruent memories were rated with greater clarity, and were spoken 
about more than positively incongruent and congruent memories. The impact of incongruence 
was predicted to be different for the MDD compared to the control group.  This prediction is 
drawn from evidence that MDD is linked to monotony in the structuring of chapters 
(Dalgliesh, et al, 2011), and narrative accounts (Habermas, et al¸ 2008), and this was 
anticipated to be seen in a significant reduction in the degree to which incongruence impacted 
on recall, however no group differences were seen.  This absence of a group effect could have 
been seen for a number of reasons, first that simply the representations of incongruent events, 
are not recalled differently depending on depressive status, and that mood effects are more 
likely to manifest in the recall of autobiograpchail information more generally.  However, 
this was also not a characteristic of either the chapters, or specific memories in the MDD 
group.   
A series of analyses were carried out on the life-story narratives, the first was to 
explore depresso-typic narrative features, with the prediction that the MDD groups would 
produce more negative and fewer positive words, be shorter, and have a more self-focussed 
narrative style.  The life-story narratives were used to establish whether there was a 
consistent difference in the narrative, in terms of negative representations, and a depresso-
typic self-focus.  In addition to this the self- and social-focus of narratives were explored to 
begin to differentiate the content of life-stories, and further to this the rate of delivery of 
narratives to establish comparability between groups was examined.   
Overall, and somewhat intriguingly, the never-depressed controls produced a 
significantly greater proportion of negative words within their life-story narratives, while 




offered for this, the first being that in depression, engagement with negative material can 
induce a disproportionately negative response, and thus a disengagement or avoidance of 
negative material in narrative could be seen to be a protective device in accordance with the 
predictions of Williams and colleagues (2011).  This might be particularly significant in the 
MDD group in this study as depressive status was established using SCID-II criteria, and 
current mood was not taken in to account, so if current mood were positive, avoidance might 
function to reduce risk of dysphoric mood.  This explanation is supported by evidence for a 
significantly reduced self-referencing speech for the MDD group.  Contrary to expectations 
the ruminative self-focus (Nolen-Hoeksema, et al, 2008) associated with depression was not 
apparent, however, if there is a functional avoidance of negative material in the MDD 
narrative production, this might be linked in to a reduction in the personalisation of narrative 
accounts.  In conjunction these two characteristics would serve to allow the speaker to fulfil 
the demands of the task, while still avoiding speaking of negative material linked to the self.  
A separate account for functional avoidance of negative event memories has been proposed, 
whereby the negative impact of events is reduced by recall perspective (Robinson & 
Swanson, 1993; Siedlecki, 2015) as a third-person perspective is associated with reduced 
emotional impact of event recall, and a significant perspective difference was seen, with the 
MDD group reporting greater levels of visualising events from an observer perspective, but 
again this was seen for this group with both positive and negative memories, and so 
avoidance is suggested, but not evidenced by these results. 
A second explanation for the group difference in negative speech is that the 
characteristic absence of affective variation in depressive experience may be expressed in the 
use of moderately positive words.  The LIWC categorises words, when they are valenced, as 
either positive or negative, but does not distinguish between moderately and highly rated 
words in either category, therefore happy and ecstatic, are counted in the same way.  If the 
MDD group produce words which are consistently neutral or mildly positive ‘nice’ ‘good’, 
while the control group were more likely to produce words of both higher positivity ‘brilliant’ 
and negativity ‘awful’, this could explain the disparity.  The rate of delivery (word 
number/time taken) of narratives themselves was not different between groups and so it 
appears that the slowing of production seen in depression, particularly for hospitalised MDD 
patients (Boulard, 2015), is not a consideration in this study as a community sample of 




 The autobiographical memory cuing task using chapter-cues revealed some evidence 
for over-generality in autobiographical memory recall.  The MDD group recalled events with 
less clarity, reported access to be more difficult, and also adopted the observer rather than the 
field perspective, in particular for incongruent events.  All of these results are indicative of 
decreased specificity in recall, and the latter result links with the suggestion that depressed 
individuals are more likely to take a distanced approach to recall of impactful personal 
experiences.  
 On further examination and when controlled for by accounting for the degree to 
which an event was thought about, the difference between groups in terms of event clarity 
was removed.  While the direction of effect cannot be predicted i.e. are events more clear 
because subjects had thought about them, or were events thought about more because they 
were represented with greater clarity, this association does call in to question whether the 
effect revealed is over-generality, and how this links with the role of rehearsal and 
maintenance of specificity of memories.  The results give no evidence for a group difference 
for engagement with negative autobiographical material, and the apparent over-generality is 
not linked to memory valence, also, and in contrast to a number of studies, negative episodic 
memories were less clear overall (Berntsen, Rubin, & Siegler, 2011).  There may have been 
an impact of the life-story narrative priming memory recall in this case, but the nature of this 
impact is not clear. 
Theoretically the life-story narrative has been proposed to act as a personal schema 
(Bluck & Habermas, 2000) which provides structure to the autobiographical memory, and 
narrative construction.  The nature of schema are such that they provide a scaffold on which 
to recall and recount past events, this scaffold relies on beliefs and expectations and is used 
during recall of autobiographical events, and in the recounting of life-stories.  The prediction 
that chapters provide a mid-level structure to this schema is supported by this study in a 
number of ways, the first being the role of negative incongruence in increasing clarity of 
memories.  Negative incongruence relates to the situation where something occurs that is 
worse than expected.  Examples from the study include events where typically pleasant 
chapter, such as time at school, cued a memory for a poor performance in an exam.  That 
overall negative memories are not recalled with greater clarity than positive memories, but 
are when the chapter context is taken in to account indicates that the context of the event 




The impact of recalling memories with greater clarity has been suggested to be that they are 
more significant for goals seeking, or avoidance functions (Berntsen et al, 2011; Bluck, 2003; 
Pillemer, 1998; Csikszentmihalkyi & Beattie, 1979), and although in the current study the 
rated centrality did not appear to be a factor this could be the case.  The idea that negative 
events require processing and ‘closure’ for them to lose their sense of clarity or emotional 
impact, also points to the possible role of negative incongruence.  A negative event within the 
context of a number of other negative events, within a negative chapter would be less likely 
to feel unusual or in need of explanation.  A negative event in a period of more positive 
events might have, at the time, been more surprising and this would have impacted on 
encoding (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006), while the nature of unusual events is that they would 
require more explanation in order to become minimised (Taylor, 1991). 
Key considerations for this study were the way in which the top-down life-story 
narrative to individual event impacted on the systematic sampling of memories, at each level 
of the study (narrative, chapters, and episodic memories) there were factors which impacted 
on the comparability of the next step, and therefore draw in to question the findings reported.  
The life story narratives were of varying length, but the number of chapters which were 
reported following the narration were similar, and this was independent of the participants’ 
age.  It can therefore be reasonably assumed that if narrative chapters are representative of 
‘clustering’ of events, they would be more likely to be similar lengths, for example, ‘school’ 
‘university’ ‘first job’, whereas the chapters here appear to have been stretched to fit the task, 
indicating that we cannot draw assumptions about cognitive representations.  Using the 
method of collective sampling and creating post-hoc categories of congruence also caused 
problems, this is because a number of participants failed to provide episodic memories for all 
the congruence categories. 
These concerns resulted in a recognition that the structure of life-story narratives 
should be examined in more detail, and that if they were to be used to structure episodic 
recall, differences between life-stories and life-story chapters of people with depression and 
never-depressed groups should first be established.  Taking these results forward it is clear 
that any tentative suggestions must be considered in the context of the variability in 
participant performance, and also the nature of the way the incongruence was established 




The use of participant-defined, rather than researcher-defined chapters as cues within 
a study accommodates the need for ecological validity in the cuing process, incorporating the 
need to explore specific episodic memories.  The cuing technique appears to effectively result 
in episodic memory recall as shown by the criteria checks, and may also effectively 
differentiate the over-general memory bias seen in depressed groups.  This narrative-based 
sampling method can be considered more ecologically valid representing a closer analogue to 
real-life recall circumstances. 
Overall incongruence of events in this study has no effect on memory representations 
and difficulty of access, however negatively incongruent events were reported to have greater 
clarity than postively incongruent events.  The life-story narratives produced by the two 
groups were very similar in terms of the characteristics examined.  In terms of differentiating 
between the two models of autobiographical memory introduced in Chapter 1, this study 
provides support for the hierarchical structure of the Self-memory system (Conway, et al, 
2000) in terms of chapter-event links, but does not differentiate the impact of narrative 
context on recall because no difference was established between the MDD and control group 
narrative production in terms of sequencing and coherence.  The temporal sequencing of 
chapters produced could be a result of internal representations upon a temporally defined 
framework (as would be seen with the SMS), or be the result of a culturally accepted 
temporal sequence to the narrative frame (as would be seen with the BSM (Rubin, 2006)). 
This study was carried using a small number (25) of participants, effect sizes were 
small, and any conclusions from analysis should be approached with caution.  However, the 
protocol used to elicit life-story narratives, associated chapters, and cued episodic memories 
was effective.  Studies two and three refine and develop the method of data collection by 
separating the two stages of analysis, to life-story narratives and depresso-typic features, and 







 Chapter 4   The structure of life-stories in Chapter 4
dysphoric groups  
 4.1  Introduction 4.1
Despite theoretical models which posit the link between life-story schematic 
representations, and life-story narratives, little direct exploration has been carried out to 
evaluate the proposal that life-story narratives are verbal representations of cognitive schema.  
In order to establish this link this study uses the assumption that the components of life-story 
narratives can be matched to characteristics of underlying representations, and that in order to 
create a predictive model features of narrative will map on to representational characteristics 
of different groups (Habermas, 2011).  Research has indicated that for people with depression 
there are features of narrative which are suggestive of a breakdown in self-coherence, 
schematic; self-representations, such as low self-esteem, and cognitive processes such as 
over-general recall of autobiographical memories.   
This link has been proposed as a result of the combination of impaired narrative 
ability, and cognitive impairment for people with depression.  Depressive disorders are linked 
with a reduced ability to create a coherent life-story narrative, and this is suggested to be a 
result of either an impaired ability to access autobiographical information (Williams, et al, 
2006), or the impaired cognitive ability to undergo autobiographical reasoning (Lilgendahl & 
McAdams, 2011; Waters & Fivush, 2015) which in turn could influence their ability to 
distance themselves from past events, and to effectively anticipate a positive future.  So while 
the content of narratives is linked to the trajectory of mental health over time in terms of the 
incorporation of positive events, and optimistic outcomes (Adler, Turner, Brookshier, 
Monohan, Walder-Biesanz, et al, 2015), the structure of narratives is also indicative of 
mental health.   Habermas and Colleagues (2008) carried out a study to investigate evidence 
that life narratives both reflect (in terms of negative content) and stabilize (in terms of 
information processing) psychopathology in depression.  They examined the narratives of 20 
adults with clinical depression being treated in a psychiatric institute with 20 matched 
controls.  They found that narratives of people with depression differ from controls in the 




autobiographical events, a depressed explanatory style (more self-blame and external 
attribution of positive events), ruminative characteristics and an impaired temporal linearity 
in narrative.  Habermas and colleagues were particularly interested in the ways that a sense of 
distance from past events was reflected in narrative and used the ability to compare past and 
present as an indication of temporal structuring (Habermas & Paha, 2001).  Narratives for 
people with depression and dysphoria were negative, sparse and affectively congruent, and in 
addition, the results indicated that depressed individuals were less able to take a distanced 
perspective on past events.  The authors emphasised an interactional aspect to these 
narratives, in that the ways in which information was processed appeared to be both 
influenced by, and to influence the depressive status.   For example, reports of temporal 
breakdown in depressed groups, was evidenced in narrative by an absence of past-present 
comparison, and that this process of comparison would itself be predicted to impact on the 
ways that memories were perceived i.e. that the past is recalled with a less distanced frame.   
This proposed interaction between how something is related in narrative, and 
represented in memory relies on the ways in which meaning-making occurs.  Evidence of 
cognitive management of events is found in the autobiographical reasoning process 
(Habermas & Bluck, 2000).  As a result of autobiographical reasoning, abstracted processes 
are proposed to be evident in life-story narratives which represent the meaning-making, 
evaluative, and connection-making aspects of creating a coherent and communicative 
narrative (McLean & Pasupathi, 2011).  A number of characteristic statements are likely to be 
embedded within narrative, including reflections, evaluations, life-lessons, inferences about 
personality, and meta-communication.  Thus life-story narratives are thought to represent the 
underlying cognitive representations, or autobiographical self, but also contain evidence of 
reasoning processes essential to the creation of a narrative identity. 
In a novel study exploring the representation of autobiographical memory in 
narratives of non-depressed adults, Thomsen (2009) examined the role of chapters and 
structural components of life-story narratives in a group of 30 elderly Danes considered to be 
in ‘good emotional health’,  Participants were given 45 minutes to relate their life-stories and 
these were then transcribed and coded for the following features:  The first five narrative 
features were types of autobiographic memories, Lifetime periods, Mini-narratives, Specific 
memories/events, Categoric memories, and Facts (autobiographical semantics).  The next six 




being commonly represented categories in the data set itself: Reflections, evaluations, life-
lessons, inferences about personality, meta-communication, and chapters for other people.  
The narratives were found to contain a preponderance of chapter components, with the 
number of chapters being un-related to the number of other components.  Thomsen concluded 
that while chapters are likely to exist in nested hierarchical structures, they have an essential 
role in creating context and coherence to the higher-order structure.  Specific events within 
the narratives of this study were suggested to be the building blocks of chapter formation, as 
they functioned most often as illustrations of chapter-level summations, indicating that 
autobiographical or life-period reasoning creates links between events resulting in clusters of 
thematically linked events with a summative narrative.   
Reasoning processes are linked to the chapter structure, if chapter structures are based 
on memories for specific events, and are created through autobiographical-, or life-period 
reasoning processing, it leads to the prediction that people with depression, who have an 
impaired ability to retrieve specific memories (Sumner, et al, 2010), and also are more likely 
to find the reasoning process cognitively demanding (Roiser, et al, 2014) will have a different 
chapter representation in narrative, this could be in terms of the ability to close chapters 
(resulting in a larger number being ongoing at the time of narration), and to create chapters 
with a discrete focus (resulting in fewer chapters being produced overall, and less overlap 
between chapters).    
Outwith the chapter structure, other aspects of narrative could reflect depressive 
psychopathology as the cognitive features of depression are also predicted to be represented 
in spoken narratives.  Rumination, a negative problem-focussed thinking style which is both a 
risk-factor and mediator of recovery in depression (McLaughlin & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011), 
and difficulties in the recall of specific autobiographical memories (Williams, et al, 2006) 
could also be reflected leading to the following predictions:  That due to habitual capture and 
rumination on a categoric event-level, rather than accessing specific event-based knowledge 
(Williams, 2006), people with depression would be more likely to narrate their life-stories 
with reduced levels of specific memories, and higher levels of categorical memories, 
narratives would also reflect characteristics associated with ruminative thinking in terms of 





There are broadly three suggestions for why there might be a difference between these 
structures for dysphoric and non-depressed groups: (1) there would be a disruption in the 
ability to construct chapters resulting from impaired reasoning, resulting in temporal disorder, 
(2) a ruminative past-oriented thinking patterns would prevent the ‘closure’ of past chapters, 
and/or (3) the disrupted sense of self associated with depression (e.g. Adler, et al, 2015; 
Cruwys  et al, 2014) would prevent the crystallisation of a socially meaningful narrative.   
In order to address the proposal that depression could be perpetuated by narratives 
which are overwhelmingly negative, and representative of a life-story schema which creates 
negative links and expectations.  An examination of the differences between the narrative 
structuring of life-stories in depressed groups is required to ascertain whether there are 
differences between depressed and non-depressed groups, dolife-story narratives of people 
with depression differ from those of non-depressed controls in terms of number, distribution, 
and length of chapters reported by participants.  Based on the findings of temporal monotony 
and reduced coherence in depressive narratives (Boulard, 2015; Waters & Fivush, 2015), in 
this between-participants study, life-stories will be elucidated, and propositional content 
compared, in addition chapters are expected to be represented with longer periods with 
greater similarity of themes and features, and that a reduction in structural coherence would 
reduce the delineation between chapters.  Autobiographical reasoning processes will be less 
evident in depressed people. There would also be reduced evidence for autobiographical, or 
life-period, reasoning and past-present distancing in the form of fewer reflections, fewer 
evaluations overall, and, relative to positive evaluations, more negative evaluations of self 
(compared to others), and more negative autobiographical facts (referring to self). 
These are predicted to be evident in the presence of autobiographical information in 
narrative, and in terms of the temporal coherence reflected in the chapter-level structure.  The 
following hypotheses concerning the nature of the depressive state are also explored: That the 
life-stories of the dysphoric group would reveal fewer specific events, and more categoric or 
general memories compared to controls, and that narratives of depressed participants would 
reveal ruminative characteristics in the form of more negative evaluations, and more negative 





Overall predictions are therefore that: 
 Chapters are a primary feature of life-story narratives, and that they are not reciprocal 
to specific memories, which would be reflecting in longer narratives by: 
o more specific memories  
o fewer categoric memories 
o fewer chapters. 
 The dysphoric group, compared to controls, will have different chapter 
representations as a result of reduced coherence of life-story chapters resulting in: 
o fewer chapters overall  
o longer chapters 
o more overlapping chapters 
 As a result of reduced autobiographical, or life-period, reasoning and past-present 
distancing, the life-stories of the dysphoric group, compared to the control group, will 
have: 
o fewer, or more negative life-lessons 
o fewer, or more negative self-referencing facts 
o fewer reflections 
 The dysphoric group will also have life-stories with depresso-typic features reflecting 
overgenerality, in terms of: 
o fewer specific events 
o more general events,  
and evidence of rumination, as indicated by: 
o higher levels of negative evaluations 
o fewer positive evaluations  
 There would also be evidence for a depresso-typic narrative structure and content 
differences, in terms of self-focus and negative bias in their life-story narratives, 
demonstrated as 
o fewer positive words 
o more negative words;  
o more self-referencing words, and  





 4.2  Method 4.2
4.2.1 Participants 
This study recruited 30 young adults aged between 18-25, via campus flyers and the 
University of Abertay participant recruitment SONA, system, asking for both currently 
depressed or dysphoric individuals, and never depressed participants to take part.  The overall 
mean (SD) age of participants was 23.1 (1.9), the dysphoric group had a mean (SD) age of 
23.4 (2.1) years, with 4 males, and the control group a mean (SD) age of 22.8 (1.6) years, 
with 6 males.  Each participant received £5 on completion of the research protocol.  
Allocation to two groups, dysphoric and non-dysphoric was carried out using the PHQ-9 
(Kroenke & Spitzer, 2002) (Appendix 13) with a cut-off of 10.   
4.2.2 Design 
This is a between participant design which compares the transcripts of life-story 
narratives of dysphoric and non-dysphoric groups.  Ethical consent was obtained from the 
University of Abertay Dundee (Appendix 2).  The interviews were transcribed verbatim to 
produce 30 life-story narratives.   
Process of coding 
Each narrative was independently coded for narrative components by the current 
author, and a research assistant.  A dual-coding process was established, whereby each 
narrative account was coded by the author, and by a research assistant using the same criteria, 
coding disparities between coded components were agreed by discussion.  The same coders 
were used throughout. 
The coding categories used were chapters (lifetime periods, extended events, and 
mini-narratives), specific memories, categorical memories (general events), facts, inferences 
about personality, life-lessons, evaluations (positive), evaluations (negative), reflections, 
metacommunication and chapters for other people. 
The first five were chosen because they represent the autobiographical memory 




autobiographical or life-period reasoning, and were used by Thomsen (2009) in her transcript 
analysis as a result of common identifiable components of narratives.   
The two coders agreed on 92% of the components coded.  The percentage of 
agreement for each component is as follows:  Chapters 82%; Specific memories 89%, 
Categoric memories 92%, Facts 96%, Inferences about personality 97%, Life lessons 84%, 
positive evaluations 97%, Negative evaluations 99%, Reflections 79%, Metacommunication 
98%, Chapters for other people 100% 
While there was good agreement in the categories of evaluations, the most commonly 
confused categories were reflections and life lessons. Disagreements were resolved via 
discussions between the two coders. 
Definitions of narrative components  
Chapters 
Life-time periods are temporally extended structures containing commonalities, such 
as life-stages, and in practice are difficult to distinguish systematically from mini-narratives.  
The latter being extended periods focussing on a particular activity or situation.  Either of 
these categories can be defined as ‘chapters’ in practice.  As a result of this difficulty in 
differentiation, Thomsen (2009) chose to categorise both as ‘chapters’ in her analysis. In this 
study, initially a distinction was drawn between them, but this proved problematic as despite 
researchers feeling that the narrative distinction could be drawn there were challenges in 
establishing clear objective criteria.  Chapters therefore are both life-time periods and mini-
narratives, meeting the criteria drawn from Thomsen (2009), and allowing for the hierarchical 
clustering of chapters seen in naturalistic studies of chapter structures (Thomsen & Berntsen, 
2008; Thomsen, et al, 2011): 
A life-story chapter is a component of the life-story containing descriptions of parts of 
the life-course stretching in length from 24 hours to several years.  An example of a chapter 
is:  
‘So by the time I went to secondary school, the marriage between my parents was 




like a set of stepping stones between one row or drama and the next.  I finally got out to uni, 
and mum left shortly after, not sure why she hung around…’ 
Whereas a categorical memory might be: 
‘during my teens my parents argued all the time’ 
During categorisation it is possible to confuse chapters with general events or 
categorical memories, which are summarisations of a series of similar events.  In theory each 
chapter defined within a narrative could represent several chapters, so for the example above, 
the above example may represent chapters for the parents’ marriage and secondary school, 
leading to an underestimation of the number of chapter components.  In addition the same 
chapter may be referred to multiple times during the life-story, and this would create an over-
estimation of the number of chapter components.  In order to explore the potential disparity 
between researcher defined chapters and the perspective of the participants we asked 
participants to define life-story chapters for their own life-stories following their narration.   
Specific memories: 
These are defined as memories for events lasting less than 24 hours, which have 
sufficient detail to be identifiable as single incidents, or are indicated to have occurred only 
once.  Within a narrative account they are often signposted with the use of introductory 
statements such as ‘One day …’, or ‘It was during this time that I …’.  They generally give 
some information about setting, and the action sequence within the memory, there may also 
be sensory-perceptual information, for example:  
‘..and one day, see I’d been set about, picked upon by some group of kids actually I 
don’t remember who but I just lost it and ended up jumping on the first other kid who came 
near me.  I was furious with anyone else who went to that school and picked on just one 
person as just an example of that hated group and um beat the stuffing out of him and I was 
not particularly given to fighting at all which finally got my parents to take my repeated 
requests to change schools’ 
Sometimes evaluations and reflections are included, which are apparently intrinsic to 
the specific memory, for example, ‘I was not particularly given to fighting at all’, and these 




continuation of the story ‘ which finally got my parents to take my repeated requests..’, that 
appears to belong to this event, and while it may be the result of autobiographical reasoning 
is also considered part of the specific memory.  During coding, interpretation of these 
incidents was decided by discussion between coders, seven discussions occurred across the 
data set. 
Categorical memories: 
Categorical memories are defined as memories for repeated, and similar types of 
event which are described with no reference to time course of occurrence, nor relating to a 
particular day or date.  For example: 
‘We’d come downstairs in the morning and Dad would be sleeping on the couch’ 
They are dissimilar from chapters in that they represent not a cluster of related events 
but a summation of repeated events.  They are distinct from episodic memories in that they 
lack distinct ‘one-off’ details, and tend to be relatively poorly defined in terms of sensory 
details. 
Facts: 
Are where the narrator is providing specific information, about themselves, events or 
the world they are describing.  Because facts can be intrinsic to both specific memories, 
general events, and chapters they were only coded as being facts if they were longer than two 
lines, or could not be connected to other coded categories.  For example: 
‘In the US you start school at 5, then move to middle school at around 10, at 14/15 
you move to High School’ 
Inferences about personality: 
These are categories of communication where the narrator makes some evaluation or 
statement about the characteristics of themselves or others, such as personality traits, roles or 
interests.   These may introduce or follow a section of description of events, which support 
the inference.  For example:  
‘I think you could fairly well characterise me as, at that point, a teenage pseudo 





These are statement where the speaker draws on principles, moral rules, or some 
higher ‘truth’ which has been learnt as a result of experience.  For example: 
‘I don’t know how I got through that first year, but you have to pull yourself together 
and carry on through, you can’t just give up’ 
Evaluations: 
These were coded when the narrator made some evaluative comment about a part of 
their life-story, but not when they made some evaluation of an object, or third person e.g. ‘a 
nice house’, or ‘a horrible person’.  For example: 
‘..well I was born in Namibia in above South Africa to a South African guy and an 
American woman, I have a younger brother who if four years younger than me, um happy 
childhood’ 
Evaluations were scored as either positive e.g. ‘that was a happy time’ or negative 
e.g. ‘that was a difficult three years’. 
Reflections: 
Include narrators’ explanations for decisions and choices, along with summary 
reflections on life-story events.  They may be similar to evaluations but if so they are judged 
to be reflections when they have no clear emotional tone, for example: 
‘So at the point I chose to come here, which kind of influenced my whole life’ 
Meta-communication: 
This is when the narrator ‘breaks the fourth wall’ in terms of the description and 
indicates to the listener what they are doing.  For example: 
‘I’m just marshalling my thoughts’ 
Chapters for other people: 




‘my father had come over from the US to live and work in Africa, he flew planes for 
the oil company before he met my mother’ 
The author trained a research assistant to code the categories.  They independently 
separated the final life-story transcripts in to propositions, and any disagreement at this stage 
of categorization was agreed through discussion. 
The propositions were then coded by both the researcher and research assistant.  Thus 
all transcripts were independently double-coded by researchers.   
An important question in terms of this thesis is whether there is a difference between 
the dysphoric and control groups in the ways in which they represent chapters in their life 
story, and by inference how these chapters might be constructed and represented cognitively.  
This was examined in two ways, the first being the categorisation of life-story chapters within 
transcripts, the second being the reporting of chapters by participants which could then be 
matched to the coder categorised chapters.  To ensure coders were not influenced by 
participant-defined chapters these remained in sealed envelopes until the transcription and 
component coding of life-stories was complete.  On completion the participant-defined 
chapters were counted and matched to those defined by the coders.   
The total number of chapters, and the theme of the chapter was matched between 
participant defined and coder defined chapters.  The matching process was carried out by 
counting clear matches, followed by discussions of unclear matches using the criteria of 1. 
Matched theme e.g. ‘playing the piano’, 2. Matched timeframe, e.g. ‘early teens’, 3. Matched 
content events e.g. ‘performing in Macbeth’, chapters were considered the same if they 
matched on two out of three of these criteria. 
4.2.3 Measures 
Depression status was evaluated using the PHQ-9
7
 (Kroenke & Spitzer, 2002).  This 
self-report measure requires the rating of nine features of depression as defined by the DSM-
IV. The cut-off scores are for the absence of, or minor, depression 0-9; moderate/moderately 
severe depression 15-19, and severe depression 20+.  The PHQ-9 had sensitivity (testing 
                                                 
7
 PHQ-9 was adopted for this study to limit time taken to establish dysphoric status.  The PHQ-9 has 




positive) of 88%, specificity (testing negative) of 88%.  The PHQ-9 takes less than 3 minutes 
to complete (Appendix 13). 
4.2.4 Procedure 
All procedures were carried out at the University of Abertay Dundee. 
Participants were invited individually to attend the University research centre and 
were asked to complete the PHQ-9 (Kroenke & Spitzer, 2002).   
Following this the participants were asked to recount their life-story to the researcher.  
This was audio recorded and the following prompt was used: 
‘I am interested in understanding who you are and how you have become the person 
you are today.  Please tell me about your life to date.  Give yourself about 15-20 minutes and 
try and tell me a coherent story of your life, so that I can get a good picture of you’ 
If participants talked for longer than 25 minutes they were asked to complete their 
narration at a convenient point. 
The participants were then asked to provide, using the metaphor of an 
autobiographical book, chapters which relate to periods of their lives, in response to the 
following prompt: 
‘I would like to imagine that your life story is a book, and that within this book there 
are chapters each involving a different part of your life.  The chapters of your life story can 
be thematic e.g. ‘my love of art’, or relating to particular times in your life e.g. ‘my time in 
the army’, chapters can be of any length and can overlap e.g. for example during your time in 
the army you could have taken up painting.   
Starting with the chapter that first comes to mind, write a title and a brief description 
of the chapter in the space provided.   
Then think about the title and description of the next chapter you think of and write 
this on another, continue until all your chapters have been named and each has a response 




Participant reported the approximate date at the start and end of the chapter, and were 
free to complete as many or as few chapter sheets as they chose.  On completion, the 
participants were thanked, and received their payment. 
 4.3  Results 4.3
The transcribed life-story narratives of a dysphoric and control participant can be 
found in Appendix 8.  The number of coded components for each group, and category are 
shown in Table 4.1. 
An overview of the structure and content of the narratives revealed a mean (SD) 42.73 
(22.03) components, the minimum number of components was 25, and the maximum 66.  A 
Pearsons Correlation was carried out to examine the relationship between narrative length 
and number of components, and found no evidence for a relationship r=0.14, p=0.431, df=14.  
Our results follow the patterns reported by Thomsen (2009) in that chapters were the most 
common component of the narratives, being around three times more common than specific 
memories.   
This pattern was consistent across participants, with none providing a narrative with 
more specific memories than chapters, supporting the idea that life-stories are predominantly 
structured at chapter-level.  Expanding on this we considered whether the commonality of 
chapters was due to a need for narrative brevity, and were perhaps chosen to allow the entire 
story to be told within the suggested time allowed as this was indicated by Study one.  This 
would be indicated by shorter narratives being more likely to use summary events and 
chapters and provide fewer details in the form of specific memories?  Pearson’ correlation 
analysis revealed no evidence that longer narratives contained i) a greater number of specific 
memories r=0.05, p=0.776. nor ii) fewer categoric memories r=0.02, p=0.674, or iii) fewer 
chapters r=0.28, p=0.312, all dfs=29.  
Comparison of the two population samples:  
Life-story narratives of people with depression were predicted to differ from those of 
non-depressed controls in terms of valence, number, distribution, length of chapters reported 




Based on the findings of temporal monotony and reduced coherence in depressive 
narratives (Boulard, 2015; Waters & Fivush, 2015), chapters were be expected to be 
represented as longer periods and that a reduction in structural coherence would reduce the 
delineation between chapters.  Overall there were no group differences in the number of 
chapters produced t(28)<1, however there was a disparity between the number of chapters as 
defined by the researchers, and by the participants themselves. 
The participants reported a mean (SD) 7.65 (2.12) chapters, and the research coders 
10.40 (2.50).  This disparity was examined and it was proposed that while the coders 
understood chapters to involve mini-narratives, some of which could have had a relatively 
short time-frame, participants may have understood chapters as longer, periods which might 
align to themes within the cultural life-script (Berntsen & Rubin 2004).   
Further examination of the chapter disparity involved location of chapters reported by 
participants which were not coded by researchers.  These ‘missing’ chapters were returned to 
the transcripts to see if they could be recognised by the content, a mean of 2.75 (2.58) 
chapters were reported by participants which were not coded, and very few of these returned 
chapters were recognisable in the transcripts, for example a mention of singing in the choir 
which was coded as a categorical memory, but clearly related to the chapter ‘singing!’ 
defined by the participant.  A few of the chapters could be inferred, for example a chapter for 
‘first year’ could be inferred from the progression in the life-story from primary school to 
GCSEs, but was not mentioned in the transcript at all.  These ‘missing’ chapters could have 
been left out because of the length of time given for life-story narration. 
Although there was clearly some disparity in the matching of chapters in the life-
stories, and the ways that the participants defined chapters, around 87% of the participant-
defined chapters appeared in the chapters coded by researchers.  This supports the proposal 
that internal structuring of autobiographical memory, i.e. how individuals cluster their 









Table 4.1: Life-story components for Study two 
 Total Dysphoric Control  
Component Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t(28) 
Chapters 10.40 (2.50) 4-15 10.13 (2.25) 10.67 (2.77) <1 
Specific memory 3.16 (1.55) 0-6 3.40 (1.54) 2.93 (1.57) 1.077 n.s. 
Categorical 
memory 
6.37 (2.61) 3-14 6.80 (2.71) 5.93 (2.52) <1 
Facts 10.73 (6.01) 3-25 10.33 (5.59) 11.13 (6.55) <1 
Inferences about 
personality 
10.40(2.50) 0-7 2.40 (1.36) 3.67 (2.39) <1 




0.10 (0.30) 0-3 2.47 (1.78) 2.93 (1.57) <1 
Evaluations 
(negative) 
2.70 (1.67) 0.6 3.13 (1.82)* 1.53 (1.75) 2.373, p=0.025 
Reflections 2.33 (1.92) 0-8 1.00 (0.97) 0.67 (0.87) <1 
Meta-
communication 
0.83 (0.92) 0-3 3.00 (2.17)* 1.33 (1.59) 2.399, p=0.023 
Chapters for other 
people 
2.17 (1.99) 0-7 0.27 (0.57) 0.07 (0.25) 1.197, n.s. 
Components which 
could not be coded 
0.17 (0.45) 0-2 1.13 (1.31) 1.00 (1.26) <1 
Transcript length 
in words 
3897.87 (742.00) 2671-6001 3841.66 (604.04) 3954.51 (875.52) <1 
Number of 
components 
42.73 (22.03) 17-51 43.60 (21.75) 41.80 (23.04) <1 
 
This table provides an overview of the mean (SD) number and range of components in the life-story narratives overall, and 






It was decided that to ensure alignment with the exploration of chapters as represented 
within narrative, the researcher-coded chapters were included in the analysis of narrative 
features.  However, because of the requirement for details of start and end points for chapters, 
those reported by participants were used in the analysis of valence, temporal coherence. The 
first prediction that due to impaired abilities to create chapters, the dysphoric group would 
report fewer chapters overall was examined by comparing groups according to the number of 
chapters reported overall, results indicated that there was no group difference t(29)<1, with a 
mean (SD) 7.65 (2.12) chapters being reported by participants overall, dysphoric 7.70 (2.35) 
and control 8.56 (4.32).  An impaired ability to create ‘closure’ for chapters was predicted for 
the dysphoric group, in that reduced reasoning ability would prevent chapters being perceived 
as over, resulting in longer chapters, and a greater number being perceived as open at an one 
time.  There was no significant difference in the length of chapters reported t(29)<1, with an 
overall mean (SD) of 3.12 (1.98) years, dysphoric 3.40 (2.08) and control 2.98 (1.86).  The 
mean number of ‘open’ chapters was calculated by a year-on year analysis of current 
chapters, divided by age of the participant, this again showed no group difference t(29)<1.  
The mean (SD) number of open chapters was 1.34 (0.87) at any one time, dysphoric 1.40 
(0.81) and control 1.28 (0.79). 
The second prediction for this study was that there would also be reduced evidence 
for autobiographical, or life-period, reasoning and past-present distancing in the form of life-
lessons, self-referencing facts, and reflections.  Life-lessons were the least common 
component in the transcripts, with only a minority of participants (12) including these in their 
life-story, and although these could be categorised in to negative and positive, overall only 
two life-lessons were coded in the former category.  A Mann-Whitney U test revealed no 
significant difference between the numbers of life-lessons (U<1), but the number of negative 
life-lessons were insufficient to explore group differences.  Similarly the facts given within 
the text were generally not self-referencing, being related to circumstantial and context 
details, as a result no analysis could be carried out to ascertain group differences in the 
frequency of negative and positive self-referencing facts.  No group differences were seen in 
the frequency of reflections reported in the narratives, and in practice these were defined as 
lacking emotional tone, so no further analysis was carried out, see Table 4.1 for means. 
The final aspect of examination was for depresso-typic narrative features, following 




relationship with cognitive representations.  These were explored in terms of evidence for 
overgenerality, and rumination.  It was predicted that, reflecting overgeneral memory, the 
life-stories of the dysphoric group would reveal fewer specific events (representing episodic 
memories), and more general events (representing categoric memories) compared to controls.   
Two t-tests were carried out to explore group differences in the number and proportion of 
episodic and categoric memories in the narratives.  This revealed no significant difference in 
the number of specific memories, t(28)=1.077, nor significant difference in the number of 
categoric memories, t(28)<1. The difference in the number of general compared to specific 
memories, calculated as the proportion of general, and other autobiographical memories 
(general and specific) was also not significantly different t(28)<1.  Indicating that 
overgenerality was either not present, or not represented in the narratives. 
Ruminative characteristics in the form of more negative evaluations, and more 
negative life lessons and self-referenced facts were predicted to be higher in the dysphoric 
group compared to controls.  The narratives of the depressed group included significantly 
more negative evaluations of elements in their life-stories compared to controls t(28)=2.373, 
p=0.025, d=0.16, but not fewer positive evaluations t(28)<1.   This indicates that aspects of 
rumination may be represented in the ways in which life-stories are told by dysphoric groups. 
Evidence for depresso-typic narratives 
Study one results indicated a number of unexpected features of the narratives of the 
MDD group compared to controls, and so a component analysis replication was carried out 
examining the narrative features which were predicted to be associated with depression.  A 
series of independent t-tests comparing the proportions of each word category (self-reference, 
social, positive and negative) was carried out, as can be seen in Table 4.2, a clear pattern of 
positive and negative word use was seen, with the dysphoric group being significantly more 
likely to use negative words mean (SD) 2.56 (1.04)% negative compared to controls who 
produced 1.74 (0.82)% negative words in their life-stories.  As can be seen in Table 4.2, and  
in contrast to Study one, the dysphoric group produced life-story narratives with significantly 
less positive words that controls with a mean (SD) 2.00 (0.77)% compared to 3.18 (1.07)% 






Table 4.2: Component production (%) in life-story narratives in Study two 
 
This table provides the proportion of words, as compared to the total number of words produced in the life-stories, which were categorised 
within each category.  Results are provided for the dysphoric and control groups, and the results were compared using t-tests reported in 
the final column. 
 4.4  Discussion 4.4
The aim of this study was to replicate the component analysis carried out by Thomsen 
(2009), and to expand this analysis to a dysphoric group in order to test the prediction that the 
production of depresso-typic life story narratives both represent, and as a result could 
perpetuate, depression.  In order to do this three predictions were explored concerning the 
life-story narratives of the dysphoric groups were compared to non-depressed controls.  The 
first asked whether, the reduced temporal coherence found in narratives of depressed groups 
would be evident in the distribution of chapters; the second was to look for evidence of 
autobiographical reasoning, which may be reduced in dysphoric groups.   Finally, life-stories 
were examined for evidence of depresso-typic processes including overgeneral recall of 
specific memories, and ruminative characteristics.  
The first focus of this study was the comparison of life-story chapters, the mid-level 
organisational narrative structures in life-stories.  There are broadly three suggestions for why 
there might be a difference between these structures for dysphoric and non-depressed groups: 
(1) there would be a disruption in the ability to construct chapters, resulting in temporal 
disorder, (2) a ruminative past-oriented thinking patterns would prevent the ‘closure’ of past 
chapters, and/or (3) the disrupted sense of self associated with depression would prevent the 
crystallisation of a socially meaningful narrative.  Results point to the depressed and control 
groups having a similar ability to create a structured narrative as non-depressed controls.   
Within the narratives of both groups chapters were the most common component identified, 
and this reflects similar findings by Thomsen (2009, and Thomsen, et al, 2011), no studies 
which examine the nature of narrative coherence have looked at the chapter level, usually 
focussing on causal sequencing (Grysman & Hudson, 2010), or the thematic focus of the 
 Dysphoric (SD) Control (SD) t-test 
Self-reference 7.48 (2.40) 7.81 (2.26) t(28)<1, n.s. 
Social words 6.67 (2.26) 6.14 (2.51) t(28)<1, n.s. 
Positive words 2.00 (0.77) 3.18 (1.07) t(28)=3.453, p=0.002, d=0.44 




narrative (Köber, Schmiedeck, & Habermas, 2015; Habermas  & de Silverira, 2008), and this 
highlights that in research on narrative construction generally the significance of these mid-
level structures have often been neglected.  The group similarities in chapter numbers and 
distribution indicates that temporal and thematic coherence differences for people with and 
without depression are not evidenced at the chapter level, it could also be inferred that the 
ability to construct chapters is either unaffected by over-general memory recall and therefore 
might not be reliant on the recall of specific events clusters (Brown, 2005), but alternatively 
draw on a framework of cultural, and abstracted knowledge internalised from the cultural 
life-script.  This is certainly indicated by studies which have found external events to act as 
punctuation for the start and ends of chapters (Brown, et al, 2012).  The broad prediction, that 
the depressed group would show evidence within their narratives of a breakdown in temporal 
coherence due to impaired autobiographical reasoning would have been revealed in group 
differences in terms of abstracted narrative content such as reflections, evaluation and life-
lessons and, inferences.  There is no evidence that this is occurred, however these narrative 
components were sparse and group differences difficult to ascertain.   
The direct examination of possible group differences between the number of specific 
or general memories in the narratives, and also in the proportions of general memories 
compared to other memories could indicate that this particular method of accessing memories 
circumvents the generative retrieval which is subject to habitual truncation of search 
(Williams, et al, 2007).  The absence of a group difference in the number of specific 
memories could also be because i) specific memories may be embedded in the narrative, be 
frequently accessed and related to others, reflecting that this task is very different from the 
AMT and other cueing protocols  ii) No time limits were provided within the narration 
process, and some evidence points to over-generality being the result of cognitive demand 
rather than habitual avoidance alone (Lemogne, Piolino, Friszerm Claret, Girault, et al, 
2006).  iii) depressed group were not classified as severely  depressed, and also recurrent 
MDD and dysphoric individuals may not have the same negative bias, and over-general recall 
features  (Kaiser, Andews-Hanna, Spielberg, Warren, Sutton, et al, 2015; Roiser, Blackwell, 
Rock, & Riedel, 2014),  iv) the task was not sensitive enough, with mean specific memory 
recall 3.16 per narrative, which was not very high.  A standard AMT test would sample 
around 10-20 memories, and in the original study the degree of over-generality occurred for 
less than a third of the cued memories for the suicidal group (Williams & Broadbent, 1986).  




the life-story narrative protocol.  This shortcoming could be addressed in a number of ways, 
the first being that the time given to create the narratives could be longer, allowing for a 
greater opportunity to share specific memories, and that comparisons could be made with a 
group of participant meeting criteria for major depressive disorder.  
Within the narratives there were suggestions of a depresso-typic narrative style linked 
to rumination.  Negative self-evaluations have been found to be significant to the 
development (Beck, 1987), maintenance (Orth, Robins & Roberts, 2008) and recurrence 
(Shahar & Davidson, 2003) of depression in a number of domains including social expertise, 
work and/or task performance, behaviour, and personal presentation (Anderson & Friedman, 
2014).  There was no difference in the number of positive evaluations, indicating that the 
dysphoric group were more evaluative overall, which would be in keeping with evidence for 
self-focus in depression (Watkins & Teasdale, 2004), but might also represent a greater level 
of autobiographical reasoning (Habermas, 2011) and past-focus (Habermas, et al, 2008).  
Autobiographical reasoning is a process by which problematic events are assimilated (Stiles, 
2001) in to a person’s sense of self, and the linkage of negative self-evaluations may indicate 
a process by which a negative narrative is constructed in depression, with a biased reasoning 
process. 
Given the group difference in the number of evaluations it might be anticipated that 
this would be concurrent with a greater level of life-lesson production, as these are the 
outcome of the evaluative process, however there were insufficient life-lessons in the 
narrative to enable a group comparison.  This dearth of life-lessons may have been because 
the participants in the study were relatively young compared to that of similar research.  
McAdams (2006) suggests that repeated evaluation of autobiographical events ultimately 
result in the production of personally espoused ‘truths’, which are expressed as life-lessons 
i.e. what has been learnt from experiences, but that this will occur over time, with a peak 
evaluative period being entered in middle-age, it is possible that the participants in this study 
were simply too young.  Negative life-lessons which might be expected for the dysphoric 
groups (that a lesson was learnt that ‘bad things’ happen) is the equivalent of contamination 
sequences seen in narratives of late-life depressed participants in McAdams study (2001), but 
overall there were very few of these summative statements in evidence, the maximum being 3 
in any one life-story.  A tentative suggestion is that the evaluative process in depression may 




would merit further investigation with a more controlled experimental design.  The group 
difference in the number of components which represent metacommunications could be 
linked to creation of the need of external reassurance, ‘Am I doing this right’, or an attempt to 
avoid being taken up with the life-story narrative and serve as a check-in with reality, and the 
propensity for assurance seeking in dysphoric groups (Joiner, Metalsky, Gencoz, & Gencoz, 
2001).  Either way, these components are not key to the structure of the life-story narrative. 
Comparing the result in this study to those of Thomsen (2009) it can be seen that 
while the number of components is greater in her study, this can, in many cases, be explained 
by the age of participants, and the longer time taken for the life-story to be related given for 
the older participants.   The greater representation of chapters, when compared to specific 
memories is similar, with chapters being approximately three to four times more common, 
underlining that chapters are a central component to the life-story. 
The frequency of categorical memories in this study was greater than for Thomsen, 
but this could be as a result of the ways in which autobiographical memories are processes in 
to general events and used to describe events within given timescales, the smaller life-span of 
our participants would mean that descriptions of events are more likely to be produced in 
finer detail.  Thomsen suggests that categorical memories, over the lifespan, become 
autobiographical facts, and this would be indicated by a frequency trade-off between these 
two components which is not apparent in the data.  Categorical memories occur 
approximately 2.5 times more than in the Thomsen study, and facts only a little less, 
indicating not a reciprocal role but possibly a feature of narrative style.  Evaluations do seem 
to show a generational effect, with the narratives of the older cohort in the Thomsen study 
containing around four times as many positive evaluations, but only twice as many negative 
evaluations (despite the dysphoric participants in this study), this again could be the result of 
age and stage of participants, as evidence points to a greater tendency of older adults to create 
meaning and redemption sequences where events are evaluated in a positive way during a 
process of ‘coming to terms’ with the past (McAdams, 2001), this is also supported by the 
levels of reflections coded which were over ten times more common in the Thomsen cohort.  
These discrepancies may again be explained by the age of the participants. 
Finally, this study asked whether it is credible for researchers to identify chapters 
from narratives, and whether these are representative of participant-defined chapters.  




and also that participants may misunderstand the ways in which chapters can be 
hierarchically clustered (notwithstanding instructions).  Despite this, overall there was good 
alignment between the chapters defined by participants and those identified by researchers.  
This indicates that chapters are a reliable method of sampling internal representations or 
clusters of interlinking events and information, and key to the exploration of the role of 
chapters are schema is that there were no group differences in the representation in the 
narratives. 
The structure of life-story narratives from both dysphoric and non-dysphoric groups 
was examined to ascertain whether it is reasonable to assume that chapters are representative 
of underlying cognitive structures, and by inference may be temporally stable rather being a 
result of the demand characteristics of the task in hand.  There was good evidence, unlike in 
Study one, that chapters are not influenced by the need for brevity or demand characteristics, 
with other memory components being in evidence and not inter-related in terms of frequency.   
Group comparisons indicate similarities in the degree of autobiographical reasoning, and in 
narrative components, but with an underlying tendency to negatively self-evaluate in the 
dysphoric group. 
The ability of researchers to judge from reading the narrative the underlying chapter 
structures, and participants’ subjective representation, supports suggestions that narratives 
represent the structure of the autobiographical memory system, given audience, goal and 
contextual factors.  These results also validate studies which used researcher defined 
chapters.   
In summary the implications of these results are that it seems reasonable, for this 
population, that the life-story narrative accounts, and by inference the cognitive 
representations of the life-story are structured similarly for dysphoric and non-dysphoric 
groups at a chapter level.  While there are negative evaluations characteristic of depression, 
and also a greater number of metacommunications, the structural components representing 
memories, and life-story chapters were similar.  These predictions may not hold for 
individuals experiencing major depressive disorders (MDD), and so the full impact of 
possible cognitive impairments, or over-generality in autobiographical memory, may not be 





 Chapter 5   The impact of chapter context on Chapter 5
recall 
 
 5.1  Introduction  5.1
The nature of autobiographical memory, the self-memory system, and the temporally 
stable sense of self that it endows (Conway, 2005; Conway, Collins, Gathercole, & Anderson, 
1996; Prebble,  Addis, & Tippett, 2013; Tulving, 1985) has been proposed to involve striving 
for both correspondence for representations held in memory to actual events experienced, and 
coherence with the persons understandings of who they are (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 
2004).  Memory recall itself is a reconstructive process and changes to recalled 
representations of autobiographical memory have been shown to be influenced by self-
perceptions (Conway & Ross, 1984; McNally, Lasko, Macklin, & Pitman, 1995; McLean & 
Pasupathi, 2010) and long-term goals and motivations (McAdams, 1993; 1985; McAdams, 
Diamond, de Aubin, & Mansfield, 1997).  Examples of recall which creates coherence with 
either a delusional (Baddeley, Thornton, Chua, & McKenna, 1996), or hypnotically 
constructed self (Cox & Barnier, 2013) reveal the extent to which these changes can diverge 
from genuine lived experience.    
Conway (2005) proposed that changes in memory representation as a result of the 
need for coherence occur through both facilitatory, and inhibitory processes.  Evidence for 
the influence of these factors has been examined in terms of the content and themes of 
autobiographical events recalled by people with, for example, personality-based motivations 
for intimacy, or power (McAdams, Diamon, de Aubin, & Mansfield, 1997), or though the 
manipulation of perceived ‘desirable characteristics such as (McLean, Pasupathi, & Pals, 
2007).  Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) evoked the concept of the working-self, a fluid 
representation of self-identity, to account for the on-going balance between the 
correspondence and coherence which must occur, pre-consciously, for autobiographical 
recall.  This includes both a source monitoring to establish that representations actually 
occurred, and defined rules on coherence with the current working self, with autobiographic 




A number of factors are likely to influence whether a life-story chapter will cue an 
episodic event memory, these include the degree to which the event is both typical and 
representative of the chapter as predicted by schema theory; whether it constitutes a 
punctuation between chapters (Thomsen, Pillemer, & Ivcevic, 2011), and whether it is 
consistent with the schematic emotional valence of the chapter (Thomsen, 2015).  The drive 
for coherence to bring about changes to memory representations which align them to the 
emotional content of contextual chapters has, to date, only been explored in one study 
examining dissonance reduction (Beike & Landoll, 2000).  When recalling an event which is 
incongruent with the persons’ schematic understanding of the time-period for which it 
belongs, for example a happy event in a marriage which ended badly, the sense of perceived 
continuity with semantic knowledge held for this period is challenged.  The management of a 
perceived dissonance between a recalled event, and the autobiographic knowledge relating to 
the self during the period the events was based has been proposed to have three possible ways 
of resolution.  Drawing on cognitive theory (Festinger, 1957) event representations can be i) 
distanced from a person’s sense of self, ii) ‘watered down’ by the bringing to mind of other 
more congruent events, or iii) trivialised.  For example a life-story chapter for school might 
be evaluated as ‘a terrible time’, but could contain an event memory of an enjoyable school 
trip with an episodic memory of sitting in a park, in the sunshine, eating an ice-cream, this 
would be incongruent with the overall chapter evaluation, and so dissonance reducing 
processes could i) reduce the sense of personal connection with the event; ii) bring to mind 
the long bus journey, the concerns about getting lost, and the subsequent school trip which 
was a disaster, or iii) discount the event as unimportant, or ‘trivialise’ it. 
In their study of memories for events affectively inconsistent with the life-time period 
in which they occurred, Beike and Landoll (2000) explored the link between consistency 
restoring cognitive processes and mental well-being.  A dissonance reduction process was 
suggested to occur when recalled memories are perceived as incongruent with the evaluation 
of the contextual life-period in which they occurred.  The authors carried out three studies 
which tested Festingers (1957) dissonance reduction processes.  In their first experiment they 
asked 56 college (university) students to recall two events from two life-time periods in the 
recent and distant past.  They asked participant to rate the event on a Likert scale according to 
causation (caused entirely by me – not at all by me, and caused entirely by the situation – not 
all by the situation) with a low score for personal influence, and a high score for situational 




a scale of 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive).  The positivity of the events was judged by 
the cueing valence, and the congruence of events recalled to the life-time period created two 
groups, ‘consistent’ (congruent) and ‘inconsistent’ (incongruent).  This study did not control 
for depressive status, and used the outcome measure of ‘Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS: 
Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) a self-report questionnaire, which taps in to global 
life-satisfaction, to denote mental wellbeing.  In the first experiment higher well-being scores 
were associated with the ‘explaining away’ of incongruent events as predicted by cognitive 
dissonance theory, for example by not taking responsibility for them.  In a further experiment 
67 students went through a similar procedure, but instead of being given the opportunity to 
‘explain away’ or justify an event, they were asked to recall further events from the life-time 
period.  Well-being in this case was associated with the ability to recall further events which 
were congruent with the life-time period.  In a final experiment the researchers proposed to 
find evidence of ‘closure’ for a particular event, considered to be evidence of ‘trivialisation’ 
(Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995).  In this study 85 students were asked to complete the 
protocol either for the process of explaining away, for outweighing, and for a sense of closure 
on the event.  Overall this final experiment revealed that there were differences in the 
methods used to deal with dissonance depending on the participants’ well-being score.  Those 
low on well-being tended to use more explaining away, than either outweighing, or reporting 
event closure.  Those high on the well-being scale tended to use more outweighing.  However 
overall those high on well-being were not more likely to engage in consistency restoring 
processes than those low on well-being.  In particular the direction of causation in this study 
was complicated by the possibility that well-being gives a greater likelihood of engaging in 
effective strategies for reduction in dissonance, or that it is the result of reduced cognitive 
dissonance.  The latter direction was suggested by the finding that cognitive dissonance 
reduction was more likely following the recall of a negative event, suggesting a self-positivity 
bias, or avoidance of negative material.  The authors also found evidence that the recall 
valence of the life-time period was an ‘overwhelming’ factor in deciding the emotional 
impact of the recall of single events, suggesting that the impact of negative events would be 
greater if the incongruence between the event and life-time period was large, than if it were 
small, and that an overwhelmingly negative chapter would influence positive episodic 
memories to a greater extent than a more neutral or mixed chapter, and vice versa.  Overall 
there is therefore an argument that good mental health is reliant on reduced incongruence 





Brewin (2006) proposed a somewhat different situation for people who are 
experiencing depression, in that rather than demanding a reduction in cognitive dissonance, 
recall of positive events which create a level of variability, or difference from the normal 
representations could create a positive dissonance for the recaller.  For example, given the 
idea that ‘school was a terrible time’, a person who was unable to recall exceptions to this 
rule would be impacted by the negative evaluation of the entire life-chapter.  However, 
someone who was able to say ‘school was largely terrible, but I did have some good times’, 
would be less negatively impacted by thoughts of school, and there would be a reduced 
potential for interlinked and associated negative memories to be brought to mind (Bower, 
1981; 1987; Brewin, et al, 1999).  A more beneficial cognitive process would be that access 
to a range of affectively toned memories, which better reflect ‘real-life’, would be linked to 
mental health.   
The proposal that dissonance-reduction is beneficial in maintaining a coherent sense 
of self, but also that variability in available memories, particularly those which are positively 
incongruent has a number of implications for depressed groups.   These relate to the ability to 
respond to the cognitive demands of potential dissonance reduction process, the availability 
and representation of specific event memories, and the potential for the overall affect of 
negative life-periods to overwhelm the positive events which may have occurred during the 
period.  As well as reporting finding cognitive processing and attentional tasks more 
demanding that non-depressed groups (Beevers, 2005; Joorman & Vanderlind, 2014; 
Dalgleish, Tchanturia, Watking, Williams, Golden, et al, 2007; Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998), 
people with depression display a negative bias in a number of domains including automatic 
thoughts and cognitions, attentional bias, interpretation and memory (Gotlib & Joorman, 
2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Roiser, et al, 2014).   
In the development of dysfunctional cognitive schema in depression it is proposed 
that repeated patterns of activation create stable constructs representing the past, and 
anticipated future, and with concurrent negative expectations (Beck, 1997).  This feature of 
autobiographical memory clustering could be amplified in people with depression because of 
their reduced ability to recall specific memories (Williams, 2006; Williams, et al, 2007).  
That people with depression are more likely to recall general memories when cued to recall 
episodic memories is well established, although there is some evidence which points to this 




major depression (Hertel, 1998; Hertel & Rude, 1991).  The impact of habitual recall of 
general, or non-specific autobiographical memories in depression could potentially lead, first 
of all, to a reduced necessity for dissonance resolution, but would also make thematic and 
affective congruence within life-time periods more likely as incongruity is reliant on features 
of events which are associated with specific memories, such as affect, time, place and 
personal impact of events.  The idea that discrepancies between current self-concept in people 
with depression, and ideal self, may also trigger ruminative processes aimed at reducing this 
discrepancy (Martin & Tesser, 1989), resulting in the activation of abstract representations 
with reduced specificity as an avoidance strategy. 
An alternative proposition for the recall of incongruent events in depression, 
particularly in people with a mild-moderate depressive status, where cognitive impairments 
and over-general recall are less pronounced (Gotlib & Joorman, 2010), is that cognitive 
dissonance processes occur, and that the overall valence of perceived life chapters impacts on 
the negativity of the resultant event memories.  Thus if a dysphoric individual maintains 
cognitive representations within their autobiographical memory of mainly negative chapters, 
there would be a dissonance between these and positive events which occur within them.  
Cognitive dissonance processes would then serve to align the event with its contextual 
chapter.  The dissonance reduction effect would impact differently on the memories to which 
it was subject, it would be expected that events that were i) ‘explained away’ could be 
retrieved with ease and accuracy, but would be contain material which compensates for their 
a mismatch with the valence of the chapter, ultimately being less affectively incongruent; for 
those which are ii) ‘outweighed’ they would be associated with a number of other congruent 
events which would compete for accessibility; iii) for closure there would be a diminished 
rating of importance and centrality to the event, and the memories which have been subject to 
being ignored would both have decreased accessibility, and decreased centrality.  
The ability to conceptualise a positive future is an essential aspect for hope, and 
recovery in mild to moderate depression (Bjarehed, Sarkohi, & Andersson, 2010; Edmondson 
& MacLeod, 2015; Kosnes, Whelan, O’Donovan, & McHugh, 2013; Liu, Kleiman, Nestor, & 
Cheek, 2015; Luxton, Ingram, & Wenzlaff, 2006; MacLeod & Salaminiou, 2001;).  
Depressed individuals demonstrate lower positive, but similar negative, expectancies 
compared with non-depressed controls (MacLeod, Tata, Kentish & Jacobsen, 1997).  Kosnes 




version of the future thinking task (FFT: McLeod, Tata, Evans, Tyrer, Schmidt, et al, 1998), 
which measured the association latencies between responses or ‘True’ or ‘False’ to positive 
future expectancies such as ‘Happy’ ‘Wealthy’, and negative future expectancies ‘Worry’, 
‘Failure’.  The dysphoric group in this study generated fewer positive future events, but also 
were faster in the implicit negative expectancies lending support to the Hopelessness Theory 
of Depression (Liu, et al, 2015). 
In any talking therapy there is an aspect of change which involves re-interpretation 
and exception-finding to beliefs and expectations which may be firmly held by clients.  This 
may be carried out in a variety of ways, but all rely on the recall of specific events, and 
future-imagining of possible outcomes and the manipulation of these to influence mood.  
Manipulation of specificity of future event representations has shown to improve 
expectations of future ‘worrisome’ events, with increased problem-solving, and a related 
increase in positive affect, and decrease in negative affect  (Madore, & Schacter, 2016) 
Interventions which facilitate the imagining and exploration of potential positive future 
events have been found to be effective in therapeutic settings (Andersson, Sarkoje, Karlson, 
Bjärehead, & Hesser, 2013; Roepke & Seligman, 2016).  Future thinking is the third part of 
Becks (1987) cognitive triad, whereby the self, world and future must all be represented in 
schematic form.  Automatic thoughts and beliefs which drive emotions and behaviour are 
central to the theory behind cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT).  Automatic thoughts are 
beliefs and assumptions which have become so habitual that they occur pre-consciously and 
it is the role of the therapist to raise the awareness of the client to these in order for them to 
be changed.  A variety of approaches within the therapy room to encourage clients to recall 
variations on seemingly fixed events and interpretations (McLeod, 2013).  This process is 
also used to encourage clients to imagine future events which are potential positive variations 
of habitually unoptimistic future-thinking.  Negative-bias and reduced access to positive 
event memories in depression is actively countered by therapy by the location and rehearsal 
of positive events.   
While narrative therapy (White & Epston, 1990) makes no assumption on the 
cognitive processes which occur during therapy, a similar process is induced by interventions 
in which the client is encouraged to think about, and repeatedly discuss possible positive 
alternatives to negative perceptions, both of past and possible future outcomes.  Recently a 




changing the narrative explanations and descriptions client provide of themselves (Wehr, 
2010).  Re-scripting involves a narrative process by which infrequently communicated 
autobiographical events, which are positive, hopeful, or provide the foundations for positive 
self-evaluations are strategically spoken about both within, and out-with therapy.  This re-
scripting is reported to create a shift in self-identity, more positive interpersonal relations, and 
an increased ability to provide rich, and varied self-narratives (Homes, Arntz, Smucker, 
2007).  In order for these therapeutic interventions to be successful there must be a shift from 
broadly negative monotonic narratives to more varied representations where positively 
incongruent material can become increasingly available. 
Access to positively incongruent material is of therapeutic benefit to people with 
depression, however there are a number of apparent challenges to this ability.  Dissonance 
reduction mechanisms, which serve to ensure a coherent sense of self may maintain an 
overwhelmingly negative self-perception, the ability to recall positively incongruent events 
may also be impaired by over-general memory, and a tendency of depressed and dysphoric 
groups to engage with negative autobiographical material.  Evidence for the existence of 
monotonic, life-story narratives, which may be representative of reduced variation, or access 
to incongruent events in depression points to a need to understand the nature of access to this 
information.   
This current study examines the function of chapters in accessing event-specific 
knowledge for life-story chapters of the past, and those anticipated to occur in the future.  By 
comparing two groups, dysphoric and non-dysphoric controls, it aims to address the impact 
of affective incongruence on the recall or imagining of specific autobiographical events.  This 
study partially replicates Study one, in the generation of chapter cues, and the examination of 





Dysphoric groups access event-specific knowledge in a way that favours material 
congruent with contextual chapters.  This would be indicated by:  
o an overall reduction in affective variability of events, (with variability 
represented by the difference between contextual positivity and event 
positivity);  
o increased difficulty in accessing incongruent events or reduction in the 
clarity of events; and  
o a reduction in the centrality of incongruent events.   
In addition to this it was predicted that  
o the dysphoric group would show a bias towards the access of negatively 
incongruent, compared to positively incongruent events. 
Three tentative predictions can be drawn from the dissonance reduction theory which 
may provide further insight in to the processes which are undertaken by dysphoric group and 
controls to manage incongruence in recall.  These are that 
i) events are available, but are ‘explained away’ and as a result the reported 
difference in valence will be reduced resulting in the dysphoric group having 
overall a reduced affective variance between their chapters and episodic 
memories.   
ii) due to competition as a result of recall of congruent events the incongruent 
event would be less available. 
iii) due to a ‘closure’ response the incongruent events would be recalled with 
decreased importance for self.    
Further to this, the dysphoric group are predicted to show a differential dissonance 
reduction response in that they will be more likely to undergo dissonance reduction for 
positively incongruent events compared to negatively incongruent events, and that the control 




 5.2  Method 5.2
5.2.1 Participants 
The study recruited 87 undergraduate and postgraduate participants aged 19-25 were 
recruited via the University of St Andrews School of Psychology participant recruitment 
SONA system and campus posters. They received £5 for taking part. Allocation to two 
groups, dysphoric and control, was carried out using the BDI-II (Beck, et al, 1996), with the 
cut-off criteria for groups defined as dysphoric>19, control<11 (Appendix 14).  Of the 87 
participants, four were excluded as they scored between these limits.  Three participants were 
excluded as their responses to the prompts for specific events could not be confirmed as 
being single events (two controls and one dysphoric), 80 participants are therefore included in 
the analysis. 
The overall mean (SD) age of participants was 22.1 (3.6), the dysphoric group had a 
mean (SD) age of 22.3 (2.2) years, with 6 males, and the control group a mean (SD) age of 
21.8 (2.8) years, with 6 males.  The groups were therefore matched for gender. 
5.2.2 Design 
Ethical consent was obtained from the University of St Andrews (Appendix 3).  This 
was a between participants design, which aimed to establish group differences in chapter-
cued recall for dysphoric and non-dysphoric groups. 
5.2.3 Measures 
The BDI-II (Beck, et al, 1996) was used to establish depressive status.  This self-
assessment measure which reflects the severity of depressive status contains 20 questions 
focusing on aspects of mood and psychological and social functioning.  The cut-off scores are 
for the absence depression of 0–13, 14–19 is mild, 20–28 is moderate, and 29–63 is severe.  
The BDI-II has been reported as having a reliability co-efficient of 0.91 (Beck, et al, 1996).  






Participants were tested individually for approximately one hour, this was composed 
of three tasks 1. Completion of mood measures, 2. Chapter definition, and 3. Memory 
reporting.   
Section 1:  
At the beginning of the session participants were told that they would provide 
information on the events and chapters of their past and future-imagined lives.  Participants 
then completed the BDI-II (Beck, et al, 1996). 
Section 2:  
Participants were then given paper booklets in which to write their responses for the 
next part of the experiment.  The booklets contained separate sheets for each chapter, 
including space for a short description and ratings scales.  Participants defined life-story 
chapters in response to the following prompts. 
‘I would like to imagine that your life is like a book, and the story within this 
book is your ‘life-story’.  Your life-story is not only about your past, but also your 
imagined future.  So that your life-story leads on from your earliest memories, to 
today and on in to the future, it is like a complete autobiography. 
Within your life-story book there are chapters each involving a different part 
of your life.  The chapters of your life story can be thematic e.g. ‘my love of art’, or 
relating to particular times in your life e.g. ‘my time in the army’, or ‘retirement’ 
chapters can be of any length and can overlap e.g. for example during your time in the 
army you could have taken up painting.   
(Either): 
Starting with your imagined future (things that you think may happen to you), 
think of the chapter that first comes to mind, write a title and a brief description of the 
chapter in the space on top of one the booklets provided, and follow the instructions 




Then think about the title and description of the next chapter you think of and 
write this on another booklet, continue until all your chapters have been named and 
each has a response booklet with the front cover completed.   
(or): 
Starting with your past (things that have actually happened to you), think of 
the chapter that first comes to mind, write a title and a brief description of the chapter 
in the space on top of one the booklets provided, and follow the instructions on the 
front cover of the booklet.   
Then think about the title and description of the next chapter you think of and 
write this on another booklet, continue until all your chapters have been named and 
each has a response booklet with the front cover completed.   
The chapters were then rated for positivity:  
‘The way I think of this chapter now is’ 1 (very negative) – (6 very positive) 
After participants completed the first category of chapters (i.e. past or future) they 
received instructions and carried out the task for the second category of chapters (i.e. future if 
their first category had been past, past if their first category had been future). Once 
participants indicated that they had completed their chapters, the pages were removed by the 
researcher.   This chapter definition section of the study took around 10-15 minutes to 
complete.   
Section 3:  
The researcher selected four chapters to act as cues for event generation.  Cueing-
chapters were chosen as being the four most closely placed in time to the present day which 
could be considered ‘closed’ i.e. past chapters which were over, or future chapters which had 
not started yet. 
Each of the four cueing- chapters was attached to an event booklet and the 
participants were asked to work through the booklets in alternating order (past-future-past-
future or vice-versa), the presentation order was counter-balanced across participants.  Each 




‘negative event’ and ‘positive event’ in that order.  Each event had a space for a title, a short 
description, and rated for clarity, difficulty of recall and positivity, by indicating on a Likert 
scale 1-6 (not at all – very much so) for ten questions divided into four question categories: 
 
Category 1: Clarity calculated as the sum of the following ratings 
1. ‘This event is very vivid.’ (vividness) 
2. ‘This event feels coherent and complete.’ (coherence) 
3. ‘Thinking about this memory is like travelling back in time.’ (mental time travel) 
Category 2: Difficulty of recall  
4. ‘I found it difficult to think of an event’  
Category 3: Positivity 
5. ‘I feel positive when I think of this memory’ 
Category 4: Centrality of the event as the sum of the following ratings: 
6. ‘This memory is of an event which was a turning point in my life’ 
7. ‘This memory is of an event which is central to my sense of who I am’ 
8. ‘I automatically see connections between the events in this memory and my present 
life’’ 
9. ‘This memory is of an event which was very important to what I was doing in my life 
at the time’ 
10. ‘This memory is of an event which was very important to what I was doing in my life 
at the time’ 
The event report section took a further 30-40 minutes.  The entire procedure was 





 5.3  Results 5.3
Chapters and events were initially examined across groups for equality in terms of 
event positivity, clarity and difficulty of recall.  Then events were scored on their ‘degree of 
incongruence’ which was calculated as the difference between affective ratings of event and 
contextual (cuing) chapter, this was the first dependent variable examined.  In addition to this 
they were categorised according to the valence of their contextual chapter i.e. negative 
chapter (rated 1-3), positive chapter (rated 4-6), and the positivity of the event rated on the 
same scale as the chapters.  Each event was then classified according to its congruence to the 
chapter it appeared in: incongruent events being negative events in a positive chapter, 
positive events in a negative chapter, and congruent events being negative events in negative 
chapters and positive events in positive chapters.  This second method of assessing 
incongruence necessitated an analysis of the first measure, i.e. it would be invalid as method 
of categorisation if there were group differences in the degree of incongruence between 
events and chapters (for example if one groups’ negative events were more negative than 
their chapters compared to the other group), this was not the case. 
Each event had a congruence category, and ratings for clarity, difficulty of recall, 
positivity, and centrality.   
Initial analysis: In order to establish baseline equality between the groups, and 
comparability between past and future events (temporal orientation) a series of analyses were 
carried out on the positivity of both chapters and events. 
Table 5.1: Mean (SD) number of chapters and events recalled by group 
 Mean (SD) number of chapters 
 Past Future 
 Negative  Positive Negative  Positive 
Dysphoric 4.23 (2.10) 3.89 (2.43) 4.10 (2.02) 5.34 (2.34) 
Control 2.76 (3.10) 4.19 (2.11) 2.44 (1.98) 4.23 (2.09) 
This table provides the mean (SD) number of  chapters for past ,  and future imagined li fe -stories for the dysphoric 







First the positivity of all chapters was examined across groups and temporal 
orientation using a mixed factorial ANOVA, (between: group, within: temporal orientation). 
The dysphoric group rated both their past and future chapters as more negative than controls, 
mean (SD) 2.67 (0.87) compared to 3.87 (0.58), but past and future chapters did not differ in 
positivity, past: 3.50 (0.80), future: 3.96 (1.02), analysis revealed a significant group 
difference in the rated positivity of chapters F(1,78)=30.040, P<0.001, 
2
p =0.62, no effect of 
temporal orientation F(1,78)=3.240, P=0.08, and no interaction F<1.    A schematic example 
of a participant chapter structure can be found in Figure 5-1. 
    
 
  
   ‘Dad leaves’    
  ‘Primary school’ ‘Secondary school’ ‘Uni’ 
‘Early years’ ‘House on the hill’  ‘Fi and Co’ 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
 
Figure 5-1: Chapter structure against timeline (Study three participant 317). This figure shows the length, 
titles and degree of overlap between a typical series of life story chapters. 
 
Events 
Each participant produced 12 events.  The dysphoric group rated both their past and 
future events as more negative than controls, mean (SD) 2.93 (1.21) compared to 3.89 (0.62), 
but past and future events did not differ in positivity, past: 3.42 (0.48), future: 3.59 (0.86).  
Using the same independent variables the positivity of reported events was examined using a 
mixed-factorial ANOVA (between: group, within: temporal orientation). The ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of group F(1,78)=74.631, p<0.001, 
2
p =0.73  a difference approaching 
significance for an effect of temporal orientation F(1,78) = 3.583, p=0.066, and no interaction 
F(1,78)=1.494, p=0.229. This indicates that overall, events reported by the dysphoric group 
were rated as significantly more negative than controls, and that this difference was not 





Event ratings for clarity, and difficulty of access were also examined.   Past events 
were rated with greater clarity than future events, mean (SD) 4.51 (1.45) compared to 2.37 
(1.40), but that the groups did not differ in their mean (SD) rated clarity MDD 3.05 (2.71), 
controls 4.08 (3.21).  For ratings of clarity there was no main effect of group F(1,78)<1, a 
main effect of temporal orientation F(1,78) = 97.090, p<0.001, 
2
p =0.75, and no interaction 
F(1,78)<1.   
Past events were rated as being easier to access than future events, for both groups, 
mean (SD) past 2.16 (0.99), future 4.01 (1.34) but that the groups did not differ, mean (SD) 
dysphoric 3.21 (0.76), control 3.42 (0.65).  For rated difficulty of access there was no main 
effect of group, F(1,78)<1, a main effect of temporal orientation F(1,78)=47.914, p<0.001, 
2
p =0.58, and no significant interaction F(1,78)<1.     
Analysis of Congruence 
The first prediction, that there would be an overall reduction in affective variability of 
events for dysphoric groups compared to controls, was examined by calculating the ‘mean 
affective difference’ between chapter and event, the dysphoric mean (SD) difference was 
0.48 (0.12), and the control 0.56 (0.23) (chapter positivity minus event positivity).  Using a 
mixed factorial ANOVA (between: group, within: temporal orientation).  This revealed no 
main effects of group F(1,78)<1,  temporality F(1,78)<1, or interaction F(1,78)<1.  Thus the 
pattern of affective variability of events with respect to their chapters was the same for both 
groups.   
Once it was established that the groups did not differ in terms of affective variability 
for their incongruent events a second categorisation took place which organised events in to 
congruence categories.  The mean ratings of clarity, difficulty of access and centrality for 
events within these categories was then calculated.  There followed a series of tests to 
examine these variables for congruent and incongruent events across groups and between past 
recalled and future-imagined events using mixed factorial ANOVAs (between: group x 
within: temporality, congruence) 
Following the prediction that the dysphoric group would find it harder to access 




were incongruent to their contextual chapter, and then using comparisons of the incongruent 
and congruent events for each group to explore memory features. 
Congruent events appear to be recalled and imagined to a greater extent than 
incongruent events particularly for the dysphoric group,  
Table 5.2 5.1 shows the mean number of chapters produced by the two groups, and 
Table 5.2 shows the overall numbers of events recalled for each group, and category.  
Comparisons between groups on the proportion of events which were affectively incongruent 
were carried out using a mixed factorial ANOVA (between: group, within: temporality), this 
revealed a main effect of group (F1,78)=29.889, P<0.001, 
2
p =0.55 with the mean (SD) 
proportion for the dysphoric group being 0.309 (0.11) and controls 0.438 (0.10); a main effect 
of temporality F(1,78)= 53.411, p<0.001, 
2
p =0.64 with the mean (SD) proportion of past 
events being incongruent being 0.428 (0.16), and future events 0.307 (0.13), but with no 
interaction between these effects F(1,78)=2.226, p=0.140.  Pairwise t-tests revealed that the 
dysphoric group recalled and imagined fewer incongruent events when cued by life-story 
chapters than controls t(79)=7.140, P<0.001, d=0.54, and that overall future events were 
significantly more likely to be congruent with their cueing chapter t(79)=50.980, p<0.001, 
d=0.67, with the mean (SD) proportion of past events being 0.428 (0.16), and future 0.307 
(0.13). 
Table 5.2: Number of congruent and incongruent events for Study three 
 Past  Future  
 Congruent Incongruent Proportion 
Mean (SD) 





















117 123 0.513   
(0.14) 
162 78 0.362   
(0.14) 
 
This table shows the number,  and relative proportion of  chapter -congruent and incongruent events recalled by the 
dysphoric and control  groups in Study 3,  the proportion reflects the number of  incongruent events relat ive to the 
number of  events overall .   The Dysphoric group were found to be signif icantly more l ikely to recall  af fect ively 






Ratings of memory features 
In order to examine the impact of temporality and congruence category on ratings on 
the rated difficulty of recall.  A mixed factorial ANOVA (between: group, within: 
congruence category, temporal orientation) revealed main effects of congruence category 
F(1,77)=6.704, p=0.014, 
2
p =0.21 and temporality F(1,77)=36.688, p<0.001, 
2
p =0.42, but 
no main effect of group, F(1,77)<1, and no interaction between temporality and congruence 
category F(1,77)=3.717, p=0.060.  Overall incongruent events were easier to recall, 
participants reporting recalling events as easier than imagining future events. The absence of 
a significant group x congruence interaction indicates that the dysphoric group did not have 
more difficulty recalling or imagining incongruent events compared to controls. The mean 
ratings for congruent and incongruent events can be found in Table 5.3.That the dysphoric 
group would access incongruent events with less clarity than controls was examined next.  
The ratings for clarity revealed main effects of congruence category F(1,77)=36.330, 
p<0.001, 
2
p =0.32, and temporality F(1,77)=70.231, p<0.001, 
2
p  =0.64 and no main effect 
of group F(1,77)<1, but an interaction between group and congruence category 
F(1,77)=4.530, p=0.040, 
2
p =0.23.  Incongruent events were rated overall as having greater 
clarity compared to congruent events t(78)=6.760, p=0.012, d=0.43, mean (SD) incongruent 
clarity 3.88 (1.02), congruent clarity 2.46 (0.80), and memories were reported with greater 
clarity compared to future events, t(79)=10.350, p<0.001, d=0.62, but this effect of 
incongruence was significantly reduced for the dysphoric group.  We thus found support for 
prediction that there was reduced clarity in events reported by the dysphoric group as being 
incongruent.   
That the dysphoric group would rate incongruent events as less central to their sense 
of self was examined. The ratings for centrality revealed no main effects of congruence 
category F(1,77)<1, a main effect for temporality F(1,77)=9.661, p=0.034, 
2
p =0.18, and no 
main effect of group F(1,77)<1, and no interaction between group and congruence category 
F(1,77)<1.  Incongruent events were not rated as having greater centrality compared to 
congruent events, and memories were reported with greater centrality compared to future 





Positive vs negative incongruence 
A final analysis was carried out to examine the proposition that the dysphoric group 
would be more likely to maintain negative evaluations of chapters, using a differential level 
of dissonance reduction and as a result would i) have reduced access to positively 
incongruent events compared to controls, ii) have reduced access to positively incongruent 
events compared to negatively incongruent events.  As with the previous analysis, difficulty 
of access was defined as rated ability to locate an event, and the clarity with which it was 
recalled.  In order to make this comparison the incongruent events were categorised as either 
negatively or positively incongruent to their chapter. A mixed ANOVA (between: group x 
within: incongruence category) was carried out to examine the effects of dysphoria and 
incongruence category on the accessibility, and clarity, of events recalled, a further analysis 
of the impact of incongruence category on centrality of event was also included.  There were 
fewer incongruent events than congruent events in this sample, and as there were no 
significant interactions between temporal orientation and group, past and future events were 
combined for this analysis, means for the groups can be found in Table 5. 
Table 5.3: Means (SD) for ratings of incongruent events for Study three 
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This table indicates the mean (SD) ratings for the incongruent events recalled by the dysphoric and control groups, cued by 
the participant generated chapters.  *For difficulty of access lower rating means easier access. 
 
There was a significant group difference between the rated difficulty of event access 
F(1,75)=5.148, p=0.026, 
2
p =0.32, effect of the incongruence category F(1,75)=18.286, 
p<0.001, 
2
p =0.68, with positively incongruent events being easier to access overall, and an 
interaction between group and category, F(1,75)=10.801, p=0.002, 
2
p =0.43.  Follow-up t-




d=0.32, and positively incongruent events were easiest to access overall t(79)=3.688, 
p=0.029, d=0.25. The interaction appears to reflect a greater disparity between the ability of 
the control group to access negatively incongruent events, compared to positively 
incongruent events, while the dysphoric group showed little difference between the 
categories. 
No direct effect of group was found on the event clarity, F(1,75)<1, no main effect of 
congruence category F(1,75)<1, but an interaction between these F(1,75)=9.488, p=0.003, 
2
p =0.46.  Follow-up t-tests revealed that the dysphoric group recalled negatively 
incongruent events with greater clarity that positively incongruent events t(79)=4.324, 
p=0.031, d=0.30, while the control group recalled positively incongruent events with greater 
clarity than negatively incongruent events t(79)=3.377, p=0.041, d=0.26. 
No group effect was seen in the ratings of centrality of events reported F(1,75)<1, but 
a significant effect of incongruence category F(1,75)=6.073, p=0.016 
2
p =0.33, reflected a 
greater centrality of negatively incongruent events overall compared to positively incongruent 
events.  A significant interaction between these factors F(1,75)=12.683, p=0.001, 
2
p =0.40 
indicated that the dysphoric group viewed their negatively incongruent events as having 
greater centrality than their positively incongruent events t(79)=5.552, p=0.019, d=0.32, and 
that for the control group this difference was not present t(79)<1.  
 5.4  Discussion 5.4
Our first proposal was that dysphoric groups would experience a more affectively 
monotonous representation of past and future events.  Our central hypothesis was therefore 
that the dysphoric group, compared to controls, would access event-specific knowledge in a 
way that favours material congruent with contextual chapters.  Thus we predicted first that 
the dysphoric group would recall and imagine a greater proportion of congruent as opposed to 
incongruent events, and would display an overall reduction in affective variability of events.  
On examination, the dysphoric group did report a significantly lower proportion of 
incongruent events, but the between event-chapter variability was not significantly different.  
We also predicted that, compared to controls, the dysphoric group would rate their 
incongruent events as being more difficult to access, which they did not.  However, there was 




supporting our suggestion that dissonance was managed in this group by the creation of 
competing representative images associated with the chapter in question, thus potentially 
creating an underlying tendency to process incongruent events in an abstract as opposed to 
concrete manner in this group.   
Following the analysis comparing the incongruent and congruent events for the 
dysphoric and control groups, the group differences in recall of negatively incongruent i.e. 
events which are more negative than their chapters, and the recall of positively incongruent 
events, i.e. more positive than their chapters, was carried out specifically to ascertain the 
differences between groups and their relationships with positively incongruent material.  The 
basis for this was that there is a predicted therapeutic benefit to accessing positively 
incongruent events, for negative chapters to become more variable, with the inclusion of 
positive events.  The key finding in this study was that, compared to the dysphoric group, it 
was the control group that had a relatively reduced access to negatively incongruent material.  
This accessibility difference could indicate that for non-depressed groups, there is a 
propensity to maintain a ‘generally good’ representation for positive chapters (Thomsen, 
Olesen, Schneiber, & Tønnesvang, 2013), and for negative chapter representations of events 
which are positive ‘exceptions’ to the negative mood.  This representational difference 
parallels findings that non-depressed groups tend to represent the world in generally ‘good’ 
ways, with negative exceptions.  Interestingly the pattern is similar but not the same for the 
clarity of event representations, where there is a raised clarity reported for the dysphoric 
group for negatively incongruent material.  This pattern is also reflected in the ratings of 
centrality of negatively incongruent events for the dysphoric group, indicating that, while the 
results of the second and third analysis in this study have indicated that the dissonance 
management approach which is most likely for both groups is that of competition, but that 
there may be a breakdown in this process of the dysphoric group.  The apparent raised clarity 
and perceived centrality of negatively incongruent events could reflect a cognitive bias 
towards material which is ‘worse than’ the schematic chapter, and is a cognitive reflection of 
the tendency to create contamination sequences in narrative.   
This study provides evidence for a negative bias associated with depression for 
specific memories, future imagine events, but also for past and future chapters.   Based on 
previous findings of over-generality in event recall, it was anticipated that dysphoric groups 




being recalled with no less clarity or difficulty compared to controls.  Overall future imagined 
events were rated as less clear, and harder to access.  The results also indicate that 
incongruent events are, overall, less likely to be recalled when cued by life-story chapters, for 
dysphoric groups.  This may be the result of a greater reliance on a schematic chapter 
structure to guide recall in a manner analogous to the finding that depressed groups have an 
over-reliance on general memories (Williams, 2006), but also that affective generalisations 
may be occurring at recall, and negative tone exacerbated in this group by a propensity to 
recall and imagine negative chapters. 
Despite the general acceptance that autobiographical memory exists within 
hierarchical structures, contextual effects are rarely directly investigated.  This study 
indicates that chapters, reflecting a higher-level structure within the autobiographical memory 
system, play a role in how we represent events within our life-stories.  The affective rating of 
the cuing chapter was found in this study to be a significant factor in making specific 
memories and future-imagined events easier to recall, in addition incongruent events are 
recalled with significantly greater clarity than congruent events.  That the difference in 
affective tone of an event is a predictor of the clarity and difficulty of access of past events is 
perhaps unsurprising, incongruent events may simply be unusual and therefore attended to at 
encoding, or rehearsed more frequently due to their exceptional quality thereby producing a 
more accessible representations.  For future events, the explanation for this incongruence 
effect is less simple, it may be that the structure of the imagined future is a direct cognitive 
reflection of the past (de Brigard, & Giovenello, 2012; Schachter, 2012; Madore & 
Schachter, 2016) and that expectations of unusual or affectively variable events are drawn 
from experiences of the same in the past.  It may also be that contrasting events are imagined 
because they are inherently unusual and therefore worthy of report, for example ‘wedding 
day’ or ‘first day at work’ (it may be that fewer of the future events were ‘everyday’ activities 
which fit well with the context).  This future imagining characteristic could also have been 
driven by the need to relate engaging or meaningful self-narratives to an audience (Pasupathi, 
Stallworth, & Murdoch, 1998; Walker,  et al, 2003), and affective variability in this case 
would make for a good future storyline. 
The indication that affective congruence impacts on recall of events, in that 
incongruent events are less available, and lack clarity for the dysphoric groups, can be related 




study.  It is suggestive that, for dysphoric groups, the underlying cognitive representations 
about life experiences and possibilities of the future are subject to impaired variance, or that 
the construction of chapters through connecting similarities in content events may result in an 
overemphasis on connections between affectively similar events.  The final analysis for this 
study explored more deeply the role of positive and negative incongruence in the recall of 
events, and while there is a suggestion that dysphoric groups have reduced access to 
incongruent material, when this incongruent material was examined it revealed a further layer 
of difference.  Essentially that non-depressed groups are less able to access negatively 
incongruent events, while dysphoric groups access them with greater clarity and consider 
them more central to their sense of self. 
This study revealed a discrepancy between the clarity of incongruent and congruent 
events, which is not reflected in examining the group differences alone, and merits further 
research.  One potential area of interest for incongruent events in dysphoric groups is their 
role in creating opportunities for positive outcomes or events to be perceived during negative 
periods, analogous to the redemption sequences of life-story narratives linked to good mental 
health (McAdams, et al, 2001), or the glittering events recalled during narrative therapies 
(Snyder & White, 1982; White & Epston, 1990) which when recalled and integrated in to 
narrative are associated with recovery from low mood and depression.  If accessing 
incongruent ‘exceptions’ to normality, and for the future the possibilities of change, is 
impaired for depressed groups this could impact on their ability to improve their own mood.  
By recalling positive events from the past, and anticipating positive events to come, even 
when the current experience is broadly negative may be a useful function of incongruent 
events.  This function would be enhanced by the associated characteristics of the 
representation, as recall of sensory detail of positive events is more likely to improve mood 
(Walker, et al, 2003). While the role of autobiographical and self-referential material in 
dysphoric groups, has often focussed on the valence of events and the differences between 
the ability to retrieve or imagine specific events (Barnhofer, Williams, & Crance, 2007; 
Williams, Chan, Eade, Healy, Barnhofer, & Crane, 2006).  Studies examining processing 
mode, that being the degree to which events are cognitively managed in either a more 
concrete/experiential or abstract manner, have revealed that dysphoric groups may access 
information which could be beneficial to their mood in more abstract and less experience-




significance of context and that there may be a pattern of more abstract processing of events 
which are incongruent with their contextual chapter.   
In terms of an underlying cognitive process which can account for these results there 
are a number of potential explanations.  One proposal is that if chapters exist in a schema 
form, and links between clusters of events structure the content of the chapters, there may be 
variability in the importance of the valence of events which are linked.  For example, one 
possibility is that chapter formation is influenced by emotional content of events in dysphoric 
groups resulting in clusters of similarly valenced events, and an overall homogeneity whereas 
non depressed groups have more theme-based links between events.  These chapter-linked 
events can be thematic, and temporally defined, but if the emotional valence of the event, 
rather than another similarity is the most important link for dysphoric groups, then single 
chapters would contain events of similar valence and the person will be less likely to recall or 
imagine affectively incongruent events, within this model the chapter-based information 
would be less accessible, and variation reduced.  An alternative explanation draws on the 
CarFaX model proposed by Williams and Colleagues (2007).  Habitual over-general recall of 
events by dysphoric and depressed groups through a process of mnemonic interlock and 
avoidance may impact on the ways in which chapters are structured, in that they may become 
populated with memories for events which are general events rather than specific occasions, 
e.g. dinner at my mother’s (an event which occurred many times).  As a result of this over-
generality, the reconstruction of specific individual events will be influenced by the stronger 
representation within the chapter relating to general events, thus when individual events are 
constructed, they will tend to draw on this over-general material, and result in specific events 
which are by default are affectively similar to events of a similar valence, with concurrent 
reduced rehearsal of affectively non-similar events.  So while there is no difference in the 
ability to actually recall or imagine incongruent events, these may be less-specific and 
rehearsed to a lesser extent by the dysphoric compared to controls.  This reduced rehearsal 
explanation relies on the finding that rehearsal leads to clarity, which is supported in the 
literature (Walker, et al, 2003), and the delineation between knowing an event occurred 
(abstract processing) and being able to visualise it in a meaningful way (concrete processing).  
The reduced clarity of events may therefore be influenced by over-general recall, reduced 
rehearsal and also by processing mode and would be predicated to be exacerbated by 
ruminative thinking (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Watkins & Teasdale, 2004; Watkins & 




It is important to note that this study found no direct evidence for over-general recall 
in the dysphoric group.  This may be due to the highly structured nature of the task which 
reflects a generative recall process, (the contextual descriptors which must be formed prior to 
event-specific knowledge access are to some extent already provided), and thereby may 
facilitate access by generative recall, i.e. chapter-based instructions giving a preparation for 
specific event production (see de Beer, Raes, Williams, & Hermans, 2009 for the opposite 
effect), it may also be that some of the events produced were in fact over-general 
representations which could have been reported as single events.  Williams, and colleagues 
(2007) argued that cue-type does not significantly impact on specificity of events recalled, 
and it has also been suggested that limiting time-frames for recall would increase over-
generality (McCormack, 1979), while directive instruction has also been found to reduce 
over-generality (Griffith, Sumner, Raes, Barnhofer, DeBeer, & Hermans, 2012).  It can be 
argued that the cueing task functioned to reduce over-generality as rated clarity (which might 
be expected to be reduced for over-general recall) was not reduced overall for the dysphoric 
group.  It seems more likely that incongruent autobiographical events are simply experienced 
with less clarity in this group when compared to congruent events, a possibility which may be 
explored in the future by better distinguishing between reduced clarity and over-generality of 
recall. 
The similarity in the patterns of clarity between past and future congruency in both 
groups suggests that representations of the past are used to inform on the future, and this 
carries implications for dysphoric groups who displayed reduced variation.  While this 
finding contrasts with that of Dalgliesh and colleagues (2011), who found no impact of 
dysphoria on imagined future chapters, it may be that their study relied less on episodic 
details, and more on the conceptual attributes of future chapters, our results indicate that 
dysphoric groups experience difficulty in imagining future events as being affectively 
different from the norm.      
Interestingly the ability to generate over-general future events has been found to 
correlate with over-general memory (Brown, Root, Romano, Chang, Bryant, & Hirst, 2013; 
Kleim, Graham, Fohosy, Stott, & Ehlers, 2014), and so if our proposal, that reduced clarity is 
an indicator of greater chapter-level retrieval, is correct the past-future similarity in recall 
would be expected.  The ability to generate future events is clearly important for people in 




Orbach, Yefet, & Zalzman, 2008).  So the clinical implication of the results of this study lies 
in the way in which psychological therapies function, for example many interventions require 
generation of events in order to develop a more realistic or varied view on past and future life 
e.g.  CBT (Brewin, 2006); and other talking therapies (e.g. de Shazer, & Dolan, 2012; 
Launer, 2006; White & Epston, 1990).  Research has shown that the ability to visually 
imagine positive events impacts on mood to a greater extent than simply verbally describing 
them (Holmes, et al, 2007), and that concreteness training has a positive impact on dysphoria 
(Watkins, et al, 2005), and this study suggests the merits of targeted rehearsal of positively 
incongruent events in alleviating low-mood in dysphoric groups. 
Because this study explores a relatively new approach to event cueing and generation 
it has a number of limitations which should be addressed in future studies.  These relate to the 
nature of chapter-based cuing which resulted in a larger number of events being congruent, 
than incongruent.  Our analysis was based on the mean ratings for events, however there was 
an inherent imbalance between the number of events in each of the categories, particularly 
incongruent events for the dysphoric group.    A further limitation was the use of the clarity 
ratings scale, which required participants to rate features of vividness, re-experiencing and 
coherence/completeness of the event, and the centrality of event factors.  These features were 
drawn from the Memory Experiences Questionnaire (Sutin & Robins, 2007) and the 
centrality of event scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006) and as such were an attempt to summarise 
some of the key dimensions of memory experience.  The choice to not use the full scales was 
made because this study focussed on establishing the life-chapter context for event recall or 
future imagining, and to ensure comparability between past and future events, and is 
discussed later in Section 7.1.7. 
This study reveals a role for the hierarchical structuring of autobiographical knowledge in 
recall or future-imagined event characteristics.  This is an important yet underexplored area, 
as while most researchers acknowledge the role of hierarchies of representations within the 
autobiographical memory system there is a clear focus within the literature on specific events.  
Results may be of particular interest to psychological therapists who may attempt to focus 
clients on these during therapy, thereby enhancing their access to positive and ‘redemption’ 
stories, and whether access to incongruent event improves during therapy.  Results suggest 
that dissonance reduction, in the form of competition processes might serve as a 




A further area of research might focus on how chapters are cognitively constructed by people 
with depression, for example, if events of a particular valence are clustered together in 
dysphoric and depressed groups, but that non-depressed individuals use other event 
characteristics.   
In summary this study established, in parallel with Study one, a pattern of enhanced 
access and clarity for events affectively incongruent with their life-story chapter, and 
differential pattern of access for the dysphoric group. The clarity ‘uplift’ of incongruent 
evetns was reduced for the dysphoric group, an accessibility reduction for non-depressed 
controls when accessing negatively incongruent events, and the opposite effect for the 
dysphoric group when accessing their positively incongruent events.  Study four aimed to 





 Chapter 6   Retrieval-induced forgetting Chapter 6
using life-chapter cues  
 
 6.1  Introduction 6.1
We do not remember all the events and experiences from our lives, and we tend to 
remember the same key incidents and events repeatedly while other autobiographical 
memories, while temporarily available, fade over time and become inaccessible.  Studies 
in psychopathology have revealed the extent of the human capacity to store and make 
available an almost limitless number of memories.  Parker, McGaugh, and Cahill (2006) 
reported on a woman, A.J. who experiences hyperthymnestic syndrome, an inability to 
forget personal experiences and events from her entire life.  A.J. experiences her 
memories as ‘non-stop, uncontrollable and automatic’ and although rare is an illustration 
of both the human capacity to store and recall events, and also the essential need to limit 
recall.   Other sufferers of this condition have been reported (LePort, et al, 2012), 
highlighting the problems with Thorndike’s (1914) Theory of disuse which assumes the 
forgetting track of autobiographical memories.   To recall information as single events 
without ordering them, according to importance and usefulness, in to a higher order 
structure would result in the kinds of chaotic experience described by AJ.  In order to do 
this memories must be linked together, categorised, and those which are not needed 
deselected for recall. 
Life-story chapters (McAdams, 2001, Thomsen, 2008), serve as temporally 
defined clusters of semantic knowledge and episodic events which are linked by shared 
themes, activities and goals (Wright & Nunn, 2002).  These life-story chapters are 
thought to be generated through a process of autobiographical reasoning (Habermas & 
Bluck, 2000), or life-period reasoning (Thomsen, 2015) which creates categorical links 
between events and information.  Theoretically chapters are created as a result of the 
replaying of episodic events, and the linking of these, through reasoning processes, in to a 
greater whole (D’Argembeau, et al, 2014).  For example, a number of experiences at 
senior school could be encoded as a set of single events, but because of the meaning-
making processes and understanding of culturally accepted life-phases, would progress 




was like, how it ended, which is illustrated by a number of episodic events e.g. a first 
school play, failing a French exam.  At the point of creation of chapters could, 
theoretically, include any and all events within this time period, but in practice only some 
of them are available, suggestive of a process whereby some memories are favoured over 
others.   
When considering past events, and looking back over life-story chapters, there are 
episodic memories which may belong to a particular chapter, this has been evidenced by a 
number of studies revealing the priming effects of life-periods (Section 1.1.2), and studies 
which use chapters as effective cues for memory recall (Section 1.3.1).  There are three 
phases during which episodic memories may be included in the formation of chapters, the 
first is at the time of encoding when what is remembered depends on the personal 
relevance and impact of the events (e.g. Conway, Anderson, Larsen, Donnelly, McDaniel, 
et al, 1994), following that there is a process of rehearsal and reasoning whereby events 
are recalled either privately (Ritchie, et al, 2006) or during interactions (Alea, 2010; 
Beike, Brandon, Cole, Baron, & Bluck, 2009), which will result in them becoming more 
accessible over time (Harris, Barnier, Sutton, & Keil, 2010), and finally the point of 
cued/generative, or spontaneous/direct recall which is current context and goal dependent 
(Baron & Bluck, 2009).   
 
Research into the tagging, or priming of particular episodic memories, discussed 
in Section 1.3.1 indicates that single events tend to be ‘tied’ to life-story chapters 
(Thomsen, 2008; 2015), and Studies one and three have shown that chapters can form the 
context, and reliably act as cues, for recall, with each chapter providing a ‘category’ for 
the memory.  A further proposal is that life-story chapters not only function to index 
episodic events, but also act as schema for recall, and impact on episodic memories 
according to their congruence with a chapter, being more likely to be recalled if they are 
representative of the chapter, but also subject to being recalled with greater clarity if they 
are atypical (Studies one and three).  While typical events are schema-linked Study three 
highlighted the need for dissonance reduction at a chapter level, and one of the processes 
by which this occurs is by managing a challenge to the self-schema by recruitment of 





The availability of long-term episodic memories, in experimental contexts and in 
everyday life, is thought to be reliant on two main factors, the first being the storage 
strength of memory representation information relative to other information, which itself 
is dependent on encoding and subsequent learning and rehearsal, and the second is the 
current accessibility or ‘retrieval strength’ (Bjork & Bjork, 1992).  Retrieval strength is 
thought to depend on the current relevance of information and the availability of cues 
(Bjork, 1989), but the most impactful factor in recall is retrieval capacity itself.  This 
retrieval capacity can be thought of as the limiting factor in recall, and the conduit 
through which information is retrieved from memory storage.  Given that we are 
theoretically capable of storing a vast amount of information in memory for each chapter, 
and that for each chapter cue we would be able to recall countless memories, the fact that 
our ability to recall is limited means that factors which curb recall must be in place.   It is 
pertinent, therefore, to consider the mechanisms of selection in terms of active processes, 
and one such process which has been examined is that of retrieval-induced forgetting 
(Anderson, Bjork & Bjork, 1994).  A process which has been proposed to work through 
an inhibitory mechanism functioning between exemplars of a single category of to be 
retrieved information. 
Retrieval induced forgetting is a cognitive phenomena whereby stored memory 
information is inhibited by the recall of other, categorically linked, information.    It has 
been described as the impaired ability to remember an item when it is similar to other 
items stored in memory (Anderson & Neely, 1996).  The phenomena has been explained 
in terms of adaptive function whereby competitive inhibition of target-linked but non-
relevant information heightens the relative activation of target information (Anderson, 
Bjork & Bjork, 1994), and alternatively as a way of preventing spreading activation of all 
information directly or indirectly linked to cues (Saunders & MacLeod, 2006).  These 
explanations both describe retrieval induced forgetting as an emergent quality of memory 
recall, but in addition to that can provide opportunities for inference around the nature of 
information interconnectedness within the memory system. For example inhibition of 
memories will be more likely to occur when they are a) more closely associated with a 
given cue (vertical association) and b) when they are more closely associated with 
competitors (horizontal association) (Anderson & Neely, 1996), what is also suggested by 
these accounts is that memories are not thought to be unlearned as a process of 




competitors, this has been termed the retrieval-based learning assumption (Anderson, et 
al, 1994).    
The paradigm by which Retrieval-induced forgetting is explored experimentally 
involves a three-stage process illustrated inFigure 6.1.  Initially category-exemplar (cue-
targets) pairs are studied, for example fruit-apple, fruit-pear…, followed by a second 
retrieval phase where categories are provided and targets are recalled, for example fruit-
a____, fruit-p____; a short (5-20 minute) distractor period follows, with a subsequent free 
recall phase.  Two key results have been established using this paradigm, the first, 
unsurprisingly is that the target memories which are recalled during the retrieval phase 
(denoted RP+) are more likely to be recalled at test, the second is that of the memories 
which remain unrecalled during the retrieval phase, those which share a cue with the RP+ 
memories (denoted RP-) are significantly less likely than those which do not share a cue 








Figure 6-1: Schematic illustration of the RIF paradigm.  Depicting the stages of memory recall and rehearsal 
for a standard RIF procedure.   
 
The types of cue-target information which can display this phenomena have been 
expanded from the original examination of semantic word pairs, to real-life situations (for 
a review see Anderson & Levy, 2010).  These include the attribution of personality traits 
(McCrae & McLeod, 1999); mental imagery (Saunder, Fernandes & Kosnes, 2009); 
social contexts (Dunn & Spellman, 2003; Storm, Bjork & Bjork, 2005); eyewitness 





















addition to these types of information, personal autobiographical memories have also 
been found to be subject to retrieval-induced forgetting. 
The phenomenon of retrieval-induced forgetting has been specifically investigated 
for autobiographical memory characteristics which are key to some material being 
privileged over others, in particular, the emotional content (valence and emotionality) and 
self-relevance of memories.   Generally emotional material is less likely to be forgotten 
than neutral material (Power 2000; Dehli 2009) independent of whether the event is 
positive or negative (Barnier, Conway, & Hung. 2004).  While autobiographical 
information and information of high self-relevance may be ‘insulated’ from forgetting 
effects (Amir, et al. 2001; Macrae & Roseveare 2002; Geraerts, Jelicic, & Merkelbach, 
2006), and might also be too well integrated with other recalled memories to create 
forgetting effects (Anderson & McCulloch 1999).   Individual ability to inhibit memories 
has been linked to the recall of negative autobiographical memories, Storm and Jobe 
(2012) carried out two experiments which linked the ability of their participants to 
experience RIF for standard category-exemplars such as fruit-lemon, with the recall of 
autobiographical memories from childhood, and the month prior to testing using positive 
and negative recall conditions, each rated for clarity, detail, and valence.  A regression 
analysis indicated a significant negative correlation between recall of negative 
autobiographical memories and RIF, and that this occurred at the level of memory 
accessibility rather than memory clarity, or details, and independent of depressive status.  
The authors proposed that this reflected a general phenomena within non-depressed 
populations of a bias towards the recall of positive autobiographical material.   
When Barnier and colleagues (2004) used three category cues which were of a 
positive (e.g. happy), negative (e.g. horrified), or neutral valence (e.g. patient) to evoke 
30 autobiographical memories, they found that unrehearsed autobiographical memories 
from practiced categories were recalled more slowly than non-category members and 
practiced category members i.e. a consistent RIF effect in all valence categories.  Overall, 
and somewhat unexpectedly, emotional memories (with positive or negative cues) were 
more likely to be forgotten that neutral memories.   
Following from Barnier and collegues’ (2004) work, Hauer and Wessel (2006) 
used valenced category cues of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ events (with where, when, what 




recall in the RIF procedure.  They found that facilitation of recall resulted from retrieval 
practice (as expected) in both valence categories, and that the memory details of RP- 
items were recalled less accurately than the nRP memories in the negative category 
condition, but not in the positive category condition.  This result could have been due to a 
consistent difference in valence between the rehearsed (RP+ and RP-) and non-rehearsed 
(nRP) categories.   In a second follow-up experiment Hauer and Wessel used categories 
of ‘situations’ and ‘traits’ for only negatively valenced cue words to collect 
autobiographical memories.  Although a RIF effect was seen, it was reduced compared to 
that which might be found in more traditional RIF studies.  This again indicates that 
memories may be recalled less accurately when they share characteristics with other more 
frequently rehearsed memories 
Because of the impact of mood-disorders on the retrieval of autobiographical 
memories (Dalgliesh & Werner-Seidler, 2014) in particular the relationship between 
cognitive failures and performance using the RIF paradigm (Bäuml & Kuhbandner, 2007; 
Groome & Grant 2005; Groome & Sterkaj 2010; Potts, Law, Golding, & Groome, 2012),  
Harris and colleagues (2010b) examined the potential inhibitory effects on 
autobiographical memories for high or low dysphoric groups using category cue words 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’.  The memories, 10 positive and 10 negative, were scored for 
age, latency, valence and clarity and given a self-generated cue word.  In the first study  
there were differences in the memorability of positive compared to negative memories in 
both groups (positive memories were more memorable overall), and this led to a RIF 
effect being reported only in the groups who had retrieval practice for negative memories.  
In a second experiment looking at the impact of selective rehearsal on oppositely 
valenced memories in people with dysphoria.  Their categories were work/study (5 
positive, 5 negative) and home/family (5 positive, 5 negative) and their RP+ was either 
positive or negative memories.  Their results showed a RIF effect only in the work 
category when positive memories were rehearsed and negative memories inhibited.  
Facilitation occurred independent of valence, and there was no effect of age, nor ratings 
of clarity, valence or importance of memory events. 
The 2010 study by Harris and colleagues seems to indicate that even in people 
suffering from dysphoria there is a tendency to favour positive over negative memories, 




used.  For example, work memories are subject to a RIF effect while home/family 
memories are not.  The authors suggest that this may be due to memories retrieved for 
these categories being more recent, more closely linked to the ‘self’ or being more 
emotionally impactful. 
In Section 1.3.1 the evidence for the cognitive structuring of chapters was 
outlined, this includes that chapters reliably prime constituent episodic memories, and 
that horizontal priming occurs between constituent episodic memories within the same 
chapter.  In addition to this Study two gave evidence that the recognition of chapters in 
narrative and as representations for participants was convergent and therefore chapters 
represent both internal and communicated schematic information.  In addition studies one 
and three gave support for the use of chapters as cues for episodic memories, and 
therefore reliable cue-target links.  Retrieval-induced forgetting can impact on the recall 
of specific autobiographical memories, but as a result of their non-neutrality when 
compared, for example, to word pairs, there must be a consideration of equivalence 
between categories, and of memories themselves in terms of affective content, and 
personal significance.  The use of chapter-episodic memory pairs has never been explored 
but represents a way of addressing this neutrality and the effect of personal significance 
on RIF. 
The formation of chapters themselves is suggested to be a result of the stringing 
together of the experiences by linking themes, activities and temporal similarity through 
autobiographical (Habermas, 2011; Habermas & Bluck, 2000) or life-period reasoning 
(Thomsen, 2015).  In addition to this it appears that chapter valence is not simply and 
emergent feature of the summation of event valence, but may also be influential in 
deciding the valence, on recall, of constituent episodic memories (Beike & Landoll, 
2000).   Although not fully explored it seems that while there is evidence that the valence 
of chapters in dysphoric groups are significantly less positive (Study three, Section 5.3), 
but there is no reason to think that they are structured differently (Studies one and two), in 
terms of length, narrative coherence, and temporality.  While this may be the case, there 
is some indication that the events within them are influenced by the chapter in a ‘top-
down’ manner, with a drive to reduce dissonance between within-chapter events (Beike & 
Landoll, 2000).  In Studies one (Section 3.3.2) and three (Section 5.3) the incongruence 




clarity at which positively incongruent events are recalled for people with dysphoria, this 
group also recalled fewer incongruent events overall.  Study three also indicated that the 
dysphoric group overall spontaneously recalled fewer incongruent events.  This is 
significant to dysphoric groups in particular because there are suggestions that of a 
‘healthy balance’ between coherence with the evaluative whole of the chapter, and the 
ability to recall incongruent events, particularly those which are more positive than the 
contextual chapter (Study three) or schema-related expectation, is essential to mental 
health and well-being (Beck, 1987; Brewin, 2006; Singer & Salovey, 1993; White & 
Epston, 1990).   
These studies are based on the proposal that, first of all, the composition of 
chapters, i.e. as collective representations of autobiographical information, and higher 
order themes, is influential in the recall of affectively incongruent events by a process of 
competitive inhibition in both dysphoric and non-dysphoric groups.  Retrieval-induced 
forgetting is one of the mechanisms which impacts on recall in the short term, but 
according to the retrieval-based learning assumption (Anderson, et al, 1994) over longer 
periods could function to downgrade affectively incongruent events, and could be at play 
in the formation of chapters which are coherent, positive summations of life events, and 
have limited dissonance.  The suggestion that people with dysphoria have chapters with 
reduced access to incongruent events, and for their incongruent events, reduced clarity for 
positive events, indicates that, assuming retrieval-induced forgetting is a factor, they 
would have a differential RIF effect, with negative material being more likely to 
effectively inhibit positive material, but not vice versa.   
The first study in this chapter aims to establish patterns of inhibition and retrieval 
of positive and negative autobiographical memories cued by chapters in non-depressed 
populations, the second study examines this pattern of retrieval for dysphoric groups.  In 
order to examine the impact of autobiographical reasoning on the process, i.e. the 
attribution of causation, consequence and personal significance, in addition to overall 
retrievability on manipulation, this study examines a number of salient and ecologically 
valid memory characteristics, of the content of chapter-cued memories rather than speed 
or order of recall.   
In order to control for ‘importance to self’ on the retrieval process the aim is to 




produced by people when ordering their past experiences in to chapters (Thomsen, 2009).  
In Studies 1 and 3 of this thesis we found that university student participants aged 
between 18-25 reliably chose chapters relating to school and university chapters, and so 
these categories were applied to create category (chapter) -exemplar (episodic memory) 
links.  Using recall practice of either positive or negative category exemplars, the 
predictions of this study are that: 
 Recall practice of autobiographical memories will enhance recall at test 
(standard facilitation) 
 Recall practice of autobiographical memories from particular life-chapters 
will cause inhibition of other memories from these chapters i.e. a RIF 
effect.  This will be evidenced by: 
o reduced recall of memories from the RP- memories 
o changes in memory features of RP- memories indicative of 
dissonance reduction processes: 
 increase reported difficulty in accessing memories 
 a rehearsal valence linked change in positivity (negative 
rehearsal results in more negative recall vice versa) 
 decreases in memory clarity (vividness, coherence, and 
intensity) 
o reduced accuracy of memory details (who was present during the 
event; what occurred during the event; where the event occurred, 
and when it was, along with the attributed cause of the event; 








Study 4a: Retrieval-Induced Forgetting of autobiographical memories  
 6.2  Method 6.2
6.2.1 Participants  
46 participants between 18-25 years of age, with a mean (SD) 24.1 (2.7) years were 
recruited from campus and using the University of Abertay and University of Andrews 
School of Psychology participant recruitment SONA systems. Of the included participants, 
18 were male. The PHQ-9 (Kroenke & Spitzer, 2002) (Appendix 13) was used to establish 
non-depressed status, and study participants were required to be currently non-dysphoric 
(PHQ-9<5), and six recruited participants were not included in the analysis because their 
PHQ-9 score was greater than 5.  The participants were either required to take part in the 
study to obtain course credit, or received £10 for taking part.  
6.2.2  Design 
Ethical consent was obtained from the University of St Andrews (Appendix 4), and 
University of Abertay Dundee (Appendix 5).  This study was a between participants design 
with 20 participants rehearsing positive autobiographical memories, and 20 rehearsing 
negative autobiographical memories in the RP+ phase.  The two cueing chapters were ‘high-
school’ and ‘university’ and recency of recalled events, and categorical priming during the 
memory production phase, which could impact on retrievability, was controlled by 




 (Kroenke & Spitzer, 2002) was used to establish depressive status. 
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 PHQ-9 was adopted in place of the BDI-II for this study to decrease time taken to establish dysphoric 





Study sessions were carried out in the experimental labs of St Andrews University 
and in the Division of Mental Health Nursing and Counselling, at Abertay University, 








Figure 6-2: Schematic of RIF procedure for Study four.  Depicting the sequence of activities for the studies 4a 
and 4b.  ABM generation occurred in the week prior to the RIF, the study phase involved a reminder of these, 
and this was followed by the RP+ rehearsal phase, distractor and final free recall phase. 
 
Session 1:  
Following informed consent being given, participants were required to complete the 
PHQ-9 and undergo autobiographical memory generation. 
Participants were informed that there were two autobiographical periods of interest, 
these being the ‘life-story chapters’ of high-school and university henceforth known as 
categories.  They were then given a definition of specific autobiographical memories as 
follows: 
‘Specific autobiographical memories are of events that lasted less than a day, and are 
events which you know only happened once (because you can remember some ‘one off’ 
details), that happened to you so not things like current events e.g. the royal wedding, or 
things that people said happened e.g. your sister had an accident.  They don’t have to be 



























of these times.  For this study we ask that they happened during the chapter in question.  In 
addition, a positive memory is one that is ‘good to think about’ and a negative memory is one 
that is ‘bad to think about’  
There are two types of cue for which memories can be retrieved in this study, (high, 
or senior) ‘school’, and ‘university’.  When cued for a memory please ensure it is related to, 
and occurred during, the appropriate life-time period. 
The cueing of memories occurred via a computer monitor using E-Prime (Psychology 
Software Tools Inc).  Each cue was presented on on-screen and the participant was required 
to respond to each one in turn.  Following the appearance of the cue participants verbally 
confirmed when a specific autobiographical memory had been retrieved, they then typed in a 
‘personal word(s)’ specific to that memory, e.g. ‘Christmas with Alice’, to act as a reminder 
and ‘tag’ for subsequent sessions.  Once the ‘tag’ had been entered participants were 
sequentially prompted on-screen for memory details which were given verbally and recorded 
by the researcher these included who, what, where and when (memory details) along with the 
cause, consequence and personal significance (autobiographical reasoning) of the event.  The 
participant then scored the memory features on a likert scale (1-6):   
Positivity (very positive/very negative),  
Recall (comes to mind easily/with difficulty),  
Coherence (feels coherent and complete/does not feel coherent and complete)  
Vividness (very detailed/not detailed at all)  
Emotional Intensity (not at all/extremely emotional) 
Participants were then asked to estimate their age during the event and this enabled a 
check-back to ensure the event occurred during the time period of the chapter/category. 
Prior to the initial generation phase two practice memories were generated, for the cue 
‘last week and +ve’ and ‘last week and –ve’ and the protocol below followed to ensure that 




The experimental procedure was then used to generate 20 autobiographical events, 
comprising 10 positive and 10 negative memories.  The cue sequence was alternated by 
chapter and by valence. 
Between sessions the memory details were transcribed (who, what, where and when, 
along with cause, consequence and personal significance), and rehearsal groups matched 
according to the ratings of valence and clarity (summed score of coherence, emotional 
intensity, and vividness) of the memories.  This resulted in four sets of ten participants with 
memories which are equivalent at baseline for these two memory features.  
Slides were created on E-prime for two phases of the subsequent session.  In order to 
remind participants of all memories which had been produced in the previous week a set of 
slides was created on which was contained an event memory ‘tag’, and associated chapter 
and valence.   
For the rehearsal phase cueing slides for the appropriate category and valence were 
produced i.e. all memories for either school: positive, or negative, university: positive or 
negative.  This created four sets of RP+ slides for cued recall as indicated in Table 6.1 
During session two the participants underwent a reminder stage where each of the 
memories they had produced in the previous session were cued by the tag being presented on 
an E-Prime slide, and they were asked to scroll through these slides once they had recalled 
and spoken out loud some details of the memory and the researcher had confirmed that they 
had remembered at least two details correctly e.g. who, and when. 
The next stage of session two involved the cued recall of the RP+ memories, this 
entailed presentation of a slide containing the cue ‘tag’ along with prompts for who, what, 
where, and when, along with cause, consequence, and personal meaning  details on sequential 
slides.  Participants were required to state the event details out-loud in response to the slides, 
and were corrected by the researcher if their response deviated from their previous report or if 
they took longer than ten seconds to recall the detail.  The RP+ curing continued for three 






Table 6.1: The RP+, RP-, and nRP cues for each group in Study four 
 RP+ RP- NRP 
GROUP A SCHOOL + SCHOOL - UNIVERSITY - 
GROUP B SCHOOL - SCHOOL + UNIVERSITY + 
GROUP C UNIVERSITY + UNIVERSITY - SCHOOL - 
GROUP D UNIVERSITY - UNIVERSITY + SCHOOL + 
 
This table represents the four possible groups, ten participants in each, and the memories which are included in 
each RP category in studies 4a and 4b 
A twenty-minute distractor phase followed during which participants undertook an 
on-screen operational-span task (OSPAN: Turner & Eagle, 1989) which engaged attention 
and working memory to prevent covert rehearsal of memories. 
In the final phase participants were asked to freely recall as many memories as they 
could from the 20 that they had been reminded of at the beginning of the session.  They spoke 
the ‘tag’ out-loud and were cued on screen for memory details of what where when, causes, 
consequences and personal significance, and memory features  
On completion of this phase, when participants confirmed that they were unable to 
recall further memories, they were debriefed, and provided with their £10 for participation.   
 6.3  Results  6.3
6.3.1 Study 4a Results 
The data resulting from this protocol included the number and category (RP+, RP-, 
nRP) of the memories produced in the final test phase, along with the memory details which 
were examined according to their baseline.  Recall was examined in terms of availability of 
autobiographical memories, changes to rated memory features (difficulty of access, 
positivity, and clarity: coherence, emotional intensity, and vividness). 
Accuracy for memory details was established using two criteria following Noreen and 
McLeod (2013).  Using jist criteria where the memory recall was considered accurate if the 
feature of interest was indicated as broadly matching that of the originally generated 




kitchen’ which by inference is not in conflict with the original information, while the strict 
criteria were that the description was the same i.e. the participant would have to have said ‘in 
my house’, and ‘in the kitchen’ would have been scored as inaccurate.  The accuracy over the 
seven details of the memory were summed, and each participant had a proportional score for 
accuracy under the ‘jist’ and ‘strict’ criteria. 
Table 6.2 shows the memory feature ratings for the categories of ‘School’ and 
‘University’.  A series of ANOVAs (within: school or university; positive or negative) were 
carried out, once it was established that there was no difference between the autobiographical 
memories’ ratings of difficulty of access, positivity, coherence, vividness, and emotional 
intensity at baseline for the categories of school and university, these were combined to 
create two RP+ groups, Negative rehearsal and Positive rehearsal. 
 
Table 6.2: Mean (SD) baseline ratings for memory features in Study 4a 
 Difficulty 
of recall 
Positivity Coherence Vividness Emotional  
Intensity 
School  3.04 (0.97) 4.21 (1.77) 3.12 (1.01) 4.81 (1.42) 3.40 (1.16) 
University  3.12 (1.90) 4.63 (1.44) 3.52 (1.54) 4.62 (2.41) 3.21 (1.74) 
F(1, 38) 1.431, p=0.11 <1, n.s. 1.122, p=0.21 <1, n.s. <1, n.s. 
This table indicates the mean (SD) rated memory features for the memories cued by chapter categories ‘School’ and ‘University’ in Study 
4a.  Differences between groups were examined using a series of mixed-factorial (between: rehearsal valence, within: category (school, 
university)) ANOVAs 
 
The impact of rehearsal on memory recall was examined for its impact on: 
i) the mean number of memories from each category which were retrieved 
during the free-recall phase 
ii) the change in memory features during the free-recall phase (positivity, 
coherence, vividness, and emotional intensity) 
iii) the accuracy of memory details which were recalled correctly during the free-




For this analysis the RP- and nRP means were calculated only for the memories 
recalled of the opposite valence to the RP+ memories, to control for memory valence effects 
impacting on recall.   
The mean (SD) number of memories recalled for each category were RP+ 3.70 (1.16), 
RP- 2.15 (1.31), nRP 2.73 (2.76),  In order to test the primary hypothesis that rehearsal for 
RP+ memories would inhibit the recall of RP- memories, but not nRP memories, a repeated 
measures ANOVA (between: rehearsal valence, within: rehearsal category RP+, RP-, nRP 
(different from rehearsal)) revealed a main effect of rehearsal category F(1,37)=15.614, 
p<0.001, 
2
p =0.61 on the number of memories recalled at test, no main effect of rehearsal 
valence, F(1,37)=1.010, n.s., and no interaction between valence and category F(1,37)<1.  
RP+ memories were more likely to be recalled than both RP- t(39)=6.125, P<0.001, d=0.48 
and nRP t(39)=3.914, p<0.001, d=0.31.  A follow-up t-test revealed a significant difference 
between RP- and Nrp categories with the Nrp memories being more likely to be recalled, 
t(39)=2.890, p=0.006, d=0.38, indicating both a significant facilitation effect and a retrieval-
induced forgetting effect of rehearsal.   
Table 6.3: Mean (SD) change in ratings for memory features in Study 4a 




Difficulty 0.068 (1.50) 0.576 (1.32) 0.797 (1.75) 
Positivity 0.570 (1.84) 0.151 (1.03) 0.201 (1.03) 
Coherence -0.181 (1.25) -0.370 (1.24) -0.532 (1.38) 
Intensity 0.013 (0.97) 0.630 (1.01) 0.220 (1.20) 




Difficulty 0.824 (1.16) 0.051 (0.76) 0.107 (0.90) 
Positivity 0.071 (0.71) 0.220 (0.87) 0.011 (0.71) 
Coherence 0.431 (0.56) 0.057 (1.03) 0.032 (0.46) 
Intensity -0.045 (0.77) 0.540 (0.71) -0.320 (1.10) 
Vividness 0.624 (1.12) -0.123 (0.81) -0.011 (1.17) 
 
This table represents the mean change in rated memory features for the two RP+ groups in Study 4a, a negative change 





The examination of the changes to memory features followed this primary analysis.  
A mixed factorial ANOVA (between: rehearsal valence, within: rehearsal category RP+, RP-, 
nRP (different from rehearsal)) was carried out to ascertain the degree of change in rated 
difficulty of recall between categories.  There was a significant effect of rehearsal category 
F(1, 37)=12.980, p=0.001, 
2
p =0.69, a significant effect of rehearsal valence, F(1,37)=8.742, 
p=0.005, 
2
p =0.54, and no interaction F(1,37)<1.  This indicated that following rehearsal 
(RP+) of negative memories, positive memories (both RP- and nRP) were more accessible.  
A further comparison t-test between the two non-rehearsed categories, revealed no effect 
t(39)<1. suggesting that the reduction in rated difficulty of recall was down to a short-term 
rehearsal effect. 
To examine whether the rated positivity of recalled memories would relate to the 
rehearsal valence, i.e. that rehearsal of positive memories would increase the reported 
positivity of recalled memories, and vice versa, a mixed factorial ANOVA (between: 
rehearsal valence, repeated measures RP+, RP-, nRP (different from rehearsal)) was carried 
out to ascertain the degree of change.  There was no effect of rehearsal category F(1,38)<1, 
rehearsal valence, F(1,38)<1, and no interaction F(1,38)=1.786, p=0.189.  A further 
comparison t-test between the two non-rehearsed categories, matched by valence, revealed no 
effect t(39)<1.  No significant changes occurred to the positivity of the recalled memories, 
indicating no short-term mood improvement, or reduction following rehearsal. 
Three features of memories were used to indicate the clarity of recall, coherence, 
emotional intensity, and vividness.  While tentative predictions were made concerning the 
changes brought about by rehearsal on the RP- memories, in that overall there would be a 
reduction in clarity relative to nRP, it was also anticipated that details of RP+ memories 
would be enhanced by facilitation effects.   
It was predicted that coherence for RP+ would increase, as a result of rehearsal, a 
mixed ANOVA (between: rehearsal valence, within: rehearsal category RP+, RP-, nRP 
(different from rehearsal)) found a significant impact on change of coherence of the rehearsal 
category, F(1,38)=4.862, p=0.034, 
2
p =0.27, the valence of the rehearsed memories 
F(1,38)=6.624, p=0.014, 
2
p  = 0.30 and no interaction F(1,38)<1.  The mean (SD) increase in 
coherence for the negative RP+ memories was 0.431 (0,564), for RP- 0.057 (1.029), and nRP 




(1.378).  This indicated that rehearsal of negative autobiographical memories increased the 
reported coherence on recall of both negative rehearsed and positive non-rehearsed 
memories, while the rehearsal of positive memories has the reverse effect.  Follow-up t-tests 
revealed that there was no significant difference in the changes for the non-rehearsed 
memories t(39)<1, but that RP+ memories were significantly more coherent on recall when 
compared to nRP memories t(39)=2.233, p=0.031 d=0.23, but not for RP- memories 
t(39)=1.190, p=0.241, and no difference between nRP and RP- t(39)<1.  What appears to be 
occurring is that rehearsal of negative memories raises their subsequent coherence on recall, 
but rehearsal of positive memories reduces overall coherence of all memories recalled at test.   
Again it was anticipated that rehearsal of RP+ memories would increase the 
emotional intensity at test, a mixed factorial ANOVA (between: rehearsal valence, repeated 
measures RP+, RP-, nRP (different from rehearsal) was carried out to ascertain the degree of 
change in emotional intensity between categories.  There was no significant effect of 
rehearsal category F(1, 38)=1.021, p=0.319, no significant effect of rehearsal valence, F(1, 
38)=1.052, p=0.312 and no interaction between category valence and rehearsal category 
F(1,38)=4.049, p=0.051.  A further comparison t-test between the two non-rehearsed 
categories, thereby matching for valence revealed no effect t(39)<1, n.s.  There was therefore 
no difference in the reported change in emotional intensity for any of the categories of 
recalled memory. 
Finally a mixed ANOVA (between: rehearsal valence, within: rehearsal category 
RP+, RP-, nRP (different from rehearsal)) was carried out to ascertain the degree of change in 
vividness between categories the prediction, as before, was that RP+ memories would 
increase in reported vividness.  There was a significant effect of rehearsal category 
F(1,38)=4.246, p=0.046, 
2
p =0.19, no effect of rehearsal valence, F(1,38)=1.784, p=0.190, 
and no interaction F(1, 38)<1.  This effect was due to both the RP- and nRP memories being 
reported as less vivid on test than at initial production and t-tests revealed that neither 
category changed to a greater extent individually compared to the RP+ memories RP- 
t(39)=2.011, p=0.051 and nRP t(39)=1.094, p=0.064.  A further comparison t-test between 
the two non-rehearsed categories, revealed no effect t(39)<1.  These results indicate that, as 





Accuracy of memory recall  
The accuracy of memory recall was expected to increase for RP+ memories, and that 
RP- memories would reduce in accuracy compared to nRP memories.  This study used two 
measures of accuracy, ‘jist’ whereby recalled details were matched to those reported on 
memory generation but did not have to be exactly the same, and ‘strict’ criteria, where 
descriptions were required to match exactly.   The mean (SD) accuracy using the ‘jist’ criteria 
for RP+ was 0.990 (0.01), RP- 0.810 (0.26), and nRP 0.781 (0.13). Accuracy of memory 
recall using the ‘jist’ criteria was examined using a mixed ANOVA (between: rehearsal 
valence, repeated measures RP+, RP-, nRP (different from rehearsal).  This indicated no 
significant effect rehearsal category had no effect on recall accuracy F(1,37)<1, no effect of 
rehearsal valence F(1,37)<1, nor an interaction between these F(1,37)<1.    
Accuracy of memory recall using the ‘strict’ criteria was examined using a mixed 
ANOVA (between: rehearsal valence, repeated measures RP+, RP-, nRP (different from 
rehearsal).  This indicated that rehearsal category had a significant effect on recall accuracy 
F(1,37)=2.947, p=0.046, 
2
p =0.36, no effect of rehearsal valence F(1,37)=3.812, p=0.058, 
and no interaction between these F(1,37)<1.  Follow-up t-tests revealed that compared to the 
RP+ memories RP- were recalled with less accuracy t(39)= 2.011, p=0.021, d=0.25, but not 
nRP memories t(39)=1.114, p=0.072.  RP- memories were recalled with significantly less 
accuracy using the strict criteria compared to nRP memories, t(39)=1.959, p=0.031, d=0.21.  
The mean (SD) accuracy for RP+ was 0.917 (0.17), RP- 0.622 (0.21), and nRP 0.733 (0.12). 
Overall these results indicate that the RIF procedure of rehearsal which included 
recall of memory details and autobiographical reasoning processes i.e. thinking about the 
cause, consequence, and personal meaning of the events, resulted in both facilitation as a 
result of rehearsal and inhibition of oppositely valenced within-chapter episodic memories.  
This was demonstrated in terms of the memories which were recalled, and in the accuracy of 
recall using strict criteria.  Some mixed effects were seen in the memory features which were 





 6.4  Retrieval-Induced Forgetting in dysphoric groups 6.4
This study carried out the same procedure as 4a, however, the participants were 
selected to be dysphoric, scoring greater than 10 on the PHQ-9 (Kroenke & Spitzer, 2002), 
which constitutes categorization as moderate (10-15), moderately severe (15-20), and severe 
depression (20+).  A total of 52 participants aged between 18-25, mean (SD) 21.6 (3.9) 
years,were recruited on campus, seven of whom were not included as their reported events 
could not be confirmed as meeting the criteria for an episodic memory, and five of whom 
scored below 10 on the PHQ-9 scale.  Those who were not included in the analysis were not 
required to complete part 2 of the study.  Of the participants included two were male. 
6.4.1 Study 4b Results 
It was established using a series of mixed factorial ANOVAs (between: rehearsal 
valence, within: category) that there was no baseline difference between the autobiographical 
memories ratings of difficulty of access, positivity, coherence, vividness, and emotional 
intensity for the categories of school and university, these were combined to create two RP+ 
groups, Negative rehearsal, and Positive rehearsal. 
 
Table 6.4: Mean (SD) baseline ratings for memory features in Study 4b 
 Difficulty 
of access 
Positivity Coherence Vividness Emotional 
intensity 
School   4.34 (1.78) 3.59 (2.87) 2.48 (1.32) 4.72 (1.02) 2.83 (2.76) 
University  5.12 (1.90) 3.33 (1.84) 3.15 (2.01) 4.42 (2.23) 3.01 (1.78) 





This table indicates the mean (SD) rated memory features for the memories cued by chapter categories ‘School’ and ‘University’ in Study 
4b.  Differences between groups were examined using a series of mixed-factorial (between:rehearsal valence, within: category (school, 
university)) ANOVAs  
 
The mean (SD) number of memories recalled for each category was RP+ 3.54 (1.76), 
RP- 2.46 (1.91), nRP 2.27 (2.11).  To explore for a RIF effect of rehearsal on the memories 
recalled at test, with the prediction that RP+ memories would be more likely to be recalled, 




ANOVA (between: rehearsal valence, repeated measures RP+, RP-, nRP (different from 
rehearsal)) was carried out on the number of memories of each category recalled at test.  This 
revealed a main effect of rehearsal category F(1,37)=14.913, p<0.001 
2
p =0.42,  no main 
effect of valence F(1, 36)=1.481, p=0.232., and no interaction F(1,37)<1..  Follow-up t-tests 
revealed that RP+ memories were recalled more than both RP- t(39)=2.984, p=0.021, d=0.21, 
and nRP t(39)=3.011, p=0.013, d=0.27, but that these groups did not differ t(39)<1.   
Indicating a significant facilitation effect of rehearsal but no retrieval induced forgetting at 
test for recall. 
Examining ratings for changes to memory features  
A series of tests were carried out to examine changes in memory features: reported 
difficulty of recall, positivity, and measures of clarity: coherence, emotional intensity, and 
vividness of memories.  Each of these was tentatively anticipated to be impacted by rehearsal, 
and subject to a RIF effect.  In addition positivity was expected to be impacted by rehearsal 
valence. 
Table 6.5: Mean (SD) change in ratings of memory features in Study 4b 




Difficulty  -0.987 (1.08) 0.083 (1.32) 0.115 (2.01) 
Positivity  0.914 (0.92) -0.032 (1.02) 0.117 (1.57) 
Coherence 0.452 (0.70) -0.056 (1.13) 0.142 (0.99) 
Intensity 0.182 (0.64) -0.060 (0.73) 0.116 (0.93) 




Difficulty  -1.071 (0.89) 0.299 (1.09)  0.076 (0.98) 
Positivity  1.008 (1.09) 0.113 (0.62)  0.053 (0.61) 
Coherence 0.719 (1.07) -0.002 (1.10) -0.021 (0.76) 
Intensity 0.282 (1.20) -0.094 (1.13)  0.076 (0.45) 
Vividness 0.170 (1.21) 0.320 (0.92) 0.546 (1.01) 
 
This table represents the mean (SD) change in rated memory features for the two RP+ group in Study 4b, a negative change 





The rated difficulty of recall, a measure which corresponds to the subjective ability to 
bring a memory to mind, rather than the accessibility overall (which is evidenced by whether 
it is recalled or not) was examined first using a mixed factorial ANOVA (between: rehearsal 
valence, repeated measures RP+, RP-, nRP (different from rehearsal) and revealed a main 
effect of rehearsal category F(1,37)=11.077, p=0.002, 
2
p =0.62,  no effect of rehearsal 
valence, F(1,37)<1, and no interaction F(1, 37)<1.  Follow-up t-tests revealed that the RP+ 
memories were rated as significantly easier to recall on test than both the RP- memories 
t(39)=4.173, p<0.001, d=0.36 and the nRP memories t(39)=3.335, p=0.002, d= 0.33.  The 
two unrehearsed categories were not significantly different in the degree to which they 
changed in accessibility t(39)<1.  This follows the previous analysis, in that rehearsal 
increases accessibility, but gives no support for a RIF effect. 
The prediction that RP+ valence would impact on the recall positivity of memories, 
was examined using a mixed factorial ANOVA (between: rehearsal valence, within:  repeated 
measures RP+, RP-, nRP (different from rehearsal) and revealed a main effect of rehearsal 
category F(1,37)=15.763, p<0.001, 
2
p =0.53 on the change in positivity of the memory 
recalled, no main effect of rehearsal valence F(1,37)<1, and no interaction F(1,37)<1.    
Follow up t-tests revealed that the RP+ memories increased in positivity more than both the 
RP- t(39)=4.888, p<0.001, d=0.34 and the nRP t(39)=4.011, p<0.001, d=0.37, but that these 
categories did not differ t(39)<1.  This suggests that RP+ memories recalled at test were more 
positive than at generation, independent of their initial valence. 
Overall clarity was predicted to increase for RP+ memories, and reduce for RP- 
memories relative to nRP memories.  Three features of memories were used to indicate the 
clarity of recall, coherence, emotional intensity and vividness. 
The predicted increase in coherence of memories as a result of rehearsal was explored 
using a mixed factorial ANOVA (between: rehearsal valence, repeated measures RP+, RP-, 
nRP (different from rehearsal) revealing no significant effect of rehearsal category on the 
change in memory coherence F(1,37)=3.617, p=0.065, no effect of rehearsed memory 
valence F(1, 37)<1, and no interaction F(1,37)<1.  The increase in coherence seen in Study 4a 





The impact of rehearsal on rated emotional intensity using a mixed factorial ANOVA 
(between: rehearsal valence, repeated measures RP+, RP-, nRP (different from rehearsal) 
revealed no main effect of rehearsal category F(1,38)<1, no effect of rehearsal valence 
F(1,38)<1, and no interaction F(1,38)<1.   
Similarly, that the vividness of memories recalled at test would change as a result of 
rehearsal examined using a mixed factorial ANOVA (between: rehearsal valence, repeated 
measures RP+, RP-, nRP (different from rehearsal) revealed no main effect on of rehearsal 
category F(1,38)=1.617, p=0.212, or rehearsal valence F(1,38)<1. and no interaction 
F(1,38)=1.104, p=0.300.    
Accuracy of memory recall  
The mean (SD) accuracy for RP+ was 0.890 (0.05), RP- 0.810 (0.09), and nRP 0.840 
(0.06).  Recall accuracy was predicted to increase for rehearsed memories, and as with Study 
one, was predicted to be impacted by the RIF effect.  Accuracy of memory recall using the 
‘jist’ criteria was examined using a mixed-factorial ANOVA (between: rehearsal valence, 
repeated measures RP+, RP-, nRP (different from rehearsal).  This indicated no significant 
effect rehearsal category had no effect on recall accuracy F(1,37)<1, no effect of rehearsal 
valence F(1, 37)<1, nor an interaction between these F(1,37)<1.   
The mean (SD) accuracy for RP+ was 0.810 (0.09), RP- 0.760 (0.06), and nRP 0.750 
(0.03).Accuracy of memory recall using the ‘strict’ criteria were examined using a mixed 
ANOVA (between: rehearsal valence, repeated measures RP+, RP-, nRP (different from 
rehearsal).  This indicated no significant effect rehearsal category had no effect on recall 
accuracy F(1,37)<1, no effect of rehearsal valence F(1,37)=3.812, p=0.058, and no 
interaction between these F(1,37)<1.   This reveals no evidence for this group that recall 
accuracy is subject to facilitation or for inhibition.     
6.4.2 Comparison between studies 4a and 4b 
Initially the two studies within this chapter were designed to run separately, this is 
because previous research had found baseline differences between the cue-exemplar pairs 
recalled during the generation phase (e.g. Hauer & Wessel, 2006).  In the experimental design 
for study 4a it was anticipated that an effective procedure could be established to examine the 
chapter-memory relationship in terms of within chapter relationships.  Once established the 




4a and 4b was carried out to examine baseline ratings of events, and post-rehearsal recall of 
memories within the RP+, nRP, and RP- catgories. 
Baseline ratings for difficulty of recall, positivity, coherence, vividness, and 
emotional intensity are shown for the two groups in table  
Table 6.6: Mean (SD) baseline ratings for study 4a and 4b 
 Difficulty 
of recall 
Positivity Coherence Vividness Emotional  
Intensity 
Non-Depressed (4a) 3.08 (2.13) 4.42 (2.28) 3.32 (1.84) 4.71 (2.80) 3.31 (2.09) 
Dysphoric (4b) 4.73 (2.60) 3.46 (3.41) 2.82 (2.40) 4.57 (2.45) 2.92 (3.28) 








This table indicates the mean (SD) rated memory features for the memories recalled during the generation phase of Studies 4a and 4b.  .  
Differences between groups were examined using a series of t-tests 
The test phase recall performance for the study 4a non-depressed group and the study 
4b dysphoric group were then compared, means can be found in table 6.7.  Using a mixed 
factorial ANOVA (between: non-depressed; dysphoric, within: rehearsal category : RP+, RP-
, nRP) results indicated no main effect of group F(1,77)=1.002, p=0.137, a main effect of 
rehearsal category F(1,77)=3.443, p=0.002, 
2
p =0.63 and an interaction between group and 
rehearsal category F(1,77)=2.111, p=0.014, 
2
p =0.30.  These results indicate that the Study 
4b dysphoric group do not display a RIF effect, and that there is no indication that within 
chapter priming has occurred to raise retrievability of memories from the RP-  rehearsal 
category as a result of their similarity to RP+ memories. 
Table 6.7: Mean number (SD) of memories by group and rehearsal category 
 RP+ RP- nRP 
Non-Depressed (4a) 3.70 (1.16) 2.15 (1.31) 2.73 (2.76) 
Dysphoric (4b) 3.54 (1.76) 2.46 (1.91) 2.27 (2.11) 
    
This table gives the mean number of memories recalled in the test phase of the RIF procedure for the 





 6.5  Discussion 6.5
This study tested the hypothesis that differential rehearsal of episodic 
autobiographical memories from life-story chapters, can lead to retrieval-induced forgetting 
of oppositely-valenced within-chapter episodic memories.  This question is relevant to the 
formation of chapters, in that memories become, over time, linked to chapters, and illustrative 
of the chapter content, but also that ultimately this could lead to chapters which exist as 
positive, or negative schematic representations. 
The results of Studies 4a and 4b can be examined independently, but also used to give 
a comparison in the performance of the dysphoric and non-depressed groups as the protocols 
were identical.  For the non-depressed group there was a significant RIF effect for memories 
within the chapter categories, and this impacted on the ability to recall oppositely valenced 
events compared to the rehearsed category.  There was also a potential RIF effect for the 
accuracy at which memories were recalled, in that when applying the strict criteria (but not 
jist criteria) for memory features, RP- memories were recalled less accurately than nRP 
memories.   
Secondary analysis was carried out to examine the impact of rehearsal and 
competitive inhibition on memory features of subjective difficulty in accessing memories, 
their positivity, and clarity ratings for coherence, emotional intensity and vividness.  There 
were effects apparent in terms of changes over the study procedure (from initial production to 
test) of memory features which are likely to be a result of rehearsal  but other changes which 
appeared to be the result of the valence of the RP+ memories.  For example, an increase in 
the reported accessibility of memories following rehearsal, was independent of the RIF, and 
simply that the facilitation of access for non-rehearsed memories.  The reported ‘difficulty of 
recall’ was for memories which were recalled at test, and therefore did not provide 
information on the memories which were not recalled which, logically, were harder to recall.  
No increase in positivity as a result of rehearsing positive memories or decrease in positivity 
as a result of rehearsing negative memories was seen, while this would have been predicted 
by studies which show a short-term mood effect of memory rehearsal and that mood 
congruence impacts on judgements of positivity (Barry, Naus, & Rehm, 2004; Bradley, 
Mogg, & Williams, 1995), it seems that the ratings of valence were either not influenced by 




 Changes to the clarity of memories as a result of facilitation and inhibition was 
examined using three components of a clarity measure: coherence, emotional intensity, and 
vividness.  Clarity of recall provides both a further measure of accessibility (Ritchie, et al, 
2006), and is strongly correlated with memory relevance (Ritchie, Skowronski, Cadogan, & 
Sedikides, 2014), and so a reduction in the relative clarity of RP- memories, even if 
accessible, could impact on the construction of chapter-based information.  Rehearsal 
increased coherence of recalled RP+ memories, and negative memories overall.  This second 
result is suggestive of the differential role of rehearsal for negative memories, and was 
observed for all categories of memory, perhaps reflecting that in non-depressed groups 
negative memories represent more important information, and could raise the levels of 
attention allocated to tasks such as memory recall (Rasmusson & Berntsen, 2009).  The 
reported vividness of RP+ memories of both valences remained constant compared to non-
rehearsed categories which reduced in rated vividness, but this was not accompanied by a 
change in the emotional intensity of memories.  This raises a question of whether the reduced 
rated vividness was a relative factor, whereby the rated vividness was comparative to other 
memories and the absolute score is not a factor, or if the rehearsal of RP+ memories 
decreases vividness of RP- and NRP memories overall.   
The results from the second study in this chapter, examining the presence of RIF in 
the dysphoric group contrasted to those of the non-depressed group, first and foremost in that 
while there was a facilitation effect on the rehearsed (RP+) memories, no evidence was found 
for this having an inhibitory effect on same chapter memories of the opposite valence.  This 
facilitation effect was seen in both the number of memories for each category recalled at test, 
for the rated difficulty of recall, and the increase in positivity (RP+ memories increased in 
positivity on test independent of valence).  Unlike the non-depressed group, there was no 
overall change in coherence, emotional intensity, nor vividness at test.  In addition, for the 
dysphoric group there appeared to be no effect of rehearsal category (RP+, RP-, nRP), or 
cued valence (positive or negative) of rehearsed memories on the accuracy of memory details 
and attribution of meaning to the events (who, what, where, when, cause, consequence, and 
personal meaning).   
Returning to the factors which impact on the recall of a particular chapter-cued 
memory, the first is its baseline memorability or storage strength, which were controlled for 




In this study the short-term effect of chapter-cued memory rehearsal was investigated, 
however rehearsal did involve a reasoning process asking participants to evaluate the cause, 
consequence and personal meaning of events.  Results are suggestive of a process which 
could create homogeneity in chapter recall for affectively congruent memories in the short 
term, by inhibition of within chapter oppositely valenced autobiographical memories, but not 
out-with chapter memories, but also in that the accuracy of within-chapter memories could 
reduce from strict details to more general (jist) information. 
Examining these results in terms of previous studies looking at the evidence for a RIF 
effect for autobiographical memory recall, we found similar results, for the non-depressed 
group, as Barnier and colleagues (2004) with a consistent RIF effect.  Hauer and Wessel 
(2006) found evidence for an autobiographical memory RIF effect when using both positive 
and negative category cues (Study one), but this appeared to occur only for the negative 
category.  In a second study the authors changed their categories, using traits and situations to 
cue negative memories, and again found a consistent RIF effect, although some category 
differences which could indicate underlying differences in the degree to which each episodic 
memory is an appropriate exemplar of the category. 
This highlights the role of what can be considered a ‘category’ of memory appropriate 
for cuing.   The current study uses life-story chapters as categories for recall, and found a RIF 
effect for both negative and positively valence episodic memories, and an opposite-valence 
inhibition effect for within chapter memories.  This adds to the research findings that chapters 
act to both provide hierarchical structure in the autobiographical memory base, and act to 
prime episodic recall (Sections 1.1.3 and 1.3.1), and therefore represent a set of stably linked 
representations.  Further to this it was proposed that the activity of chapter formation and 
perpetuation through a process of rehearsal of a sub-set of events from within a chapter could 
result in the inhibition, and ultimate down-grading of other events.  In particular the RIF 
effect which could be influential in allowing memories which are highly representative of 
chapters to remain detailed, while other memories, which may be less rehearsed to undergo 
modification of detail, and drift.  In this study the changes concerned details of events, but 
this could bring about a secondary affective impact, in that changing details can allow for 
changes in meaning and as a result positivity. 
This study examined this in terms of valenced memories and for the non-depressed 




the expected facilitatory effects, there was no evidence of RIF.  In the only autobiographical 
memory RIF study which focussed on dysphoria Harris and Colleagues’ (2010b) results 
indicated that for the dysphoric group and for controls, a RIF effect was only seen for 
categories of autobiographical memory which were associated with ‘work’ and not for 
‘home’, which was suggestive of factors such as personal relevance or emotional importance 
which over-ride the inhibitory effects of retrieval. The self-relevance of memories in this 
study was not examined, with the implicit assumption that the life-story chapters were similar 
in personal relevance and thus this would be reflected in their content chapters.  This may 
have affected the comparability of the groups with the rehearsal of autobiographical 
memories being overall less ‘insulated’ as a result of personal impact, and could be examined 
in future work by introducing and controlling for the ‘centrality’ ratings used in studies 1 and 
3.  That saying, the possible ‘insulation’ effect of very personally relevant ‘home’ category 
material seemed to be across both dysphoric and control groups in the Harris study, giving no 
indication that the groups differed in propensity to undergo RIF. 
The absence of RIF in the dysphoric group impacts on the prediction that inhibitory 
mechanisms are at work during chapter formation and maintenance.  Importantly, the absence 
of a RIF effect in the dysphoric group suggests that this is not the mechanism by which 
chapters are constructed, as an absence of inhibition cuing chapter formation would be 
expected to be represented at the chapter-level.  Two possible explanations for the absence of 
RIF in this group are proposed, the first is that due to cognitive deficits found in depressed 
groups the inhibitory mechanism underlying RIF does not function.  This is supported by 
research which shows impaired inhibition for depressive disorders (Moritz, Birkner, Kloss, 
Jahn, Hand, et al, 2002), but is countered by the results of Harris and colleagues (2010b).  It 
may also be that the impact of horizontal priming, which would act to increase the activation 
of memory representations more closely linked to that which are being rehearsed, and which 
in practice is thought to counteract, or be the reason why inhibitory mechanisms are 
necessary, is at play (Mace & Clevinger, 2013).  While it would be predicted that within-
chapter priming would raise the availability of all within-chapter memories for both groups, 
and for the dysphoric participants a negative attentional bias might be predicted to show a 
differential effect, i.e that negative RP+ would be more accessible after rehearsal, and that 
negative RP- would be subject to both within-chapter priming and a negative recall bias 




three factors which may be at work (negative bias, horizontal priming, and RIF) on the group 
are not possible to parse within the result for study 4b.   
A further proposal for the group difference is that the absence of RIF was due to 
cueing-chapters not being structured in the same way for the dysphoric group, the two 
chapters used to categorise memories were not chosen by participants, but reflect commonly 
used chapter categories used by this age group (in Studies one and three).  The second 
suggestion is that the categories used to cue episodic memories are not valid and do not 
reflect the underlying category-exemplar representations of the participants.  The impact of 
this use could, in those participants who did not have chapters for school and university, have 
resulted in memories being categorised incorrectly, and therefore the inferred associative 
links between category-exemplars would be weaker.  While the presence of a RIF effect in 
the non-depressed group indicates that these links are valid, the absence of RIF in the 
dysphoric group could be a result of weaker links, therefore exemplar memories would be 
less competitive and result in less inhibition.  People with depression are more likely to have 
experienced disrupted life histories (Barnhofer, et al, 2014; Ross & Mirowksi, 1999), and the 
culturally established period of school and university attendance may be less stable for this 
group. 
The aim of this study was to examine the potential role of retrieval induced forgetting 
in the formation of life-story chapters.  The process of life-period reasoning involves the 
retrieval of episodic memories on a particular life-theme, or from a particular life-period and 
allowing these to be linked and evaluated to create higher-order chapters (Thomsen, 2015).  
This study required participants to undergo an analogous process, the recall of selected 
episodic events, and a process of reasoning i.e. thinking about the cause consequence, and 
personal meaning of the events.  Under non-experimental conditions, and subject to retrieval-
induced forgetting inhibitory processes, chapters would be formed with enhanced 
homogeneity as single events are incorporated in the higher-order chapter structure while 
simultaneously inhibiting events which are categorically linked, but not cued.  Thus episodic 
memories with higher levels of activation serve to inhibit those with lower activation levels.  
The problem for people experiencing depression is that chapter formation may result from 
accumulation of negative information and events, and further, a negative evaluation of this 
material.  Thus it was hypothesised that dysphoric groups would experience a ‘lock-out’ of 




was found for this inhibitory process.  The results of this study only partially support this 
theory, there is good evidence that retrieval-induced forgetting does occur during the chapter-
cued recall of episodic memories for non-depressed groups, suggesting this as a potential 
mechanism for chapter formation.  However, there was no evidence for retrieval-induced 
forgetting occurring for the dysphoric group, and thus the potential for inhibitory ‘lock-out’ 
of positive events during chapter formation is not supported. 
There are also a number of issues which reduce the applicability of these results to 
real-life situations.  The first is that while the exploration intended to examine a process 
which could occur during the formation of chapters, the chapters used were already formed 
and as cueing revealed, already had established constituent memories.  This means that this 
study is interfering with pre-existing structures, and indications of retrieval-induced 
forgetting may be more likely to be involved in the maintenance of chapter-structures, than 
the initial formation. The temporal stability of life-story chapters has not been examined in 
the existing literature, and the differential role of inhibition in the maintenance, or fluidity of 
chapter evaluations, and chapter content would shine some light on the role of rehearsal on 
short-term and long-term learning process.  For example, if changes to chapter content and 
evaluation as predicated by Brewin (2006) could be brought about by selective rehearsal 
during therapy.  Despite these aspects this study does provide evidence for the role of 
chapters in categorising episodic memories, and the validity of a shared culturally defined 
chapters such as ‘life at high school’ and ‘life at university’ while the content of these 
chapters may be unique and eclectic. 
In summary, Chapter 4 represents two studies which show a differential effect of a 
RIF procedure on dysphoric and non-dysphoric groups.  This RIF effect was seen only within 
the measure of availability of autobiographical memories for non-depressed participatns, and 
there is some indication that the accuracy of memory recall is also impacted by differential 
rehearsal.  The dysphoric group did not appear to be subject to RIF, but the reason behind this 




 Chapter 7   Discussion  Chapter 7
 7.1  The role of life-story and life-story chapters in recall 7.1
Life-story chapters are a neglected, and ill-defined aspect of autobiographical memory 
and narrative, and this thesis has gone some way to define their role in the structure of 
autobiographical narratives, and in the facilitation of access to cognitive representations of 
autobiographical events.  Second to this it highlighted the similarities and differences 
between the life-stories, chapter structures and memory recall and future-imagining for 
depressed and non-depressed groups. 
An overview of study results can be found in Table 7.1.  The aim of Study one was to 
establish a precedence for the use of chapter-level information in memory recall.  In this 
study the use of a participant defined progression from life-story narratives through chapters, 
to chapter-cued events attempted to mimic the theoretical structure of the autobiographical 
self-memory system, and in essence the first study asked whether it is necessary to consider 
the influence of life-story narrative context on episodic recall when using chapter cues, but 
also included an analysis of the life-stories of participants to assess these for depresso-typic 
features.  The results of this study indicated that, contrary to research which shows that verbal 
narratives of dysphoric groups have features such as temporal breakdown, prosodic slowing, 
negative bias, and ruminative self-focus (Section 2.2.1), the MDD group showed no 
indication of this, and on the contrary the narratives of the non-depressed control group were 
more self-focussed.  A tentative explanation for this could have been that the depressed group 
were using a more distanced perspective on recall of past events as indicated by a significant 
difference in the episodic memory recall observer perspective of the MDD group, and that 
this self-focus reflected ruminative characteristics.  For both groups negatively incongruent 
memories were rated with greater clarity, and were spoken about more than positively 
incongruent and congruent memories, but no difference was seen in the clarity, centrality, and 
rehearsal of memories for the MDD and control groups.  Giving little support to the 
prediction of temporal monotony and affective congruence of life-stories either in narrative, 
or in terms of affective incongruence of episodic recall, this study did raise some interesting 
questions around the life-story narratives of people with depression.  However, improvements 
to the experimental protocol were required to increase comparability of life-story narrative 




Table 7.1: Overview of Thesis results  
Study one examined three levels of life-story chapters, comparing 14 participants with 
major depressive disorder (MDD) to 11 never-depressed controls.  Participants 
produced verbal life-story narratives, sub-sectioned these narratives in to life-story 
chapters, and these chapters were used to cue episodic memories.  These episodic 
memories were then categorised as congruent or incongruent (either positively or 
negatively).  Analysis explored the group differences in life-story narratives, chapters, 
and episodic recall, and the impact on recall characteristics of chaper-memory 
incongruence. 
It was hypothesised that  
 Incongruence would impact on memory recall, and memory characteristics of clarity, 
centrality, and difficulty of access. 
 That the MDD group would show a negative bias and reduced accessibility to 
incongruent events compared to controls. 
 The chapters reported by the MDD group would reveal evidence of temporal 
breakdown in terms of sequence of production, number produced and degree of 
overlap. 
 The MDD group would show evidence for a depresso-typic narrative structure and 
content, in terms of self-focus and negative bias in their life-story narratives, for word 
count, and proportions of positive words, negative words, self-referencing words, and 
social words. 
It was found that  
 Overall incongruence had no effect on clarity, centrality and difficult of access, 
however negatively incongruent memories were recalled with greater clarity compared 
to positive, and spoken about more than positively incongruent memories. 
 For the MDD group there was no negative bias for either chapters or episodic 
memories.  
 No evidence was found for reduced accessibility, or a difference in memory features 
for the MDD group compared to controls for incongruent memories. 
 There was also no temporal breakdown in life-story narratives for the MDD group.  
Within the life-story narratives there was no difference between groups in the number 
of words used, and no difference in proportion of positive, or social words used, but 
controls used a greater proportion of negative and self-referencing words compared to 





Study two examined the transcripts of the life-story narratives of 15 dysphoric and 15 non-
dysphoric participants.  Each transcript was coded according to categories of components: 
chapters (lifetime periods, extended events, and mini-narratives), specific memories, 
categorical memories (general events), facts, inferences about personality, life-lessons, 
evaluations (positive), evaluations (negative), reflections, metacommunication and chapters 
for other people.  It also compared the narratives for negative bias, rumination and 
overgeneral memory which would be associated with the dysphoric status. 
It was hypothesised that: 
 Chapters are a primary feature of life-story narratives, and that they are not reciprocal 
to specific memories, which would be reflecting in longer narratives by more specific 
memories, fewer categoric memories, and fewer chapters. 
 The dysphoric group would have different chapter representations as a result of 
reduced coherence of life-story chapters resulting in fewer chapters overall, longer 
chapters, and more overlapping chapters compared to controls. 
 As a result of reduced autobiographical, or life-period, reasoning and past-present 
distancing, the dysphoric group, compared to the control group, would have fewer life-
lessons, self-referencing facts, and reflections within their life-story narratives. 
 The dysphoric group would also have life-stories with depresso-typic features 
reflecting overgenerality, in terms of fewer specific events, more general events, and 
evidence of rumination, indicated by higher levels of negative evaluations, and fewer 
positive evaluations compared to controls 
 There would also be evidence for a depresso-typic narrative structure and content 
differences, in terms of self-focus and negative bias in their life-story narratives, and in 
proportions of positive words; negative words; self-referencing words, and social 
words. 
It was found that: 
 Chapters were a common feature of narratives, and coding of chapters in narrative 
accounts revealed a close convergence with participants when they defined their own 
chapters, 
 There was no evidence was found for a reciprocal role between specific memories and 
chapters, indicating that chapters are not a method of collectively verbalising a number 
of specific events, but are an independent representational structure in 
autobiographical memory 
 No differences were seen between the groups in the chapter-level structuring of the 
life-story narratives 
 There was no evidence was found for reduced reasoning processes 
 There was no evidence for overgenerality, but a relatively higher proportion of 
negative evaluations for the dysphoric group, with no fewer positive evaluations 
 Group differences were seen in proportions of positive words, negative words, but not 





Study three compared the impact of affective incongruence on the recall 
characteristics of episodic memories for 40 dysphoric and 40 non-dysphoric 
participants.  Past and future chapters were generated by participants, used to cue 
episodic events (memories and imagined future events), and these events were rated 
for characteristics of clarity, difficulty of access, positivity, and centrality.  The events 
were then categorised in to congruence categories, and compared across groups 
It was hypothesised that: 
 Incongruence would impact on accessibility, in terms of overall ability to access, 
subjective difficulty of access, clarity, and centrality. 
 The dysphoric group would show a negative bias in terms of recall and future 
imagining of chapters, and events. 
 Dysphoric groups access event-specific knowledge in a way that favours material 
congruent with contextual chapters.  This would be indicated by an overall reduction 
in affective variability of events, (with variability represented by the difference 
between contextual positivity and event positivity); increased difficulty in accessing 
incongruent events or reduction in the clarity of events; and a reduction in the 
centrality of incongruent events.  In addition to this it was predicted that the dysphoric 
group would show a bias towards the access of negatively incongruent, compared to 
positively incongruent events. 
It was found that: 
 Incongruent events were rated as easier to access, had greater clarity, but were not 
more central overall.   
 The dysphoric groups showed a negative bias in chapter and memory and future 
imagined event production. 
 There was no reduction in overall affective variability between events and chapters in 
the dysphoric group, however congruent events were more common for the dysphoric 
group, and more common overall for future chapters.  The dysphoric group also rated 
incongruent events as having less clarity compared to controls 
 On comparison of positive and negative incongruence categories, positively 
incongruent events were easier to access overall, but an interaction between group and 
congruence indicated that for the dysphoric group access to positively incongruent 
events is the same as for negatively incongruent events, while for the controls access to 
negatively incongruent events is reduced.   
 In addition the negatively incongruent events of the dysphoric group were rated as 
having greater clarity, and being more central, than their positively incongruent events, 
while the control group reported the opposite effect for clarity, and no difference 






Study four used a protocol for retrieval induced forgetting in two separate studies, the 
first for 40 non-depressed participants, and the second for 40 dysphoric participants. 
20 episodic memories, 10 positive, 10 negative, were cued for the chapters ‘school’ 
and ‘university’.  Each episodic memory was rated for positivity, recall accessibility, 
coherence, vividness, and emotional intensity.  As well as this details of who, what, 
where, and when, along with the cause, consequence, and personal meaning of the 
event were used to assess accuracy (jist and strict) on recall, and also the allow 
rehearsal to mimic the autobiographical reasoning process. 
Participants selectively rehearsed of five of these 20 events (RP+), and the proportion 
of within chapter (RP-) and out-with chapter (nRP) memories compared, in addition, 
those memories retrieved during a subsequent free recall were compared for changes 
to memory characteristics. 
It was hypothesised that: 
 Recall practice of autobiographical memories from particular life-chapters (school and 
university) will cause inhibition of oppositely-valenced memories from these chapters 
i.e. a RIF effect, in terms of free recall,  
 This effect will also be see in the memory characteristics of recalled memories in 
terms of changes in memory features of RP- memories: in terms of an increase 
reported difficulty in accessing memories; a rehearsal valence linked change in 
positivity (negative rehearsal results in more negative recall vice versa); decreases in 
memory clarity (vividness, coherence, and intensity), and reduced accuracy of memory 
details (who was present during the event; what occurred during the event; where the 
event occurred, and when it was, along with the attributed cause of the event; 
consequence of the event, and its personal significance) 
 
It was found that: 
 For the non-depressed group, rehearsed memories (RP+) were recalled during the free 
recall phase more than non-rehearsed memories, and within chapter memories (RP-) 
were recalled less than non-chapter memories (nRP), indicating RIF.   
 RP+ memories increased in coherence, compared to the non-rehearsed memories.   
 There was also an increase in the recall of nRP and RP- positive memories following 
negative RP+ recall (which appeared to be unrelated to RIF) 
 While there was an overall decrease in the rated vividness of unrehearsed memories 
(RP- and nRP), this appeared to be unrelated to RIF.  
 However within chapter non-rehearsed memories (RP-) were recalled with reduced 
accuracy in terms of the strict detail criteria compared to out-with chapter non-
rehearsed memories 
 For the dysphoric group there was no RIF effect, a facilitation effect of rehearsal was 
seen on proportion of memories recalled, and rated difficulty of recall.  All RP+ 
memories increased in positivity from initial production to the free recall phase, but 





Study two focussed on one aspect of Study one, that being the nature of life-stories 
produced by depressed and non-depressed groups.  It returned to Thomsen’s (2009) proposal 
that life-story narratives are representative of the components of the self-memory system and, 
further to this, the role of chapters within this structure, comparing groups to test the 
prediction that over-generality and dissimilarities in the structure and coherence of depresso-
typic narratives may be the result of chapter level differences.   Using an alternative and more 
in-depth method of component analysis of narratives compared to Study one there were few 
differences between the groups’ transcripts, however the use of the LIWC procedure did find 
evidence of a significant negative bias in the narratives for the dysphoric group.  The two 
significant differences between the narratives found using the component analysis were that 
the dysphoric group made more negative evaluations, and that they also used a greater 
number of metacommunicative statements.  While this provided evidence of depression 
characteristics in negative evaluative speech construction, but no support for the prediction 
that narrative coherence breakdown occurred at a chapter-level for the dysphoric group. 
Study three improved and refined the procedure for the chapter-based cuing method 
from Study one, by limiting the age of participants and recruiting from a pool of 
undergraduate and post-graduate students, to examine the impact of chapter-incongruence, or 
dissonance on the recall of episodic memories and future-imagined events in both dysphoric 
and non-dysphoric groups.  This study asked specifically if the structure of life-story chapters 
impedes access to event-specific information which is incongruent, and that which would be 
useful in therapeutic interventions i.e. positively incongruent material, finding evidence for 
both of these effects in that fewer incongruent events are recalled by dysphoric groups and 
that positively incongruent events are recalled with reduced clarity compared to controls, 
while the control group experienced the opposite effect i.e. had reduced access to negatively 
incongruent events.  Finally, drawing on the results of the first three studies, Study four 
examined the potential role of rehearsal in the formation and perpetuation of life-story 
chapters by retrieval-induced forgetting of within chapter episodic, memories for dysphoric 
and non-dysphoric groups and found a RIF effect for within-chapter autobiographical 
memories for the control group in terms of both spontaneous recall, and in recall accuracy, 





The importance of chapter representations has been shown by their cognitive function 
in terms of their cataloguing effect on episodic events (Brown, et al¸1986; Friedman, 2004; 
Shum, 1998), but also reflected in everyday interactions where recollective experiences rely 
on personal semantics and life-story chapters which are frequently used to contextualise and 
create temporal reference points (Brown, Sheval, & Rips, 1986; Friedman, 2004; Shum, 
1998).  Study two revealed that chapters are the most frequent structural component of life-
story narratives (see also: Mackavey, Malley, & Stewart, 1991; Thomsen, 2009).  This thesis 
provides evidence for their primary role in enabling the organisation, contextualisation and 
communication of autobiographical events (Thomsen 2009; 2015).  In the introduction a 
number of suggestions for why life-story chapters were neglected within the memory 
research were made (Section 1.3), these include difficulties in establishing a clear definition 
for them, and a lack of an established and systematic method of chapter elucidation.  What is 
clear from the results of this thesis is that while chapters may vary in terms of time-span, 
thematic focus, and content, they are ubiquitous, and central to autobiographical information 
storage.   
Chapters are a meaningful aspect of the perception of autobiographical events, 
participants are able to clearly identify their own chapters, and these are well-matched to 
those which are identified by researchers examining the life-story accounts, with an 87% 
convergence being seen in Study two.  Thematic analysis of chapters (Appendix 10) indicates 
that they may align with the cultural life script (Rubin, et al, 2009), although life-script events 
are conceptualised as single (episodic) events, whereas chapters are considered in terms of a 
longer term structure.  An indication of the degree to which chapter themes align to life-script 
events, suggests that chapter formation may be influenced by learnt cultural understandings 
rather than summations of actual experiences.  Adding to Thomsen’s (2016) suggestion that 
they are formed from life-period reasoning processes, with a role of cultural knowledge.  
Future research might explore the life-story chapter script, moving the focus away from 
specific events, and on to anticipated phases of life for a ‘typical’ person within a cultural 
context. 
In Study one it was suggested that chapters are defined with a degree of flexibility, 
with participants appearing to be providing a similar number of chapters independent of 




but it may be that this was due to the limitations of the task in hand rather than a free 
conceptualisation of chapters from their life.  In Study two this was addressed to some degree 
by limiting the age of participants to the 18-25 age group which still resulted in a range of 
lengths and themes of chapters.    
Building on this evidence for autobiographical organisation, the current thesis has 
explored the role of chapters as schema for self-knowledge, and as a result their impact on 
episodic memory recall.  This questioned whether chapters exist as contextual schematic 
information, and as such are influential in the recall of episodic memory.  Schema are a 
concept used to describe cognitive frameworks for understanding experiences, they serve to 
‘fill-in’ absent information about events using knowledge of typicality, once constructed a 
schema will endow rules of expectation and generalisation for schema-linked information 
(Bartlett, 1932), schema have been shown to cause recall and recognition biases (Section 
1.3.5).  If, as proposed, chapters exist as schematic representations and are used to cue a 
memory, this was predicted to influence recall in several ways, for example, the typicality 
and relevance to the chapter of the memory is likely to improve its chances of retrieval, so a 
chapter about school is likely to cue a memory of a classroom-based activity.  If a chapter is 
perceived as an unhappy period in life then retrieval of a negative memory for this time is 
more likely for the same reasons, first that there may be more memories which are congruent 
with this negativity, but secondly, according to dissonance theory, positive event memories 
may be atypical, and therefore create a dissonance with the chapter content, and be 
downgraded.  Finally the atypicality of the event must be taken in to account as this is likely 
to make the event more memorable overall, being unusual and taking more cognitive effort to 
integrate.  This differentiates the role of expectation on encoding, and that of recall 
likelihood.  Dissonance theory proposes that automatic cognitive processes act to bring 
consistency between schema and recalled information (Festinger, 1957).  This difference 
between atypicality enhancing encoding, and atypicality creating dissonance would have 
contrasting effects and would be difficult to control for within the experimental design used 
in this thesis.  Some indication does come from the absence of a difference in the 
retrievability of incongruent events between groups in Studies 1 and 3, but the potential 
impact of rehearsal confounds the effect of incongruence on clarity.  The final study looked at 
the impact of short-term rehearsal of chapter-based memories in creating and maintaining 
congruence within chapters, with the idea that if this occurred in the short-term could it have 




was observed at the level of recall, with oppositely valenced within-chapter memories being 
inhibited by short-term rehearsal, giving a promising indication of how chapter construction 
and the maintenance of affective congruence could occur, as in the longer term, in non-
depressed groups, chapters would form with an overall valence which was either positive or 
negative.  In the dysphoric sample, while experiencing facilitation of episodic recall, results 
showed no within-chapter RIF effect, indicating that either chapter formation and 
maintenance is independent of these effects, or that chapters tend towards a less culturally 
prescribed categorisation i.e. different from the school and university chapters chosen by the 
researcher, which was not indicated by the chapter themes produced between all depressed 
and dysphoric participants during the completion of this thesis. 
It can be postulated that there are broadly two ways in which chapters are created and 
maintained, the first being that they are an emergent feature of experience and subsequent 
unbiased memory recall, and that experiences which occur during the same time-period, or 
are connected thematically for example by being linked to activities or relationships, are 
categorised under the same chapter with autobiographical reasoning processes create links 
between these events, and repeated co-rehearsal results within-chapter horizontal activation.  
This constructive process is supported by evidence of a within chapter reminiscence bump for 
episodic memory recall (Thomsen, et al¸ 2011), although this study only examined highly 
significant event memories, it indicates that chapter formation is punctuated by experiencing 
significant life-events.  The alternative is that life-script and cultural understandings structure 
experience, and that the recall of episodic memories is guided by relevance to the abstracted 
beliefs about the chapter, and that chapters are therefore causative of recall by acting as 
autobiographical ‘files’ of memories.   It may also be the case that chapters and episodic 
memories are created and maintained by a combination of these processes.  On balance this 
thesis provides some support for the emergent role of autobiographical recall, in that overall 
episodic memories matched the valence of their chapter, but more strongly for the causative 
explanation, in that there was significant overlap for participants in Studies one, two, and 
three who defined culturally common chapters of school and university, that incongruence 
raised clarity i.e. events which were affectively atypical to their schematic chapter tended to 
be more available and recalled with greater clarity.  Finally, that future events are subject to 
the same incongruence effects as episodic memories indicates that life-scripts which are 
influential on future life expectations contain a chapter structure which influences future 




schema.  However consideration should be given to dissonance reduction processes which are 
likely to reduce schema incongruence over time, as seen in the study by Koppel and Berntsen 
(2014), so one prediction from these results is that expectation overrides experience over time 
for life-script events, particularly for dysphoric groups who may rely more heavily on 
abstracted information. 
7.1.2 Impact of depression on memory recall 
Studies one, two, and four explored the relationship between the recall of 
autobiographical memories cued by life story chapters from narratives produced by depressed 
and non-depressed groups, and the role of affective incongruence in recall, a concept first 
introduced by Beike and Landoll (2001).  Episodic memories recalled from the chapters-cues 
were examined for clarity, valence, centrality to self, perspective, and ease of access.  In 
Study one the depressed group recalled memories overall with less clarity then controls; 
found recall more difficult, and in addition this group were more likely to recall events from 
an observer perspective supporting both the prediction that this group have an over-general 
bias in autobiographical recall, and the idea that depressed individuals may habitually avoid 
cognitive re-living of events through distancing functions.  While this could be predicted for 
depressed groups (Kuyken & Moulds, 2009), the impact of affective incongruence was only 
revealed in that negatively incongruent events are recalled with greater clarity for both 
groups.  In Study three the relationship, in terms of affective incongruence between life-story 
chapters and their component episodic memories, was further examined.  This experimental 
study tested the impact of life-story chapters on specific event recall and future imagining in 
dysphoric (n= 40) and non-dysphoric (n=40) groups.  Contrary to the findings of Study one, 
but aligning with the LIWC analysis in Study two, both recalled and imagined events, as well 
as the life-story chapters of the dysphoric group were rated as more negative than those of the 
control group supporting the expected pattern of a negative bias in dysphoric groups 
(Boulard, 2015).  When chapter-cued events were classified as either congruent or 
incongruent with the affective rating for the chapter (positive or negative), an absence of 
affective variation was predicted for the dysphoric group compared to controls, and was seen 
in the proportions of incongruent vs. congruent events (Table 5.1), but when examined as a 
potential reduction in the rated difference between rated positivity of chapters and events for 
both past and future-imagined chapters this was not the case, the overall within-chapter 




variability between chapters and events was the same for dysphoric and control groups.  
When examined for accessibility (difficulty of recall), clarity, and centrality to self, it was 
found that whilst the two groups generated incongruent events with the same subjective ease, 
the mean rated clarity of incongruent events was reduced for the dysphoric group.  This was a 
result of reduced clarity of positively incongruent events for the dysphoric group, when 
compared to the negatively incongruent events.  These results suggest that people with 
depression show, in addition to experiencing a negative bias for memories, future events and 
life-story chapters, a propensity to represent incongruent events as more abstract rather than 
concrete cognitions, giving reduced access to positively incongruent ‘exceptions’ to negative 
chapters, while non-depressed controls appear to have reduced access to negatively 
incongruent events.  This may reflect the use of dissonance reduction processes which re-
enforcing the depressive cycle of ‘global’ negative thinking, and potentially impacting on the 
effectiveness of therapeutic interventions.    
Drawing on evidence for the reduced proportions of incongruent events produced by 
the dysphoric group in Study three, the fourth study in the thesis manipulated the rehearsal of 
memories from life-story chapters for high school and university for dysphoric and control 
participants, in an attempt to establish the role of retrieval-induced forgetting in the formation 
of chapters, and the maintenance of intra-chapter affective homogeneity.  For non-depressed 
controls the rehearsal of either positive or negative episodic memories from within a chapter 
resulted in the inhibition of oppositely valenced within-chapter memories, but not oppositely 
valenced memories from other chapters, a retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) effect.  This 
presented a possible mechanism by which autobiographical-, or life chapter-, reasoning could 
create evaluative judgements for chapter content, such as the belief that a chapter was broadly 
positive or negative.  The second RIF study within this chapter explored this effect for 
dysphoric participants, in order to establish if this reasoning effect could explain the 
formation of negative chapters, with the concurrent reduced access to positively incongruent 
material seen in Study three.  However the anticipated RIF effect was not present in the 
dysphoric sample, leading to the conclusion that it is unlikely to be the driving mechanism in 
the creation and maintenance of negative chapters in depressive disorders. 
Study three found that the dysphoric group had reduced access to incongruent events, 
both in terms of the overall number of incongruent events recalled, and the rated clarity of 




explored to test the hypothesis that RIF could be a factor in this difference, and Study 4b 
indicated that RIF did not occur for the dysphoric group.  There are a number of suggestions 
as why these results are compatible, the first being that RIF does not have a long-term impact 
on chapter-event affective congruence, this question could be resolved by taking a more 
nuanced approach to the chapter-memory links for participants.  For example, while in Study 
one it was possible to confirm the affective incongruence of chapters and events, in Study 
four the valence of the RP+ memories was contrived by the rehearsal of positive or negative 
events, and the unrehearsed oppositely valenced events were manipulated to be incongruent.  
7.1.3 Impact of depression on life-story narratives  
An examination of the life-story narrative accounts of the Study one participants, of 
which there are 25 (current or former major depressive disorder, n=14, never depressed 
control n=11) using LIWC software (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010) revealed that depressed 
participants used fewer negative and self-referencing words, which is suggestive of a 
‘distancing’ effect for depressed groups as a result of the demand characteristics of the task.  
However, the narratives formed a heterogenous set of transcripts which varied in terms of 
length, focus, and detail.  Study two carried out the same analysis on the life-stories of 15 
dysphoric and 15 control participants aged between 18-25, and found different results, in that 
the dysphoric group used fewer positive and more negative words within their narratives, and 
were more likely than controls to make negative evaluations.  The inconsistency in terms of 
these life-story accounts made it difficult to draw any strong conclusions about the impact of 
depressive status on structure and content.  The second study refined the approach of Study 
one by repeating the LIWC analysis and examining group differences in the structure of life-
story narratives, specifically for narrative structure in terms of chapters, and other narrative 
features predicted by the self-memory system this is likely to provide stronger evidence for 
the impact of depression on narrative accounts.  The component analysis examined included a 
number of narrative features representative of the autobiographical self-memory system; 
features of autobiographical reasoning, and life-story chapters the latter of which were 
defined by participants and by researchers through narrative analysis.  Overall Study two 
points to a negative bias in dysphoric narratives, but no evidence for a breakdown in 
structural coherence at a chapter level, nor that representations of the self-memory system 
such as episodic memories differ between groups.  What is apparent from these results is that 




methods used to analyse these transcripts.  One of the best evidenced characteristics is that of 
narrative coherence, which in depression is reduced in verbal accounts, in Study two this 
feature was examined in terms of chapter progression and closure, but also in terms of past-
present distancing, reflections, and evaluations. 
7.1.4 What do we mean when we talk about coherence? 
Coherence is a schematic feature of narratives which has been linked to mental health 
and well-being is structural coherence (Reese, et al, 2011).  It is thought that when personal 
episodes are processed in to coherent narratives they become stable, are no longer cognitively 
and emotionally demanding and thus lend stability to the sense of self with concurrent well-
being (Waters and Fivush, 2015).  The nature of narrative coherence has been examined in 
terms of orientation, in that the reader is provided with appropriate contextual information, an 
internal structure that follows a culturally appropriate sequence, an affect index which 
indicates the importance of the events recounted, and integration whereby events are related 
back to a broader sense of selfhood, and life-story (Baerger & McAdams, 1999), this 
approach has been used to assess the links between mental well-being and coherence, and 
also changes in coherence of narratives over the course of therapy.  McAdams later argued 
that coherence has a fundamentally cultural context as it is measured according to causal 
explanations; being reflective of a range of experiences, and finally that it provides a 
discourse reflecting social value (McAdams, 2006b).  But the concept of narrative coherence 
varies amongst theorists and researchers, in some cases meaning the way in which a 
particular story or explanation will consistently track through a narrative for example, 
Habermas (2008) who used a measure of temporal order of events and past-present 
evaluations to measure coherence of life-stories from depressed and non-depressed 
participants, while his Global Coherence coding method (Habermas & Diel, 2005) focussed 
on temporal orientation, causal coherence, and thematic coherence (plausible transitions).  
This is clearly different from Baerger and McAdam’s (1999) definition of coherence leaving 
questions about its role, first, whether narrative coherence is a consistent characteristic of 
depressive status (in which case chapter-level coherence as examined in Study two is not a 
factor); if coherence, as it is measured in a variety of ways, is too abstract a concept to be a 
single phenomenon, for example, does the coherence of client speech on entering therapy, 
which involves interactive explanations of a series of events or experiences, link to the 




to understand why this might be the case it is worth examining not only our interpretation of 
coherence, but also to examine a little closer the nature of life-story chapters. 
7.1.5 Role of chapters in therapeutic interventions 
As with the life-story narratives, there did not appear to be strong evidence for a 
breakdown in chapter structure for Studies one to three, while Studies three and four did 
provide an indication that perhaps for dysphoric groups chapters are structured differently 
(although this is only one possible explanation for the absence of a RIF effect).  Given that 
chapters are potentially a stable structure in the life-stories of people with depression, and are, 
at least to some extent, influential in the access of episodic events from within the chapter we 
can consider if there is a place for them within Brewin’s (2006) cross-therapy model defining 
the influence of autobiographical recall in therapeutic interventions.  Key to this theory is that 
therapy aids the location and rehearsal of positive outcome and events which allow a person 
to maintain a more realistic and varied cognitive representation of autobiographical 
knowledge, and in turn for this to impact positively on expectations of future outcomes.  In 
this thesis these positive outcomes are the positively incongruent events of Studies 1, 3 and 4, 
those episodic events which are more positive than their contextual chapter.  The cognitive 
availability of these events for dysphoric groups was compared to that of non-depressed 
controls in on a number of measures, overall availability, and memory characteristics such as 
clarity and centrality.   
Theoretically the development of a mix of congruent and incongruent events within 
autobiographical memory provides a structure for people to engage in realistic thinking, 
which benefits mental health (Beck, 1979).  Therapeutic targets may be the positively 
incongruent events which allow a favourable evaluation of negative periods in a person’s life, 
and the generation of these within the therapy room, and rehearsal to enhance spontaneous 
access is central to Brewin’s (2006) model of therapeutic change.  Brewin does not suggest 
how these target events should be defined or brought about, but suggests a role for retrieval-
induced forgetting (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994) in the cognitive changes that recall 
imposes.   
While generally the focussed recall or imagining of positive autobiographical events 
has been shown to lead to improvements in mood and well-being (Josephson, Singer & 




frequency, or manner of rehearsal, for example concrete rather than abstract processing 
(Werner-Seidler & Moulds, 2011, 2012) or focal interventions such as the Method of Loci 
approach (Dalgelish, et al, 2013; Werner-Seidler & Dalgleish, 2016), which trigger recall 
events for positive memories in the mental navigation of routes and sequences linked to every 
day activity.  In addition the role of positive event representations improving mood in people 
with depression is complicated by evidence pointing to an absence of the preconscious recall 
of positive events in response to negative mood (Joormann & Siemer, 2004; Joorman, Siemer 
& Gotlib, 2007), and in differences in the processing mode used during positive memory 
recall (Werner-Seidler & Moulds, 2012).  Research in this area has tended to assume 
equivalence between the autobiographical events which span the lifespan, but this thesis 
would suggest that targeted interventions are more appropriate. 
Brewin’s (2006) suggests that changes to the retrievability of memories is the 
foundation of change within talking therapies, and links the idea of focussed recall of positive 
events to a narrative context.  Brewin supposed that repeated rehearsal of negative self-
relevant material would act to facilitate negative self-schema, and that therapeutic 
interventions can raise awareness and therefore retrieval, of alternative, more positive, 
information.  At a standing state, and in alignment with Becks proposal that raised self-
relevance of negative events (Beck, 1987), this thesis proposed that by processes of negative 
bias, negative recall, and inhibition of positive events (Bjork & Bjork, 1992) negative events 
could act to inhibit positive events in a negative cycle.   If this is the case then there would be 
a role for the therapist to create opportunities for focused expansive rehearsal of particular 
life events in order to counter the inhibitory mechanism. The finding that the recall of 
incongruent events is less likely in dysphoric groups, may link with the depressive experience 
of anhedonia (Pelizza & Ferrari, 2009), and absence of perceived affective variability, it may 
also be the result of over-general memory.  But result indicate that impaired access imposes 
some challenges on to the responsiveness of people with depression to talking therapies. 
7.1.6 How effective were the cueing methods used? 
There is a small body of research outlined in the introduction which has used chapters 
(under various pseudonyms) to cue autobiographical recall.  Some procedures use them to 
control for temporal distribution of recalled events (e.g. Borrini, et al, 1989), but this thesis 
has examined them in terms of the impact of chapter characteristics on recall, previously only 




this approach was broadly unproblematic, with dating information allowing check-backs to 
ensure the memory occurred within the given period.  What may have confounded results 
was the manner in which categorisation was carried out in Study four. 
A second feature to the cueing methods within this thesis is the absence of time limits 
to the retrieval of memories (as recommended by Borrini, et al, 1989), in favour of a 
subjective difficulty judgement.  Several issues arise from the use of this approach, the first is 
the ambiguity in the statement ‘I found it difficult to think of/recall an event’ (Studies one 
and three) and ‘comes to mind easily/with difficulty’ Study four, which both could be 
interpreted as being a difficulty in the experience of recall, for example it is ‘a highly 
negative event that I don’t like thinking about’, rather than locating an event from the range 
available from within the chapter.  In Studies one and three there was also a concern that 
recall would result in within-chapter priming of events and that cued recall of a positive event 
would create a mood-congruent increase in the availability of associated events through 
horizontal priming.  The tasks which required recall of sequential first to mind, positive, and 
negative memories could have resulted in a short-term positive impact on the recall of 
memories congruent with the mood of the first event memory. This was controlled for, to 
some extent with the counter balancing of the request for positive or negative events, 
however given that people with depression are more likely to spontaneously recall negative 
over positive events a negative priming effect could have occurred. 
The potentially therapeutically important representations of interest in this thesis were 
the positively incongruent events associated with negative life chapters.  Lemogne and 
colleagues (2005) found a similar recall deficits in depressed groups to our studies, and their 
examination of the autonoetic experience of recall illustrates that for depressed groups there 
was impaired access to positive memories revealed not by speed of access, but in the detail of 
representation.  Study three in this thesis indicates that it is not simply the positivity of an 
event which impacts on this as overall clarity of recalled and imagined events did not differ 
between dysphoric and control groups, however the role of positive or negative incongruence 
had a differential impact depending on depressive status.  Despite their recall advantage 
incongruent events had reduced clarity for the dysphoric group, and further to this, clarity of 
negatively incongruent events was higher for dysphoric compared to controls, and clarity of 




But how do these results translate – what does a 1.26 point reduction in clarity 
actually mean?  Which leads this discussion to the uncomfortable problem of the use, through 
Studies one and three, of an untested summation scale to rate memory perceptions, and in 
Study four more simple, but also constructed scales to quantify degree of change in rated 
memory characteristics.   
7.1.7 Use of memory feature rating-scales for this thesis 
The rationale for the use of minimised scales was brevity, and that they formed part of 
an experimental design which was looking to pinpoint the impact of incongruent memory 
recall on accessibility.  It did so by drawing on two established memory questionnaires, the 
Memeory Experiences Questionnaire (MEQ: Sutin & Robins, 2007), and the Centrality of 
Event Scale (CES: Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). 
The memory experiences questionnaire (Sutin & Robins, 2007) is an instrument 
designed to assess phenomenological experiences of autobiographical memories.  It contains 
63 items within ten dimensions which have been identified as ways in which memories vary:  
These are vividness, coherence, accessibility, time perspective, sensory details visual 
perspective, emotional intensity, sharing, distancing, and valence which are rated on a 5 
point scale.  The time taken to complete the scales used in this thesis was around 30-60 
seconds, in studies using the MEQ scale times given for completion for each memory are 
around 10 minutes (e.g. Montebarocci, Luchetti & Sutin, 2014).  In the light of difficulties in 
using the MEQ for studies which require the sampling of a large number of memories, a 31-
question short form for the MEQ has been developed (Luchetti & Sutin, 2015) with good 
internal consistency (median alpha=0.79).  Unfortunately this occurred only following the 
studies carried out in this thesis.  A number of studies have used shortened or modified 
version of the MEQ, for example, Grysmand, Prabhakar, Anglin & Hudson (2013) who 
shortened the form to 33 items by author consensus, and  Østby, Walhovd, Tamnes, 
Grydeland and Westlye (2012) who despite not describing their decisional process, appear to 
have drawn on aspects of vividness and autonoetic consciousness to assess functional 
connectivity during recall and imagining.  Other studies have simplified the scales further, for 
example Werner-Seidler and  Moulds (2012b) who chose single items from the MEQ 
subscales and adjusted the scale to six-points to align with a further memory instrument used 
in the experimental procedure.  Thus the amendment of the MEQ scale is not unprecedented, 




incongruent with their chapters the shortened scales were functionally effective for the 
dimensions of interest (Study one: clarity (vividness, coherence, time perspective); difficulty 
of recall; valence; rehearsal, and visual perspective, in Study three the rating of visual 
perspective as not used as there was no indication from Study one or the research literature 
that visual perspective would be impacted by incongruence and it functioned to reduce the 
time taken to complete the procedure. 
Centrality of events was also rated in Studies one and , this measure was drawn from 
the Centrality of Event Scale (CES-20 and CES-7, Berntsen & Rubin, 2006) a seven item 
questionnaire that allows the rating of memory importance.  This scale was reduced down to 
five items in the current thesis, once again raising questions around the validity of the results, 
although in this thesis centrality of events did not appear to be impacted by depressive status, 
or affective incongruence of events.  Because the CES-7 has only seven items, it has not, to 
the author’s knowledge, been used in a shortened form in previous studies.  The scale was 
partially developed from research on the nature of traumatic events, and research in to PTSD.  
In 2003 Berntsen, Willet, and Rubin used what became items 2 and 3 on the scale to quantify 
the experience of intrusive memories for people with PTSD.    Three items were used to 
examine the centrality of an event to a person identity in Berntsen and Thomsen’s 2005 
study, and these relate to items 2, 3 and 6 on the scale.   Five items (1, 2, 3, 6, and 10) were 
used by Rubin and Berntsen (2004) to correlate these with both PTSD symptoms and 
depression.  On developing the scale 23 items were originally used to address the importance 
of the event as a reference for understanding events and creating expectations; that the event 
was central to the development of the persons’ identity; and whether the event was 
considered a turning point.  A further issue with the centrality scale is that it was essentially 
developed to explore stressful and traumatic events, whereas the current studies used the 
measure to evaluate general importance to the person.   Thus the current author drew on the 
implicit meaning of the CES-20 to derive five questions which reflected the importance of the 
event in the context of their life-story, identity, and connectedness to current and former life.  
The first three relate to the key themes identified by the authors of the CES-20, and the latter 




 7.2  Autobiographical memory system 7.2
Two models of autobiographical memory system were introduced within this thesis, 
the Self-memory System (SMS: Conway, et al, 2000), and the Basic Systems Model (BSM: 
Rubin, 2006) and while it is acknowledged that the former model is used more commonly to 
conceptuatlise autobiographcail memory, an examination of some of the results can enhance 
our understanding of each of these.  The first assumption of the SMS which contrasts it to the 
BSM is that once encoded there is a level of representation in memory which may be subject 
to the current recall goal of the individual, but not the context of the events within the 
memory system.  So, for example an affectively contrasting event would be encoded in 
greater detail, and be more memorable because of its impact at the time.  While we cannot 
examine the lives of particiants for the varicty of their reporting, it seems reasonable to 
assume equivalence in terms of variability of experience between them.  Thus an equivalence 
would be seen across memory systems for both chapters and events. 
The BSM diverges from the SMS in that the external representation of 
autobiographical events, in narrative form, influences the reconstructive process on memory 
recall, creating longer-term changes in the representations produced and the potential for 
large scale discrepancies between what occurred, and what is recalled.  The finer detail of 
events ultimately being guided by narrative, rather than narrative being guided by the detail 
of events.  Within the studies of this thesis it is not easy to differentiate the role of narrative, 
which would lend support to the SMS, there were few indications of narrative breakdown, or 
reduction in coherence for the depressed and dysphirc groups of Studies one and two, and os 
no differntial recall would be evident as a result. The results of Study three, which do indicate 
an effect of chapter context, might be explained differently by the two models.  The SMS 
would predict that the tendancy for congruence within the dysphoric sample could be caused 
by over-generality of recall over the longer term, or that the cognitive effort of differential 
recall results in the greater monotony for this group, indeed the control group did report 
finding the recall of events easier overall.  The same results would be seen but explained by 
the BSM as being the result of narrative monotony, and given the results of Study one and 
two, may be less likely. 
A key finding for this thesis has been the ubiquity, and ease of access and definition 




common than episodic events (Burt et al, 2003; Thomsen, 2009), and our conceptualisation 
of them should be developed.  A potential outcome of this thesis is that it may influence the 
ways in which talking therapies are conceptualised as having a unitary mechanism of change, 
but also that it could aid the theoretical development of the autobiographical life-story 
chapters. 
There are two important questions which should be asked about the nature of chapters 
in terms of the autobiographical memory system, the first is whether chapters are the same as 
life-time periods of the SMS.  Used to tag and categorise, (e.g. Conway & Bekerian, 1987), 
and for inference of event occurrence (Arbruthnott & Brown, 2009), chapters are clearly not 
neutral representations and may themselves be adjusted according to self-concept and current 
goal by the conceptual-self and working-self suggested by Conway (2005).  Unlike life-time 
periods however, and although it is common for chapters to be temporally represented, this is 
not always the case (Burt, Kemp, & Conway, 2003; Burt, 2008), and they are then perhaps 
more like the sematicized categorisation structures predicted by the BSM.  Narrative aspects 
of chapters appear also to indicate that BSM is more likely to reflect the autobiographical 
memory system as it allows for affective links to take primacy over temporal links.  It also 
allows for future imagining to directly reflect the memory representations using the same 
neural substrates.   
Should we consider an amendment to the way we conceptualise the autobiographical 
memory system?  The concept of life-time periods could be changed to represent a more 
variable structure in terms of time, content and importance.  Consideration could also be 
given to the nature of specific autobiographical memories over time, in the SMS episodic 
memories are thought to be held within a separate storage system, and once cued 
reconstructed relatively reliably with the same constituent features such as visio-sensory 
information, and affect.  This would suggest a relatively stable link between the category 
(chapter) and target (episodic memory).  Contrastingly, within the BSM episodic memories 
exist as consistent patterns of activation within existing, independent, cognitive systems and 
as such differ from chapters only in the degree to which they are sensorially rich, and 
semantically linked to shorter time periods, this is suggestive of a somewhat looser category-
target relationship, and a more fluid system of recall which may adjust to cultural 
expectations in the longer term.  Either way the challenges of studying the clustering and 




development of the concept of life-story chapters, to help progress our understanding of how 





 7.3  Final conclusions 7.3
 
This thesis has highlighted the need for an examination of the autobiographical 
memory system and the assumptions which are being made as to the relationship between 
memory as represented in narrative, and memories as reconstructed as guided by narratives.  
Basing hypotheses within the literature which posits depressive narratives as being 
disordered, or lacking coherence led to predictions around the nature of internal 
autobiographical memory structures, however, both Study one and Study two indicated that 
in terms of the chapter and episodic memory representations of dysphoric and non-depressed 
groups there were broad similarities.  In terms of the finer-grained links between chapter-
linked it became clear, form the results of Studies Three and Four, that it may be the 
relationship between the perceived vlacen of the life-story chapter, and the differential 
rehearsal of the content memories of that chapter which feed back in to patterns of rehearsal 
and recall.  Ultimately these dynamics could lead to a self-perpetuating cycle in people with 
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Age at start of chapter…………………………………….. 
 
















Please rate this chapter for overall: 
 
1. In terms of how I felt at the time, this chapter is…. 
 
very negative 1…………….2………..3………..4…………..5………… 6 very positive 
 
2. In terms of how I feel now, this chapter is…. 
 
very negative 1…………….2………..3………..4…………..5………… 6 very positive 
 
3. Life now is…. 
 
just the same 1………..2………..3………….4……..…..5…………6 completely different 
 
 
4. I feel I am….. 
 










What is the first specific memory that comes to mind when you think of this chapter in 
your life? 




Age of memory…………………………………………………………………. 








and rate it on the following: 
Subjective clarity 
This memory is very vivid 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
This memory feels coherent and complete 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
Thinking about this memory is like travelling back in time 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
I experience this memory as if I am looking through my own eyes (as opposed to 
watching myself) 





Importance to identity 
This memory is of an event which was a turning point in my life 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
This memory is of an event which is central to my sense of who I am 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
I automatically see connections between the events in this memory and my present life 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
This memory is of an event which was very important to what I was doing in my life at 
the time 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
This memory is of an event which is very important to what I am doing in my life now 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
 
Rehearsal and integration 
I have spoken about this memory to other people 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
I have thought about this memory a lot 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
I found it difficult to retrieve a memory for this part of the task 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
I feel positive when I think of this memory 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
Specificity 
This memory is of an event that lasted no more than one day……….Yes…..No 
This event happened only once……………………………………….Yes…..No 
I can recall at least two specific details about the event which differentiate it from other 





Now I would like you to recall an event from this chapter which you could define as 
negative. 




Age of memory…………………………………………………………………. 
 





and rate it on the following: 
 
Subjective clarity 
This memory is very vivid 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
This memory feels coherent and complete 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
Thinking about this memory is like travelling back in time 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
I experience this memory as if I am looking through my own eyes (as opposed to 
watching myself) 






Importance to identity 
This memory is of an event which was a turning point in my life 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
This memory is of an event which is central to my sense of who I am 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
I automatically see connections between the events in this memory and my present life 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
This memory is of an event which was very important to what I was doing in my life at 
the time 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
This memory is of an event which is very important to what I am doing in my life now 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
 
Rehearsal and integration 
I have spoken about this memory to other people 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
I have thought about this memory a lot 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
I found it difficult to retrieve a memory for this part of the task 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
I feel positive when I think of this memory 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
 
Specificity 
This memory is of an event that lasted no more than one day……….Yes…..No 
This event happened only once……………………………………….Yes…..No 





Now I would like you to recall an event from this chapter which you could define as 
positive. 
 




Age of memory…………………………………………………………………. 
 







and rate it on the following: 
Subjective clarity 
This memory is very vivid 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
This memory feels coherent and complete 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
Thinking about this memory is like travelling back in time 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
I experience this memory as if I am looking through my own eyes (as opposed to 
watching myself) 





Importance to identity 
This memory is of an event which was a turning point in my life 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
This memory is of an event which is central to my sense of who I am 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
I automatically see connections between the events in this memory and my present life 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
This memory is of an event which was very important to what I was doing in my life at 
the time 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
This memory is of an event which is very important to what I am doing in my life now 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
 
Rehearsal and integration 
I have spoken about this memory to other people 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
I have thought about this memory a lot 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
I found it difficult to retrieve a memory for this part of the task 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
I feel positive when I think of this memory 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
 
Specificity 
This memory is of an event that lasted no more than one day……….Yes…..No 
This event happened only once……………………………………….Yes…..No 





Appendix 7: Study 3 chapter and event report and scales 
 
Title of chapter……………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Age at start of chapter…………………………………….. 
 
Age at end of chapter………………………..…………….. 
 
 
Please rate this chapter for overall: 
 
In terms of how I felt at the time, this chapter is…. 
 






In the next part of the study you are going to be asked to retrieve some specific events 
relating to the chapters of your life story you have entered on the front of these response 
booklets.  We would like you to try and retrieve specific memories and have included 
some instruction to help you do this. 
Instructions for reporting an event: 
The event must occur within the chapter specified, and be something which lasted  less than 
one day and contain some details that make it unique (e.g. when you received/receive a letter 
of acceptance for a job). 
 
It must be something that is directly related to yourself i.e. something you remember or will 
experience. 
 
It doesn’t have to be a particularly important event, just what comes to mind. 
 
 
Please make sure that you do not make yourself upset while trying to think of an event. If you 
find any thoughts or events distressing, you don’t have to report it and you can use the 
opportunity at the end of the session to seek further advice, if you wish.   
 
 
Three events will be recorded for each of two past and two future chapters.   
 
a) First specific event which comes to mind 
b) A negative event (‘Now I would like you to recall an event from this chapter which 
you could define as negative’.) 
c) A positive event (‘Now I would like you to recall an event from this chapter which 
you could define as positive’.) 
 
Instructions: (*two versions will be presented ‘memory’ and ‘was’ is for past 
chapters, ‘future event’ and ‘will be’ is for future chapters; **one of each of the 





What is the first specific *memory/future event that comes to mind when you think of this 
chapter in your life?** 




Age of memory…………………………………………………………………. 









This (memory/imagined event) is very vivid 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
This (memory/imagined event) feels coherent and complete 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
Thinking about this (memory/imagined event) is like travelling (back/forward) in time 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
I experience this (memory/imagined event) as if I am looking through my own eyes (as 
opposed to watching myself) 







Importance to identity 
 
This (memory is/event will be) of an event which was a turning point in my life 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
This (memory is/event will be) central to my sense of who I am 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
I automatically see connections between the events in this (memory/imagined event) and 
my present life 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
This (memory/imagined event) is of an event which was very important to what I was 
doing in my life at the time 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
This (memory/imagined event) is very important to what I am doing in my life now 
Not at all    1………..2………..3……….4……….5……….6    Very much so 
 
Specificity 
This is an event that lasts no more than one day…………….….Yes…..No 
This specific event *happened/will happen only once………….Yes…..No 












Appendix 8: Examples of life-story transcripts 
 
Life-story non-depressed participant study 2 
Okay I was born on the west coast of Scotland eighteen years ago um and I was 
grown up there in H** with my family I’ve got I live at home I live with my mum and my 
dad and my older brother he’s two and a half years older than me um I went to my local 
primary school it was just around the corner um with my brother also went there as well and I 
had two really good friend Alison and Caroline I went to nursery with them as well which 
was just round the corner, um I really enjoyed primary school and it was I was always quite I 
was quite bossy quite loud in primary school um and I got to primary seven and I was a bit of 
a favourite to be honest um I was always in school plays I was the lead in the wizard of oz 
and I was so gutted leaving primary school it was just horrible I went to high school um 
which was twenty minutes away I took a train to and there was only four or five people out of 
my primary school who went to that school um it was it was such a shock because I’d went 
from being kind of a top gun to being a little fish in a big pond basically um it was first year 
was horrible I didn’t really like it at all but eventually I started getting in to the routine of 
things like as you do it was so overwhelming at first a bit like uni, um , I kind of, I was just a 
bit rebellious in my first couple of years in high school I just did what I wanted never really 
entertained anyone else but I always studies I it was just I just enjoyed it and no-one really 
noticed I was good at studying because I was so rebellious and it came to third and fourth 
year and like there was always the people in your year that you would you like the ones who 
were going to be doctors and that and Oxbridge candidates and no-one really expected that 
from me so when I got my ones in my standard grades people were quite shocked they all 
kind of thought that it was maybe kind of a fluke okay they were standard grades and um then 
I went in to fifth year and basically um had a really good group of friends in fourth year and 




friends and they all had different personalities it was crazy, there was always drama in our 
group, my best friend was D* and she’d moved in 5
th
 year to go to the private school so that 
she could do three sciences because our school didn’t offer it um and she wanted three 
advanced highers as well  she’s away to do vet medicine I found that really hard because it 
was always a group we had a group of friends but it was always separate split off it was me 
and D* so it was quite hard when she left I’d also spent basically from first year all the way 
up to fourth fifth year um on and off going out with this guy who basically I decided to go out 
with him because um my brother told me not to so I just kind of enjoyed being disobedient 
but I’ve learnt a lot from that because he’s just a horrible person but I just, I look back now 
and see where his life’s gone and where mines gone I feel, I know that’s bad to say but I fell a 
lot better, um I when I went in to fifth year I basically cut myself off from everyone and just 
stayed at home all the time or went to the library and just studied my my parents were the 
only ones who noticed how hard I was working um but I was always someone, like I was 
always someone who thinks I do rubbish, so if I’d done well I never think I have, I came out 
of my prelims and I hadn’t done very well in them, and I was a wee bit I was a bit 
disappointed but I kind of thought that was that was my standard kind of thing and I went in 
to my highers I was terrified like I’m such a nervous person and I went in to my highers and 
um I told my parents that I had just done terribly told everyone I’d done terribly um then I 
decided over the summer I would just get a job because I knew I would sit the whole summer 
and think about my exams so I got my first job and I worked in the spar, and at first I really 
enjoyed it because I’d never, I’d never had like a pay check before or anything I really 
enjoyed that but eventually it just got so tiring, five o’clock in the morning starts and 
everything so I just looked forward to holidays and nights out and stuff and then it came to 
the end of the summer and I got my exam results, me and my mum picked them up from the 




I just couldn’t believe that I’d managed to get five ‘a’s and  I just opened them and it was just 
like these aren’t right, instead of just being okay well done I did study hard I was like no wait 
a minute there must be a mistake here so I told my mum she nearly crashed the car um and 
then everyone like the people with five ‘a’s were in the newspaper and things and everyone 
said to me congratulations but I never expected it like no-one expected it and I kind of kind of 
quite liked that more than have that expected of me I quite liked being the dark horse in these 
situations, so in my sixth year I did my spent most of the year just um I did history which I’d 
wanted to do since um I’d had to choose my highers I’d wanted to do history but I couldn’t 
because I was dedicated to languages um and I did history because it was my favourite 
teacher and it was his final year aswell he was retiring so it was really good spending both 
our final years in the same class, my sixth year was a bit horrible when it came to the social 
side of things, everyone says sixth year is great because you’re you end up making friends 
with people you would never have expected to but I didn’t enjoy sixth year for the social side 
within school because our year group never worked out like everyone else’s year group  did, I 
just had, there was a couple of girls that I was friends with but they were they put me in really 
awkward positions because in sixth year I put myself forward, I was head girl I put myself 
forward for all these things in school and leadership programmes and things like that um and 
basically these two girls that I was friends with kinda like they were bullies so they always 
put me in positions where I was supposed to tell them to stop but I couldn’t because they’re 
my friend so it was quite uncomfortable and I was desperate to leave I’d applied to St 
Andrews and I couldn’t wait to go um eventually I got to the point where I just couldn’t get 
any information I’d e-mail someone and they’d get back and say oh sorry yeh yeh you’re in 
basically and I was like okay but I planned I’ve been planning to go here since I found out 
about my highers basically and I was so excited to go and I came and I just um it was hard 




thought I don’t know how this is going to work and we just thought we’d try it and we’re still 
going out and it’s great because I don’t really have to see him every single day so um and 
then I um I enjoyed eh like the first initial part of coming to university meeting people 
moving in to my own little kind of flat like I liked all that just grasping my independence um 
obviously freshers’ week was good because um exhausting but I find I find it quite difficult 
here because I find trying to balance my studies with living with people who always want to 
party really hard um I have studied quite a lot but not as much as I would have in school 
which bothers me because you need to study more here um I feel quite overwhelmed here 
like I’d quite like to honestly I’ve been looking in to trying to home and applying to, I phoned 
up Glasgow uni to try and get there but basically there they’ve their cut-off date has like 
passed um so my issue is I either go home and stay with my family and not go to uni or I stay 
here and might not find accommodation so it’s ah I just feel very confused at the moment but 
um I’m, not one of these people that doesn’t see like the end of the tunnel I really io know my 
life will go somewhere it’s just in the moment I get very overwhelmed so um, I don’t know 
what else to say, obviously I’m very family oriented because I want to go home to them and I 
quite like, um in St Andrews I’ve found aswell I’m one of these people I need to plan so I’ll 
study for two weeks and then we’ve planned a big night out and in St Andrews people come 
to your window and say let’s go out and that I under I’m just like not spontaneous so it’s it’s 
good for some people but I find that really hard because I’ve had a plan to study and then I 
I’d say to them no I’m studying tonight and they we’re going away in a couple of weeks we 
won’t be able to go out again it’s quite difficult I like to plan for a big event rather than going 
out randomly kind of thing um and I’ve found recently that I’m going to be forced to go out 
like last night I was just point blank not going anywhere um and K* was like this, you need to 




person who has been forced to socialise so um I feel like I’ve just changed quite a lot here 
already  
 
Life-story depressed participant study 1 
Starting from the beginning um well I was born in Namibia in above South Africa to 
a South African guy and an American woman I have a younger brother who if four years 
younger than me, um happy childhood, when I was four we moved to a farm which is where 
we still live um and we’ve got animals on the farm and as a kid it was really a great place to 
grow up lots of lots of space and lots of outdoors to play in I’ve always had lots of pets lots of 
cats lots of dogs um very close knit family uh very happy family life my parents are both 
lawyers they’re both somewhat volatile people so I guess when I was younger I used to worry 
sometimes maybe after one of their fights they’d break up uh but now that I’m older I realise 
that they never would because they love each other and they are together for life um I started 
school when I was 2 ½ um at a Montessori kindergarten which is in German I then went to 
primary school for the early early part of school I was happy for the later part of primary 
school which ends in grade 7 which is about age 12 or 13 the later years I wasn’t particularly 
happy um partly because I didn’t feel very popular um it was quite a small pond um and I 
was the smartest kid in the grad then so and I was very very shy really shy as a kid and my 
mum used to make me phone phone the movie theatre to ask what time the movie was um 
kind of force interaction with people on the phone which it worked um eventually I stopped 
being quite so shy but I think a combination of being smart and shy didn’t do me any favours 
and um I had a group of close friends but primary school kids can be pretty mean became I 
guess a bit self-conscious about the way I look because of being teased I guess you are also of 
an age when everything anyone says is takes on a much greater importance than it should and 




group of people um I gradually made more friends started dating guys who were older than 
me um so that was also wasn’t a strategy but I did get invited to parties and things like that 
because of because of it um and I guess I started feeling more confident about myself 
generally in high school, I did scouts which a lot of my group I have a lot of friends that our 
parents were friends so we’ve kind of known each other from a young age even though we 
weren’t always friends they were just part of our group of acquaintances so a lot of them 
were at scouts which was boys and girls um and I really enjoyed that in when I was 15 I fell 
off a barrel at scouts on to my head and I had a mild concussion followed by post-concussion 
syndrome for six months so that was a difficult period um and then about between a year and 
two years later the depression started um so I guess for most of my teenage years being ill has 
been somewhat of a defining feature um I hadn’t had major problems before that I’d seen I’d 
gone to a counsellor a couple of times some when I was very young because of um sleep 
walking headaches um I’ve seen someone a little bit to do with a bad body image in my 
earlier teens but I think that’s common to a lot of girls um so but then from the sort of age I 
guess it was 17 uh the depression was really bad um I had I had to um stop going to school 
eventually so I didn’t finish 12
th
 grade first, I stayed in a I checked myself in to a clinic for a 
couple of months to help give me some time and um take a break from life generally I think 
um and from then on it was treatments um we tried pretty much everything eventually when 
all the different pills didn’t work for me I had some bad allergic reactions then um I went to 
America and I had trans-cranial magnetic stimulation and when that on it’s own wasn’t 
enough I had that with ECT so I had 21 bouts of ECT which initially helped got me out of the 
deepest depths um but I wasn’t well even then, so then the year after that which would have 
been I think 2009 I had a vagus nerve stimulator so things have been better since then um 
then I got in to St Andrews uh I guess almost two years ago I’m in second year now and that 




been a real struggle to finish school so I really wasn’t sure if if I’d be you know I’d have the 
right um grades and everything but so it was really great to get to St Andrews and um got a 
long-term boyfriend here made new friends um it’s been a really good experience and kind of 
throughout everything it’s always my family has always been really supportive and amazing 
my mum took off lots of time from work to go to America with me and stay with me so 




Appendix 9: Chapter themes and examples 
 
Table A.0.1: Examples of participant defined chapters 
Theme Sub-theme Example (length) Example memory 
Education University UG years First year (8 months) Freshers’ fair 
 School Being Dux (18 months) Challenging head 
 Transitions Coming to the UK (5 weeks) Finding halls 
 PG study or careers PhD (6 years) On-line supervision 
disaster 
 Other Changing trains (2 months) Seeing tutor 
Jobs Temporary roles Library work Ice-cream day 
 Professional roles Nursing Ward 
Home Houses/homes Living in the lane (5 years) Brothers foot 
 Locations Life in Alaska (2 years) Grandma's kitchen drama 
 Transitions Mum’s house dad’s house (7 
years) 
Motorway services 
Holidays/trips Locations Spain (2 weeks) Falling out with Linda 
 Holidays Walking tour (5 weeks) Blisters 
 Living 'away' African adventure (3 months) Children singing goodbye 
Relationships Parenthood Abbie (8 years) Telephone call 
 Marriage Robert and me (3 years) Letter home 
 Friendships 
Partners 
Three musketeers (6 years) 
Corrie and me 
Bethany's mum 
love at first sight 
Activities Sports Climbing (18 months) Ben Nevis 
 Theatre Drama club (3 years) Cat in the Hat 
 Religion Sunday school (4 years) Lost the tape 
 Music Playing the flute (10 years) Recital in Glasgow 
Psychological Therapy Dealing with the abuse (5 years) Writing the letter 
 Periods of MH 
problems 
Things turn to shit (2 years) Wife leaving 
 Emotionally described ‘Happy' (3 months) Beach hammock 
None of the 
above 
n/a Court case (30 months) meeting the priest 
 





Appendix 10: Life-story chapters and the cultural life-script 
 
In order to begin a tentative exploration of the nature of chapters, and their link to a 
cultural life-script.  A preliminary analysis of chapters in relation to US undergraduate 
student life script events (as defined by Rubin, et al, 2009) as carried out.  The current sample 
from studies one, two, and three contain varied numbers of life-story chapters and these were 
categorised as being representative or associated with life-script events, or non-
representative.  In addition study 3 incorporated future chapters which were predicted to be 
more likely to follow a scripted pattern.  It should be noted that the participants in studies 
one, two, and three were a mix of native English speaking nationalities (primarily UK/USA). 
Life-script events from the study by Rubin and Colleagues (2009) are listed below in 
column A, they were generated by asking 100 US undergraduate student to define seven key 
events which would occur during their life story (past and present).  The list includes the 
twenty-five most frequent events.  The number of times a chapter appeared to be associated 






Table A.0.2: Chapter themes mapped to life-script events 
 Study 1 
N=25  
Ages ranged from 





Study 3  
N=80 
Ages 18-25 





Marriage 4 0 0 64 
Having children 2 0 0 52 
College 25 30 79 6 
Begin school 7 2 16 0 
High school 25 30 80 0 
First job 6 4 19 61 
Begin talking 0 0 0 0 
Begin walking 0 0 0 0 
Own death 0 0 0 12 
Go to school 19 9 80 0 
Parents’ death 0 1 4 28 
Others’ death 1 1 5 43 
Retirement 0 0 0 64 
Own birth 0 0 0 0 
Fall in love 4 2 18 58 
Begin driving 0 0 1 1 
Grandchildren 0 0 0 5 
Settle on career 1 2 3 35 
Puberty 0 1 2 0 
First sex 0 0 0 0 
Leave home 12 18 26 3 
Begin daycare 0 0 0 0 
Empty nest 0 0 0 12 
First kiss 0 0 0 0 
Other 
n/a    
 
This table shows the number of participant-defined chapters for each study which were judged to relate to life-














NART answer sheet 
I want you to read slowly down this list of words, starting here <indicate>.  
After each word please wait until I say “next” before reading the next word.  I must 
warn you that there are many words that you probably won’t recognise, in fact most 
people don’t know them, so just have a guess at these, ok?  Go ahead. 
  
Make sure read slowly, one at a time.  Encourage to attempt every word; 
guess when necessary. 
Reinforce all responses; “next”.  Can change a response if they wish, but must decide 
on their final choice.  If participant displays anxiety, reassure that I didn’t know all of them 






Word   R W     R W     R W     R W     R W 
Chord       Courteo
us 
      Hiatus       Facade       Gauche Go/ shh     
Ache       Rarefy Rare
/ a/ 
fii 
    Subtle       Zealot Zell/ ot     Topiary Top 
/ee/ a/ 
ry 
    
Depot       Equivoc
al 
      Procreate       Drachm Dram     Leviatha
n 
      
Aisle       Naive       Jist       Aeon       Beatify Be/ at/ i 
/ fii 
    
Bouqu
et 
      Catacom
b 
      Gouge Gowj     Placebo       Prelate Pre’/ lt     
Psalm       Gaoled Jail/ 
ed 










    Sidereal Side/ 
ear/ rial 




    Thyme       Simile       Detente De/ 
tant 
    Demesne D/ 
main 
    
Deny       Heir       Banal Ben/ arl     Idyll Id/ ill     Syncope Sync/ a 
/ pea 
    
Nause
a 
      Radix Ray/ 
diks 
    Quadrupe
d 
      Puerperal Poo/ 
er/ p/ 
rul 




    
Debt       Assignat
e 
      Cellist       Aver A/ verr     Campani
le 
Kamp/a
n / ee 
/lii 































Appendix 14: BDI-II Extract (removed for electronic copy) 
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